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6Oxford Studies in Metaethics: The First ten Years, 2006-2015 (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2016.Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field…Read more
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5Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8 (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2013.Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field
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158Moral judgement and moral motivationPhilosophical Quarterly 48 (192): 353-358. 1998.I criticize an important argument of Michael Smith, from his recent book The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith's argument, if sound, would undermine one form of moral externalism 2013 that which insists that moral judgements only contingently motivate their authors. Smith claims that externalists must view good agents as always prompted by the motive of duty, and that possession of such a motive impugns the goodness of the agent. I argue (i) that externalists do not (ordinarily) nee…Read more
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694Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral KnowledgeJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1): 1-38. 2012.This paper reconstructs what I take to be the central evolutionary debunking argument that underlies recent critiques of moral realism. The argument claims that given the extent of evolutionary influence on our moral faculties, and assuming the truth of moral realism, it would be a massive coincidence were our moral faculties reliable ones. Given this coincidence, any presumptive warrant enjoyed by our moral beliefs is defeated. So if moral realism is true, then we can have no warranted moral be…Read more
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8Review of Joel Feinberg, Problems at the Root of Law (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (9). 2003.
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