-
18Luc Bégin et alii, Pragmatisme et pensée contemporaine. Cahiers de philosophie, no. 2, Département de philosophie, Université Sherbrooke, 1984, ix et 178 p. Luc Bégin et alii, Pragmatisme et pensée contemporaine. Cahiers de philosophie, no. 2, Département de philosophie, Université Sherbrooke, 1984, ix et 178 p (review)Philosophiques 12 (1): 232-236. 1985.
-
18Rationality and IntentionalityGrazer Philosophische Studien 43 (1): 125-141. 1992.The view that in radical interpretation, the interpreter should aim at optimizing the rationality of agents is defended. A distinction and a parallel is drawn between linguistic interpretation and psychological interpretation. Both can be taken to be governed, in part, and in somewhat different ways, by a principle of rationality. Such approaches have been criticised on the ground that they make it impossible for a speaker or an agent to have wildly irrational or false beliefs. It is argued that…Read more
-
13On the Principle of Charity and the Sources of IndeterminacyIn Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, Springer. pp. 229--248. 1999.
-
42Making "Reasons" Explicit: How Normative is Brandom's InferentialismAbstracta 5 (2): 79-99. 2009.This paper asks whether Brandom (1994) has provided a sufficiently clear account of the basic normative concepts of commitment and entitlement, on which his normative inferentialism seems to rest, and of how they contribute to explain the inferential articulation of conceptual contents. I show that Brandom's claim that these concepts are analogous to the concepts of obligation and permission cannot be right, and argue that the normative character of the concept of commitment is dubious. This lea…Read more
-
23L'analyse théologique du contenu intentionnelRevue Philosophique De Louvain 96 (4): 660-690. 1998.
-
50Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind George Lakoff Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1987. 614 p. 29, 95 $The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason Mark Johnson Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1987. 233 p. 27, 50 $ (review)Dialogue 29 (3): 477-. 1990.
-
20Between Phenomenalism and ObjectivismJournal of Philosophical Research 30 189-214. 2005.Brandom (1994) claims to have succeeded in showing how certain kinds of social practices can institute objective deontic statuses and confer objective conceptual contents on certain performances. This paper proposes a reconstruction of how, on Brandom’s views, this is supposed to come about, and a critical examination of the explicit arguments offered in support for this claim.
-
42La logique: une introduction Michel J. Blais Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1985. 234 pDialogue 25 (2): 385-. 1986.
-
61Intentional Normativism Meets Normative Supervenience and the Because ConstraintDialogue 50 (2): 315-331. 2011.ABSTRACT: I explain and rebut four objections to the claim that attributions of intentional attitudes are normative judgments, all stemming, directly or indirectly, from the widespread assumption that the normative supervenes on the non-normative
-
13Pragmatics, Pittsburgh stylePragmatics and Cognition 13 (1): 141-160. 2005.I give a rough outline of Brandom’s scorekeeping account of conceptual content. The account is meant to be phenomenalist, normativist, expressively complete and non-circular; the question is how and to what extent it succeeds in meeting these goals.
-
73Nonconceptual contents vs nonconceptual statesGrazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1): 23-43. 2005.The question to be discussed is whether the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual is best understood as pertaining primarily to intentional contents or to intentional states or attitudes. Some authors have suggested that it must be understood in the second way, in order to make the claim that experiences are nonconceptual compatible with the idea that one can also believe what one experiences. I argue that there is no need to do so, and that a conceptual content can be underst…Read more
-
Fred Dretske's teleological analysis of the semantic properties of intentional states: explaining the semantic content of desiresRevue Philosophique De Louvain 96 (4): 660-690. 1998.
Montréal, Quebec, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
1 more
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |