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57Non-conceptually contentful attitudes in interpretationSorites 13 (October): 6-22. 2001.Brandom's book Making It Explicit defends Davidson's claim that conceptual thought can arise only on the background of a practice of mutual interpretation, without endorsing the further view that one can be a thinker only if one has the concept of a concept. This involves giving an account of conceptual content in terms of what Brandom calls practical deontic attitudes. In this paper, I make a plea for the conclusion that these practical attitudes are best seen as intentional, but non-conceptual…Read more
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34Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language: An Introduction Bjorn T. Ramberg Oxford, Blackwell, 1989, 153 p., 27,50$Dialogue 30 (1-2): 189-. 1991.
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22Les états intentionnels des créatures solitairesPhilosophiques 14 (2): 229-359. 1987.Je soutiens qu'il y a deux façons d'individuer les états intentionnels de créatures qui sont dépourvues de toute compétence linguistique, à savoir par leur rôle propositionnel ou par leurs conditions de vérité, mais que cette distinction ne vaut que pour les états intentionnels singuliers. L'examine ensuite différentes façons de spécifier, tout en restant dans le cadre d'une conception représentationnaliste de l'intentionnalité, les conditions de vérité des attributions d'états intentionnels pri…Read more
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7Le paradoxe de Wittgenstein et le communautarismeDialogue 39 (2): 263-278. 2000.The “sceptical” solution to the paradox which Kripke attibutes to Wittgenstein is supposed to lead to the conclusion that there is a sense in which thought and language are essentially social phenomena. In the following, I argue that both the “sceptical” and the “communautarian” character of this solution can be questioned, though without having to agree with Davidson, according to whom the solution to this paradox does not depend on any notion of a common language.
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17Remarques sur la sémiotiquePhilosophiques 11 (1): 91-109. 1984.Je défends la classification carnapienne des disciplines sémiotiques en montrant qu'elle permet de caractériser adéquatement la nature de la pragmatique. J'indique, en particulier, comment une notion de système pragmatique pourrait être développée par analogie avec celles de système syntaxique et de système sémantique.I defend Carnap's classification of semiotic disciplines by showing that it leads to an adequate characterization of the nature of pragmatics. In particular, I indicate how a notio…Read more
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2John R. Searle, Sens et expression: études de théorie des actes de langage Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 3 (2): 97-101. 1983.
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23Que sera seraDialectica 54 (4). 2000.Having suggested that a salient feature of philosophical naturalism is to deny that there are non‐natural norms, I make a distinction between a moderate naturalism, which admits the existence of natural norms , and a radical naturalism which denies it . On the assumption that intentional facts are irreducibly normative, their existence would thus seem to raise a problem for moderate epistemological naturalism. I argue that no non‐trivial naturalistic explanation of conceptual intentionality is t…Read more
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Francis Jacques, L 'espace logique de l'interlocution: Dialogiques II (review)Philosophy in Review 6 227-229. 1986.
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62Note sur le puzzle de KripkePhilosophiques 15 (1): 31-39. 1988.Je soutiens que Kripke n'a pas réussi à montrer que certains principes plausibles gouvernant l'attribution de croyances, tels que les principes de décitation et de traduction, pouvaient nous conduire à attribuer des croyances de dicto contradictoires à un sujet réfléchi et linguistiquement compétent sans présupposer une théorie descriptive des noms propres ou des termes désignant des espèces naturelles. Les cas décrits par Kripke se réduisent à des variantes du problème de Quine concernant les c…Read more
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20Entre la rime et la raison. Précis de L'Esprit et la naturePhilosophiques 30 (2): 407-410. 2003.
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Mark Johnson, "the body in the mind: The bodily basis of meaning, imagination and reason" (review)Dialogue 29 (3): 477. 1990.
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55Les raisons épistémiques sont-elles instrumentales?Dialogue 52 (2): 211-231. 2013.In a recent article (2011), Steglich-Petersen claims to be able to provide a teleological account of the nature of epistemic reasons which (i) avoids the standard objections to this kind of approach and (ii) is compatible with the evidentialist claim that epistemic reasons always trump non-epistemic reasons (assuming there are such reasons). I argue that his proposal is unable to do justice to the idea that epistemic reasons are constituted by the evidence, and more generally, that it is incoher…Read more
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46Between Phenomenalism and ObjectivismJournal of Philosophical Research 30 189-214. 2005.Brandom (1994) claims to have succeeded in showing how certain kinds of social practices can institute objective deontic statuses and confer objective conceptual contents on certain performances. This paper proposes a reconstruction of how, on Brandom’s views, this is supposed to come about, and a critical examination of the explicit arguments offered in support for this claim.
Montréal, Quebec, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
1 more
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |