Daniel Hausman

:Contemporary behavioural economics has documented common failures of reasoning that apparently make possible policies that benefit individuals by contravening or correcting their judgements. These policies appear to be paternalistic, even though a traditional view would deny that they are paternalistic on the grounds that policies such as nudges do not restrict individual liberty. It appears to many that a new definition of paternalism that takes its cue from behavioural economics is needed. Furthermore, if one revises the definition of paternalism, one must revisit traditional views concerning whether paternalist policies are wise. In Government Paternalism, Julian Le Grand and Bill New make a valuable start, although some corrections are needed. This essay provides a general setting for revising the definition of paternalism and suggests a revised definition of paternalism.

This essay responds to the helpful criticisms of Valuing Health: Well-Being, Freedom, and Suffering, which have been offered by Elselijn Kingma, Adam Oliver, Anna Alexandrova, Alex Voorhoeve, Erik Nord and James Wilson. I am extremely grateful to Jonathan Wolf and especially James Wilson for arranging a one-day conference on my book, Valuing Health: Well-Being, Freedom, and Suffering [Hausman, D.. Valuing Health: Well-Being, Freedom, and Suffering. Oxford: Oxford University Press.], and for publishing this symposium. I am also grateful to the wonderful six scholars who took the time to study my work and to offer perceptive and helpful criticisms. Without unduly trying the patience of readers, I cannot respond to all their remarks, but I hope that in what follows I have replied to the most important of their comments on the arguments and conclusions of Valuing Health. Before I begin these replies, a brief synopsis of Valuing Health may be helpful to the reader.

Preferences are the central notion in mainstream economic theory, yet economists say little about what preferences are. This article argues that preferences in mainstream positive economics are comparative evaluations with respect to everything relevant to value or choice, and it argues against three mistaken views of preferences: (1) that they are matters of taste, concerning which rational assessment is inappropriate, (2) that preferences coincide with judgments of expected self-interested benefit, and (3) that preferences can be defined in terms of choices.

Chapter 5 is an essay on the methodology of equilibrium theory. In the course of examining recent controversies concerning lawlike claims and "assumptions" in economic theory, I reach a position similar to J. S. Mill's. Neo-classical economics is what Mill would call "a separate science." It follows a deductive method, since its basic laws supported by everyday experience. In its general equilibrium formulation, equilibrium theory possesses, however, no explanatory worth and very little explanatory importance, since its idealizations are not legitimate. General equilibrium theory ought fundamentally to be regarded as an explanation of how economic equilibrium is possible. ;In conclusion I argue that Sraffa's contribution is a legitimate form of economic theorizing. Those methodological views, like Lionel Robbins', which would proscribe the sort of piecemeal theorizing Sraffa exemplifies, are, as methodological strictures, unjustified. In fact they involve an ideological distortion. Given the weaknesses in general equilibrium theory identified in Chapters 3 and 5, one has good reason to be eclectic. The Austrian theory, despite the Cambridge criticisms, may be useful in some investigations. A much more segmented economics built around Sraffa's work may have a great deal to teach us. Theories of capital, interest and exchange value currently are underdeveloped, unsupported, and subject to ideological influence. ;In Chapter 3 one special formulation of intertemporal general equilibrium theory is examined. I argue that general equilibrium theory may be taken as a theory of the rate of interest to which the Cambridge criticisms do not apply. Puzzles remain, however, concerning both the apparently lawlike claims and the unrealistic stipulations concerning background conditions that general equilibrium theory makes. ;In Chapter 4 Sraffa's system in The Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities is presented and tentatively assessed. I argue that it is consistent with equilibrium theory, but may be combined with other claims that are not consistent with equilibrium theory. What is puzzling but, I argue, methodologically legitimate in Sraffa's work is that he takes as givens factors like the composition of output, that are themselves subject to further economic analysis. Sraffa's work, when properly understood, can prove valuable to Marxian economists. ;Chapter 1 establishes a contrast between physical cost and marginal utility theories of exchange value and examines why issues concerning capital and interest are theoretically central to both theories. I point out that physical cost theories of value are not tenable. ;Chapter 2 is concerned with simplified aggregate capital theories, especially Wicksell's Austrian theory of capital, and with the Cambridge criticisms of such theories. The Cambridge criticisms show, I conclude, that aggregative capital theories make unwarranted economic claims. ;This dissertation examines from both an economic and a philosophical perspective controversies concerning the theory of capital and interest and the relationship of capital and interest to exchange value. The fundamentals of the neo-classical and neo-Ricardian approaches to economic theory are made explicit and compared. The neo-Ricardian approach is partially defended

The risks to groups posed by research involving human beings—including genetics research—should be conceived of as a species of third-party risks. The important task of protecting third parties from the risks posed by the conduct and the findings of research should not be assigned to IRBs because they are not designed or equipped to handle such a broad responsibility. The serious problems raised by third-party risks require an integration of policy-making and regulation that is beyond the scope and competence of IRBs

The truth about health care policy lies between two exaggerated views: a market view in which individuals purchase their own health care from profit maximizing health-care firms and a control view in which costs are controlled by regulations limiting which treatments health insurance will pay for. This essay suggests a way to avoid on the one hand the suffering, unfairness, and abandonment of solidarity entailed by the market view and, on the other hand, to diminish the inflexibility and inefficiency of the control view. It suggests that the way to mitigate these problems is to recognize the malleability of motivation and the range of factors, in addition to financial incentives, that may influence the behavior of patients and especially physicians.

Constructive empiricism, Bas van fraassen's new variety of anti-Realism, Maintains that science aims at empirically adequate, Rather than true theories and that, In fully accepting a theory, One should believe only that it is empirically adequate. A theory is empirically adequate just in case it has a model in which all observable phenomena may be embedded. I challenge van fraassen's main arguments and argue that the observable/unobservable distinction will not bear the weight that van fraassen places on it

This paper argues that egalitarian theories should be judged by the degree to which they meet four different challenges. Fundamentalist egalitarianism, which contends that certain inequalities are intrinsically bad or unjust regardless of their consequences, fails to meet these challenges. Building on discussions by T.M. Scanlon and David Miller, we argue that egalitarianism is better understood in terms of commitments to six egalitarian objectives. A consequence of our view, in contrast to Martin O'Neill's “non-intrinsic egalitarianism,“ is that egalitarianism is better understood as a family of views than as a single ethical position

The tenuous claims of cost-benefit analysis to guide policy so as to promote welfare turn on measuring welfare by preference satisfaction and taking willingness-to-pay to indicate preferences. Yet it is obvious that people's preferences are not always self-interested and that false beliefs may lead people to prefer what is worse for them even when people are self-interested. So welfare is not preference satisfaction, and hence it appears that cost-benefit analysis and welfare economics in general rely on a mistaken theory of well-being. This essay explores the difficulties, criticizes standard defences of welfare economics, and then offers a new partial defence that maintains that welfare economics is independent of any philosophical theory of well-being. Welfare economics requires nothing more than anevidentialconnection between preference and welfare: in circumstances in which people are concerned with their own interests and reasonably good judges of what will serve their interests, their preferences will be reliable indicators of what is good for them.

Many questions concerning health involve values. How well is a health system performing? How should resources be allocated between the health system and other uses or among competing healthrelated uses? How should the costs of health services be distributed among members of a population? Who among those in need of transplants should receive scarce organs? What is the best way to treat particular patients? Although many kinds of expertise bear on these questions, values play a large role in answering them. These values are of many kinds – judgments about how health states contribute to the well-being of individuals depend on views about what is good for a person, whereas judgments about how to share the costs of health care or about how to distribute scarce organs among those in need of transplants depend on theories of fairness. The value judgments that need to be made are not only multifaceted and heterogeneous; they are also controversial. Both the understanding of the questions and the substance of the answers may vary widely from individual to individual and among different groups within countries and across national boundaries. How are these many complicated, difficult and controversial evaluative questions to be answered? This could be a question about who should answer them as well as a question about how they should be answered. There are various possible mechanisms, and there is no reason why the same method should be employed to answer every question. Among the possible methods are (1) moral argument, (2) political deliberation and (3) eliciting preferences or judgments from some group. Included in the third method lie many different techniques of elicitation. For example, one could study attitudes by the use of deliberative (focus) groups, by permitting individual choice in some sort of market or quasi-market, by polling or by voting. These methods of answering evaluative questions are not always incompatible with one another. Moral argument can play a role within political deliberation, deliberation by focus groups, individual market choice, or voting..

: This commentary distinguishes five reasons why one might want to conduct a survey concerning people's beliefs about death and the permissibility of harvesting organs: (1) simply to learn what people know and want; (2) to determine if current law and practice conform to the wishes of the population; (3) to determine the level of popular support for or opposition to policy changes; (4) to ascertain the causes and effects of popular beliefs and attitudes; and (5) to provide guidance in determining which laws and practices are ethical. The commentary expresses qualms about how well surveys in general can perform with respect to the fifth objective, and it provides specific reasons to doubt whether this survey is informative from the perspective of a moral philosopher concerned with the nature of death and the contours of a permissible system of organ procurement

With the collapse of the centrally controlled economies and the authoritarian governments of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, political leaders are, with appreciable public support, espousing “liberal” economic and political transformations—the reinstitution of markets, the securing of civil and political rights, and the establishment of representative governments. But those supporting reform have many aims, and the liberalism to which they look for political guidance is not an unambiguous doctrine

This paper sketches the contemporary turn in philosophy of science and discusses its practical implications for doing philosophy of economics. This turn consists basically of regarding philosophy of science as itself an empirical (social) science. It thus embodies a naturalized epistemology. Some of the circularities inherent in such an epistemology are examined, and it is argued that they are not vicious. Although an empirical approach to the philosophy of science is defended, it is pointed out that there are practical difficulties employing it when studying a discipline like economics in which dispute and controversy are so pervasive. It is argued that the implications of the empirical approach to philosophy of science for day-to-day philosophical practice are undramatic.