-
68How to Do Philosophy of EconomicsPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980. 1980.This paper sketches the contemporary turn in philosophy of science and discusses its practical implications for doing philosophy of economics. This turn consists basically of regarding philosophy of science as itself an empirical (social) science. It thus embodies a naturalized epistemology. Some of the circularities inherent in such an epistemology are examined, and it is argued that they are not vicious. Although an empirical approach to the philosophy of science is defended, it is pointed out…Read more
-
322Revealed preference, belief, and game theoryEconomics and Philosophy 16 (1): 99-115. 2000.The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.
-
332Causation, agency, and independencePhilosophy of Science 64 (4): 25. 1997.This paper explores versions of agency or manipulability theories of causation and argues that they are unacceptable both for the well-known reasons of their anthropomorphism, limited scope, and circularity and because they are subsumed by an alternative "independence" theory of causation, which is free of these difficulties
-
-
London School of EconomicsDepartment of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific MethodProfessor (Part-time)
Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
Areas of Interest
| Social and Political Philosophy |
| Philosophy of Social Science |