Miranda Fricker: Publications

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Areas of Specialization

Value Theory

Metaphysics and Epistemology

Areas of Interest

Value Theory

Metaphysics and Epistemology

216

Introduction to Special Issue on Applied Epistemology
with David Coady

Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2): 153-156. 2016.

Social Ethics
123

Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice
with Cristina Bernabéu

Las Torres de Lucca: Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política 10 (19): 97-104. 2021.

Este texto es la traducción del capítulo cuarto de The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice (2017), editado por Ian James Kidd, José Medina y Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. En él, Miranda Fricker aclara y delimita los conceptos de injusticia hermenéutica y testimonial, proporcionando ejemplos, narrando su genealogía, respondiendo a algunas de las críticas que recibieron estos conceptos, así como estableciendo relaciones de semejanza y contraste con otras concepciones de la justicia y otras ramas de la …Read more
Este texto es la traducción del capítulo cuarto de The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice (2017), editado por Ian James Kidd, José Medina y Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. En él, Miranda Fricker aclara y delimita los conceptos de injusticia hermenéutica y testimonial, proporcionando ejemplos, narrando su genealogía, respondiendo a algunas de las críticas que recibieron estos conceptos, así como estableciendo relaciones de semejanza y contraste con otras concepciones de la justicia y otras ramas de la filosofía.

Epistemic Injustice, Misc
72

Editorial
with Helen Beebee

Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1): 1-1. 2018.
186

Diagnosing Institutionalized ‘Distrustworthiness’
Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3): 722-742. 2023.

I consider Katherine Hawley's commitment account of interpersonal trustworthiness alongside her sceptical challenge regarding the value of philosophically modelling institutional trustworthiness as distinct from reliability. I argue, pace Hawley's challenge, that there would be significant diagnostic and explanatory loss if we were to content ourselves with ideas of institutional (un)reliability alone; and I offer an illustrative case where institutional unreliability is only the half of it, ind…Read more
I consider Katherine Hawley's commitment account of interpersonal trustworthiness alongside her sceptical challenge regarding the value of philosophically modelling institutional trustworthiness as distinct from reliability. I argue, pace Hawley's challenge, that there would be significant diagnostic and explanatory loss if we were to content ourselves with ideas of institutional (un)reliability alone; and I offer an illustrative case where institutional unreliability is only the half of it, indicating that when it comes to certain kinds of institutional dysfunction, we do need philosophical models of institutional ‘distrustworthiness’ if we are to achieve a proper diagnosis.

Collective Epistemology Trust
191

Whose morality is it anyway?
with Simon Blackburn, A. C. Grayling, Anthony O’Hear, and Bhikhu Parekh

The Philosophers' Magazine 30 41-49. 2005.

Value Theory, Miscellaneous
16

Confidence and irony
In Edward Harcourt (ed.), Morality, reflection, and ideology, Oxford University Press. pp. 87-112. 2000.

This paper discusses Bernard Williams' meta-ethical views in relation to certain forms of value scepticism, principally J. L. Mackie's 'error theory', and Richard Rorty's 'ironism'. Finally Williams' concept of ethical 'confidence' is explained, and an argument given for why it requires more anti-ideological critical reflection than he seems to think.

Meta-Ethics, Miscellaneous Richard Rorty Moral Naturalism and Non-Naturalism Moral Value Moral Realism a…Read more
Meta-Ethics, Miscellaneous Richard Rorty Moral Naturalism and Non-Naturalism Moral Value Moral Realism and Irrealism Bernard Williams History of Meta-Ethics Moral Judgment

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Miranda Fricker

Introduction to Special Issue on Applied Epistemology
with David Coady

Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2): 153-156. 2016.

Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice
with Cristina Bernabéu

Las Torres de Lucca: Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política 10 (19): 97-104. 2021.

Editorial
with Helen Beebee

Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1): 1-1. 2018.

Diagnosing Institutionalized ‘Distrustworthiness’
Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3): 722-742. 2023.

Whose morality is it anyway?
with Simon Blackburn, A. C. Grayling, Anthony O’Hear, and Bhikhu Parekh

The Philosophers' Magazine 30 41-49. 2005.

Confidence and irony
In Edward Harcourt (ed.), Morality, reflection, and ideology, Oxford University Press. pp. 87-112. 2000.

Miranda Fricker

Introduction to Special Issue on Applied Epistemology with David Coady Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2): 153-156. 2016.

Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice with Cristina Bernabéu Las Torres de Lucca: Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política 10 (19): 97-104. 2021.

Editorial with Helen Beebee Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1): 1-1. 2018.

Diagnosing Institutionalized ‘Distrustworthiness’ Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3): 722-742. 2023.

Whose morality is it anyway? with Simon Blackburn, A. C. Grayling, Anthony O’Hear, and Bhikhu Parekh The Philosophers' Magazine 30 41-49. 2005.

Confidence and irony In Edward Harcourt (ed.), Morality, reflection, and ideology, Oxford University Press. pp. 87-112. 2000.

Introduction to Special Issue on Applied Epistemology
with David Coady

Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2): 153-156. 2016.

Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice
with Cristina Bernabéu

Las Torres de Lucca: Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política 10 (19): 97-104. 2021.

Editorial
with Helen Beebee

Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1): 1-1. 2018.

Diagnosing Institutionalized ‘Distrustworthiness’
Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3): 722-742. 2023.

Whose morality is it anyway?
with Simon Blackburn, A. C. Grayling, Anthony O’Hear, and Bhikhu Parekh

The Philosophers' Magazine 30 41-49. 2005.

Confidence and irony
In Edward Harcourt (ed.), Morality, reflection, and ideology, Oxford University Press. pp. 87-112. 2000.