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29Tarski, Davidson et la significationDialogue 22 (4): 595-620. 1983.Depuis 1967, Donald Davidson defend l'idée qu'une théorie de la signification pour une langue naturelle doit prendre la forme d'une théorie tarskienne de la vérité. Je me propose ici d'exposer les grandes lignes de l a conception davidsonienne de la sémantique des langues naturelles et de chercher à préciser en quel sens une theorie tarskienne de la vérité pour une langue L constitue, selon Davidson, une théorié de la signification pour L. Je ferai pour cela abstraction des obstacles qu'il pourr…Read more
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27Pangloss, L’Erreur et La DivergenceJournal of Philosophical Research 19 345-372. 1994.The theory of radical interpretation, as based on the principle of charity, sets a priori limits on the possibility that different agents have different beliefs, and on the possibility that one has false beliefs. David Papineau put forward a teleological approach to intentional states which, he claims, doesn’t have these unacceptable consequences. Having distinguished half a dozen of different forms that the problem of radical interpretation might take, I show that Papineau’s approach is not rad…Read more
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26Le paradoxe de Wittgenstein et le communautarismeDialogue 39 (2): 263-. 2000.The solution to the paradox which Kripke attibutes to Wittgenstein is supposed to lead to the conclusion that there is a sense in which thought and language are essentially social phenomena. In the following, I argue that both the and the character of this solution can be questioned, though without having to agree with Davidson, according to whom the solution to this paradox does not depend on any notion of a common language
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24Le programme de Davidson et les langues naturellesDialogue 24 (2): 195-212. 1985.Une théorie davidsonienne de la signification pour une langue L prend la forme d'une theorie tarskienne de la véeritée-dans-L. Une telle théeorie sera absolument radicale s'il est possible d'éetablir qu'elle est tarskienne, c'est-à-dire conforme à la convention T de Tarski, en n'utilisant que des donnéees empiriques dont la description ne fait intervenir aucun concept linguistique, tandis qu'elle sera relativement radicale s'il est possible d'éetablir qu'elle est tarskienne en n'utilisant que de…Read more
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23L'analyse théologique du contenu intentionnelRevue Philosophique De Louvain 96 (4): 660-690. 1998.
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22Que sera seraDialectica 54 (4). 2000.Having suggested that a salient feature of philosophical naturalism is to deny that there are non‐natural norms, I make a distinction between a moderate naturalism, which admits the existence of natural norms , and a radical naturalism which denies it . On the assumption that intentional facts are irreducibly normative, their existence would thus seem to raise a problem for moderate epistemological naturalism. I argue that no non‐trivial naturalistic explanation of conceptual intentionality is t…Read more
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21Les états intentionnels des créatures solitairesPhilosophiques 14 (2): 229-359. 1987.Je soutiens qu'il y a deux façons d'individuer les états intentionnels de créatures qui sont dépourvues de toute compétence linguistique, à savoir par leur rôle propositionnel ou par leurs conditions de vérité, mais que cette distinction ne vaut que pour les états intentionnels singuliers. L'examine ensuite différentes façons de spécifier, tout en restant dans le cadre d'une conception représentationnaliste de l'intentionnalité, les conditions de vérité des attributions d'états intentionnels pri…Read more
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20Between Phenomenalism and ObjectivismJournal of Philosophical Research 30 189-214. 2005.Brandom (1994) claims to have succeeded in showing how certain kinds of social practices can institute objective deontic statuses and confer objective conceptual contents on certain performances. This paper proposes a reconstruction of how, on Brandom’s views, this is supposed to come about, and a critical examination of the explicit arguments offered in support for this claim.
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20Entre la rime et la raison. Précis de L'Esprit et la naturePhilosophiques 30 (2): 407-410. 2003.
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18Luc Bégin et alii, Pragmatisme et pensée contemporaine. Cahiers de philosophie, no. 2, Département de philosophie, Université Sherbrooke, 1984, ix et 178 p. Luc Bégin et alii, Pragmatisme et pensée contemporaine. Cahiers de philosophie, no. 2, Département de philosophie, Université Sherbrooke, 1984, ix et 178 p (review)Philosophiques 12 (1): 232-236. 1985.
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17Rationality and IntentionalityGrazer Philosophische Studien 43 (1): 125-141. 1992.The view that in radical interpretation, the interpreter should aim at optimizing the rationality of agents is defended. A distinction and a parallel is drawn between linguistic interpretation and psychological interpretation. Both can be taken to be governed, in part, and in somewhat different ways, by a principle of rationality. Such approaches have been criticised on the ground that they make it impossible for a speaker or an agent to have wildly irrational or false beliefs. It is argued that…Read more
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17Remarques sur la sémiotiquePhilosophiques 11 (1): 91-109. 1984.Je défends la classification carnapienne des disciplines sémiotiques en montrant qu'elle permet de caractériser adéquatement la nature de la pragmatique. J'indique, en particulier, comment une notion de système pragmatique pourrait être développée par analogie avec celles de système syntaxique et de système sémantique.I defend Carnap's classification of semiotic disciplines by showing that it leads to an adequate characterization of the nature of pragmatics. In particular, I indicate how a notio…Read more
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13On the Principle of Charity and the Sources of IndeterminacyIn Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, Springer. pp. 229--248. 1999.
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12Making „Reasons " Explicit. How Normative is Brandom's Inferentialism?Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 13 (1): 127-145. 2008.This paper asks whether Brandom has provided a sufficiently clear account of the basic normative concepts of commitment and entitlement, on which his normative inferentialism seems to rest, and of how they contribute to explain the inferential articulation of conceptual contents. I show that Brandom's claim that these concepts are analogous to the concepts of obligation and permission cannot be right, and argue that the normative character of the concept of commitment is dubious. This leads me t…Read more
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12Pragmatics, Pittsburgh stylePragmatics and Cognition 13 (1): 141-160. 2005.I give a rough outline of Brandom’s scorekeeping account of conceptual content. The account is meant to be phenomenalist, normativist, expressively complete and non-circular; the question is how and to what extent it succeeds in meeting these goals.
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11Que Sera SeraDialectica 54 (4): 247-264. 2000.Having suggested that a salient feature of philosophical naturalism is to deny that there are non‐natural norms, I make a distinction between a moderate naturalism, which admits the existence of natural norms, and a radical naturalism which denies it. On the assumption that intentional facts are irreducibly normative, their existence would thus seem to raise a problem for moderate epistemological naturalism. I argue that no non‐trivial naturalistic explanation of conceptual intentionality is to …Read more
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10Between Phenomenalism and ObjectivismJournal of Philosophical Research 30 189-214. 2005.Brandom (1994) claims to have succeeded in showing how certain kinds of social practices can institute objective deontic statuses and confer objective conceptual contents on certain performances. This paper proposes a reconstruction of how, on Brandom’s views, this is supposed to come about, and a critical examination of the explicit arguments offered in support for this claim.
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9Rationality and IntentionalityGrazer Philosophische Studien 43 (1): 125-141. 1992.The view that in radical interpretation, the interpreter should aim at optimizing the rationality of agents is defended. A distinction and a parallel is drawn between linguistic interpretation and psychological interpretation. Both can be taken to be governed, in part, and in somewhat different ways, by a principle of rationality. Such approaches have been criticised on the ground that they make it impossible for a speaker or an agent to have wildly irrational or false beliefs. It is argued that…Read more
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8Nonconceptual Contents vs Nonconceptual StatesGrazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1): 23-43. 2005.The question to be discussed is whether the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual is best understood as pertaining primarily to intentional contents or to intentional states or attitudes. Some authors have suggested that it must be understood in the second way, in order to make the claim that experiences are nonconceptual compatible with the idea that one can also believe what one experiences. I argue that there is no need to do so, and that a conceptual content can be underst…Read more
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7Le paradoxe de Wittgenstein et le communautarismeDialogue 39 (2): 263-278. 2000.The “sceptical” solution to the paradox which Kripke attibutes to Wittgenstein is supposed to lead to the conclusion that there is a sense in which thought and language are essentially social phenomena. In the following, I argue that both the “sceptical” and the “communautarian” character of this solution can be questioned, though without having to agree with Davidson, according to whom the solution to this paradox does not depend on any notion of a common language.
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6Mind, Davidson and RealityPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 9 (1-2). 2005.The aim of this article is to show that the prospects for intentional irreal-ism are much brighter than it is generally thought. In the first section, I provide a general characterization of some of the various forms that the realism/irrealism debates might take. In the second, I ask whether there is any defensible form of realism about intentional states. I show that most candidates are nearly trivially false, and that the only form of in-tentional realism which is not, is a restricted one whic…Read more
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4L'analyse téléologique du contenu intentionnel: l'écueil du désir: l'écueil du désirRevue Philosophique De Louvain 96 (4): 624-659. 1998.
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4L'esprit et la naturePUM. 2002.Dans quelle mesure les caractéristiques fondamentales des êtres humains, telles que leur capacité de penser, de raisonner, de vouloir et de communiquer, peuvent-elles être complètement expliquées à l'aide des seules ressources des sciences naturelles? En s'appuyant sur l'analyse rigoureuse de quelques-uns des travaux les plus significatifs de la philosophie de l'esprit, en particulier ceux de R. Millikan, F. Dretske, W. Quine et D. Davidson, Daniel Laurier révèle les limites d'un tel programme d…Read more
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2Pangloss, L’Erreur et La DivergenceJournal of Philosophical Research 19 345-372. 1994.The theory of radical interpretation, as based on the principle of charity, sets a priori limits on the possibility that different agents have different beliefs, and on the possibility that one has false beliefs. David Papineau put forward a teleological approach to intentional states which, he claims, doesn’t have these unacceptable consequences. Having distinguished half a dozen of different forms that the problem of radical interpretation might take, I show that Papineau’s approach is not rad…Read more
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Philosophy of Mind |
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Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
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