-
65Beware of economists bearing advice. Though some of it is valuable, the framework of theoretical welfare economics from which economic advice usually issues has serious normative limitations and distortions. When economists go beyond identifying consequences of policies to making recommendations, they typically rely on a theory whose only normative concern is welfare and its distribution and that mistakenly identifies welfare with the satisfaction of preferences. Their advice about how to increa…Read more
-
65Economics as Separate and InexactEconomics and Philosophy 12 (2): 207-220. 1996.The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics offers an overview of standard microeconomics and general equilibrium theory. These are not the whole of orthodox economics, and orthodox economics is not the whole of economics. But orthodox economics dominates the profession, and the theoretical core of microeconomics and general equilibrium theory – what I called ‘equilibrium theory’ – is central to most orthodox economics. Unlike many methodological works, which focus almost exclusively on the em…Read more
-
64The Handbook of Economic Methodology, John Davis, D. Wade Hands, and Uskali Mäki . Edward Elgar, 1998, xviii + 572 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 15 (2): 289. 1999.
-
64No doubt men are capable even now of much more unselfish service than they generally render; and the supreme aim of the economist is to discover how this latent social asset can be developed more quickly and turned to account more wisely. (Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics , p. 8).
-
63Causal and Explanatory AsymmetryPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982 (Volume One: Contributed Papers). 1982.This paper asks why causal asymmetries should give rise to explanatory asymmetries. One way to give some rationale for the asymmetries of causal explanation is to adopt a pragmatic view of explanation and to stress the fact that causes can be used to manipulate their effects. This paper argues, however, that when one recognizes that causal asymmetry is fundamentally an asymmetry of "connectedness", one can see how causal asymmetry leads to an objective difference between explanations in terms of…Read more
-
60Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, Matthew D. Adler. Oxford University Press, 2012, 634 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 28 (3): 435-443. 2012.Book Reviews Daniel M. Hausman, Economics and Philosophy, FirstView Article
-
59Trust and trustworthiness, by Russell Hardin. Russell Sage foundation, 2002, XXI + 234 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 20 (1): 240-246. 2004.
-
57Making Interpersonal Comparisons CoherentlyEconomics and Philosophy 6 (2): 293. 1990.Many ethical theories, including in particular consequentialist moral the ories, require comparisons of the amount of good possessed or received by different people. In the case of some goods, such as monetary income, wealth, education, or health, such comparisons are relatively unproblematic. Even in the case of such goods there may be serious empirical measurement problems, but there appear to be no difficulties in principle. Thus Cooter and Rappoport maintained that there was no serious diffi…Read more
-
54Causal AsymmetriesCambridge University Press. 1998.This book, by one of the pre-eminent philosophers of science writing today, offers the most comprehensive account available of causal asymmetries. Causation is asymmetrical in many different ways. Causes precede effects; explanations cite causes not effects. Agents use causes to manipulate their effects; they don't use effects to manipulate their causes. Effects of a common cause are correlated; causes of a common effect are not. This book explains why a relationship that is asymmetrical in one …Read more
-
54Are there causal relations among dependent variables?Philosophy of Science 50 (1): 58-81. 1983.This paper makes explicit and takes issue with the bizarre view, which is unfortunately prevalent among social scientists, that causal relations are features of models only. There are some good reasons to represent causal factors with independent variables. But the association between causes and independent variables is only a desideratum in model construction. It is not a criterion for judging which things are causes and which are effects
-
53Review article. The mathematical theory of causation (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1): 151-162. 1999.
-
53Constructive empiricism contestedPacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1): 21-28. 1982.Constructive empiricism, Bas van fraassen's new variety of anti-Realism, Maintains that science aims at empirically adequate, Rather than true theories and that, In fully accepting a theory, One should believe only that it is empirically adequate. A theory is empirically adequate just in case it has a model in which all observable phenomena may be embedded. I challenge van fraassen's main arguments and argue that the observable/unobservable distinction will not bear the weight that van fraassen …Read more
-
52Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis want to redirect egalitarianism away from redistribution of income and toward redistribution of assets, particularly productive assets. <1> Their main reason, apart from the fact that income redistribution is so obviously dead in the political waters, is that income redistribution lowers productivity and competitiveness, while asset redistribution raises these, and in the long run the welfare of the worst-off depends more on increasing productivity than it does o…Read more
-
51Linking causal and explanatory asymmetryPhilosophy of Science 60 (3): 435-451. 1993.This essay defends two theses that jointly establish a link between causal and explanatory asymmetry. The first thesis is that statements specifying facts about effects, unlike statements specifying facts about causes, are not "independently variable". The second thesis is that independent variability among purportedly explanatory factors is a necessary condition on scientific explanations
-
49Measuring or Valuing Population Health: Some Conceptual ProblemsPublic Health Ethics 5 (3): 229-239. 2012.There is no way literally to measure health, because health is multi-dimensional, and there is no metric whereby one person who is healthier than a second with respect to one dimension but less healthy with respect to another counts as healthier, less healthy or equally healthy overall. Health analysts instead measure how good or bad health states are in some regard. If these values are measures of health states, then identical health states must have identical values. But in different circumsta…Read more
-
49On the Econ withinJournal of Economic Methodology 23 (1): 26-32. 2016.This essay examines the critique of behavioral economics that Infante, Lecouteaux and Sugden offer in:"Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent.” It identifies and questions three main criticisms that ILS make: a methodological criticism, alleging that there is no psychological basis for the attribution of purified preferences, an epistemological criticism, alleging that there is little evidence for claims about purified preferences, and a normative criticism, arguing that policies s…Read more
-
48Physical Causation (review)Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 33 (4): 717-724. 2002.
-
48The Composition of Economic CausesThe Monist 78 (3): 295-307. 1995.Discusses the composition of economic causes. Applications of John Stuart Mill’s inductive method to economics; Problems with the deductive method; Effect of multiple causal factors in economics; Derivation of economic laws; Mill’s arguments for deductive economics.
-
47Philosophy of Economics: A Retrospective ReflectionRevue de Philosophie Économique 18 (2): 185-202. 2018.
-
46Health and Functional EfficiencyJournal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (6): 634-647. 2014.This essay argues that what is central to Christopher Boorse’s biostatistical theory of disease as statistically subnormal part function (BST) are comparisons of the “functional efficiency” of parts and processes and that statistical considerations serve only to pick out a healthy level of functional efficiency. On this interpretation, the distinction between health and pathology is less important than comparisons of functional efficiency, which are entirely independent of statistical considerat…Read more
-
45Protecting groups from genetic researchBioethics 22 (3). 2008.ABSTRACT Genetics research, like research in sociology and anthropology, creates risks for groups from which research subjects are drawn. This paper considers what sort of protection for groups from the risks of genetics research should be provided and by whom. The paper categorizes harms by distinguishing process‐related from outcome‐related harms and by distinguishing two kinds of group harms. It argues that calls for community engagement are justified with respect to some kinds of harms, but …Read more
-
45Challenge Trials: What Are the Ethical Problems?Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (1): 137-145. 2021.If, as is alleged, challenge trials of vaccines against COVID-19 are likely to save thousands of lives and vastly diminish the economic and social harms of the pandemic while subjecting volunteers to risks that are comparable to kidney donation, then it would seem that the only sensible objection to such trials would be to deny that they have low risks or can be expected to have immense benefits. This essay searches for a philosophical rationale for rejecting challenge trials while supposing tha…Read more
-
43Paradox postponedJournal of Economic Methodology 20 (3). 2013.This comment argues that there is an explanation paradox in economics, as Julian Reiss maintains, only if models in economics succeed in explaining even though they are not approximately true, fail to identify the causes of what they purport to explain, and misdescribe the mechanism by which the causes lead to the effects to be explained. Reiss provides no reason to believe that models that do not describe the causes and mechanisms at work are nevertheless explanatory
-
-
London School of EconomicsDepartment of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific MethodProfessor (Part-time)
Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Social and Political Philosophy |
Philosophy of Social Science |