Daniel Hausman

This paper argues that egalitarian theories should be judged by the degree to which they meet four different challenges. Fundamentalist egalitarianism, which contends that certain inequalities are intrinsically bad or unjust regardless of their consequences, fails to meet these challenges. Building on discussions by T.M. Scanlon and David Miller, we argue that egalitarianism is better understood in terms of commitments to six egalitarian objectives. A consequence of our view, in contrast to Martin O'Neill's “non-intrinsic egalitarianism,“ is that egalitarianism is better understood as a family of views than as a single ethical position

Abstract Contrary to Peter J. Boettke's essay, ?What Went Wrong with Economics??, there is no connection between ?formalism? and the alleged inability of mainstream economists to regard theoretical models as anything other than either depictions of real market economies or bases for criticizing market economies and justifying government intervention. Although Boettke's criticisms of the excesses of formalism are justified, Austrian economists such as Boettke need to justify their view that government interventions into economic affairs are inevitably harmful.

This paper sketches the contemporary turn in philosophy of science and discusses its practical implications for doing philosophy of economics. This turn consists basically of regarding philosophy of science as itself an empirical (social) science. It thus embodies a naturalized epistemology. Some of the circularities inherent in such an epistemology are examined, and it is argued that they are not vicious. Although an empirical approach to the philosophy of science is defended, it is pointed out that there are practical difficulties employing it when studying a discipline like economics in which dispute and controversy are so pervasive. It is argued that the implications of the empirical approach to philosophy of science for day-to-day philosophical practice are undramatic.

Beware of economists bearing advice. Though some of it is valuable, the framework of theoretical welfare economics from which economic advice usually issues has serious normative limitations and distortions. When economists go beyond identifying consequences of policies to making recommendations, they typically rely on a theory whose only normative concern is welfare and its distribution and that mistakenly identifies welfare with the satisfaction of preferences. Their advice about how to increase welfare must accordingly be regarded with caution, and policy makers must not forget that increasing welfare should not be their only goal.

This essay comments on the theory of social norms developed by Cristina Bicchieri in The Grammar of Society. It applauds her theory of norms but argues that it cannot account for the experimental results concerning ultimatum games. A theory of fairness is also needed. It develops a number of specific criticisms of her way of incorporating the influence of norms into preferences. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 5197 Helen C. White Hall, 600 N. Park Street, Madison, WI 53706‐1474; e‐mail: [email protected]

: This commentary distinguishes five reasons why one might want to conduct a survey concerning people's beliefs about death and the permissibility of harvesting organs: (1) simply to learn what people know and want; (2) to determine if current law and practice conform to the wishes of the population; (3) to determine the level of popular support for or opposition to policy changes; (4) to ascertain the causes and effects of popular beliefs and attitudes; and (5) to provide guidance in determining which laws and practices are ethical. The commentary expresses qualms about how well surveys in general can perform with respect to the fifth objective, and it provides specific reasons to doubt whether this survey is informative from the perspective of a moral philosopher concerned with the nature of death and the contours of a permissible system of organ procurement

expose some gaps and difficulties in the argument for the causal Markov condition in our essay ‘Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition’ ([1999]), and we are grateful for the opportunity to reformulate our position. In particular, Cartwright disagrees vigorously with many of the theses we advance about the connection between causation and manipulation. Although we are not persuaded by some of her criticisms, we shall confine ourselves to showing how our central argument can be reconstructed and to casting doubt on Cartwright's claim that the causal Markov condition typically fails when there are indeterministic by-products. Why believe the causal Markov condition? Causation and manipulation The argument Indeterministic by-products and the causal Markov condition The chemical factory counterexample and PM2 Conclusions: causation and manipulability.

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis want to redirect egalitarianism away from redistribution of income and toward redistribution of assets, particularly productive assets. <1> Their main reason, apart from the fact that income redistribution is so obviously dead in the political waters, is that income redistribution lowers productivity and competitiveness, while asset redistribution raises these, and in the long run the welfare of the worst-off depends more on increasing productivity than it does on distribution. Compound interest is a wonderful thing. Young workers in an inegalitarian society growing at 5% per year making half the wages of those in an egalitarian society growing at 1/2% per year will catch up in 16 years and by the time of their retirement will have four times the income. Bowles and Gintis argue that such mathematics, which has long been an argument for inegalitarian trickle-down policies, in fact supports egalitarian asset redistributions.