Russ Shafer-Landau

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only periodical publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work on the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship in the field. Its broad purview includes work at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. OSME provides an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

This book is divided into three parts-one on the Good Life, another on Doing the Right Thing, and the last on the Status of Morality. You can read these parts in any order. Many will want to begin at the end, for instance, with a discussion of whether morality is a human invention, or is in some way objective. Some will prefer to start in the middle, asking about the supreme principle of morality (and whether there is any such thing). And others may want to begin at the beginning, by thinking about human well-being and the quality of life. Each part can be understood independently of the others, though there are of course many points of connection across the three main branches of moral philosophy. No matter where you begin, there are footnotes in most chapters that provide cross-references to relevant discussions elsewhere in the book. When beginning a new area of study, you're bound to encounter some unfamiliar jargon. I've tried to keep this to a minimum, and I suppose that you can be thankful that we're doing ethics here, rather than physics or anatomy. I define each technical term when I first use it, and have also put together a glossary, which appears at the end of the book. Each specialized term that appears in boldface has an entry there. You may be interested enough in what you read here that you'll want to continue your studies in moral philosophy. There is a natural place to begin-the companion volume to this book, The Ethical Life, described later in this preface. I have also compiled a list of Suggestions for Further Reading for each chapter or pair of chapters. This list appears at the end of the book, just before the glossary. I have selected the readings with an eye to what might be accessible and interesting to those just beginning their study of moral philosophy.

This text carefully reconstructs and analyzes dozens of arguments in depth, and introduces students to the essential ideas of moral philosophy. Offering more comprehensive coverage of the good life, normative ethics, and metaethics than any other text of its kind, this book also addressesissues that are often omitted from other texts, such as the doctrine of doing and allowing, the doctrine of double effect, and more.Ideal for courses in introductory ethics and contemporary moral problems, this book can be used as a stand-alone text or with the author's companion reader, The Ethical Life: Fundamental Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems, Third Edition.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

Brief yet thorough and affordably priced, The Ethical Life: Fundamental Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems, Sixth Edition, is ideal for courses in introductory ethics and contemporary moral problems. Featuring forty-eight readings divided into four parts, it introduces students to ethical theory and a wide range of moral issues. The essays include selections from such historically influential philosophers as Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and Mill alongside work by contemporary philosophers like Philippa Foot, Robert Nozick, Peter Singer, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. Detailed reading introductions provide helpful contextual information.

In “Trusting Moral Intuitions” we argued that moral intuitions are trustworthy due to their being the outputs of a cognitive practice, with social elements, in good working order. Backes, Eklund, and Michelson present several criticisms of our defense of a socially conscious moral intuitionism. We respond to these criticisms, defending our claim that social factors enhance the epistemic credentials of moral intuitions, answering worries pertaining to the reliability of the moral intuition practice, and addressing concerns about both the individuation of this practice and the good conditions for its implementation.

A substantial collection of seminal articles, Foundations of Ethics covers all of the major issues in metaethics. Covers all of the major issues in metaethics including moral metaphysics, epistemology, moral psychology, and philosophy of language. Provides an unparalleled offering of primary sources and expert commentary for students of ethical theory. Includes seminal essays by ethicists such as G.E. Moore, Simon Blackburn, Gilbert Harman, Christine Korsgaard, Michael Smith, Bernard Williams, Jonathan Dancy, and many other leading figures of ethical theory.

Our project in this essay is to showcase nonnaturalistic moral realism’s resources for responding to metaphysical and epistemological objections by taking the view in some new directions. The central thesis we will argue for is that there is a battery of substantive moral propositions that are also nonnaturalistic conceptual truths. We call these propositions the moral fixed points. We will argue that they must find a place in any system of moral norms that applies to beings like us, in worlds similar to our own. By committing themselves to true propositions of these sorts, nonnaturalists can fashion a view that is highly attractive in its own right, and resistant to the most prominent objections that have been pressed against it.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

This paper seeks to clarify one of the deepest questions about the source or ground of normativity, while also presenting an essence-based approach to answering it. We call it the ‘Arché Question.’ Though all metanormative theories must address this question, very few realists have explicitly grappled with the challenge it poses; those who have appear to deny any need to give an answer. After critically discussing extant realist responses, this paper outlines an essence-based approach to answering the Arché Question that draws on theoretical resources forged in recent advances in post-modal metaphysics.

We develop an argument for a novel version of moral intuitionism centered on the claim that moral intuitions are trustworthy. Our argument employs an epistemic principle that we call the Trustworthiness Criterion, a distinctive feature of which is its emphasis on oft-neglected social dimensions of cognitive states, including non-doxastic attitudes such as intuition. Thus our argument is not that moral intuitions are trustworthy because they are regress-stoppers, or because they are innocent until proven guilty, or because denying their epistemic contribution would be self-defeating, or because they are presupposed in rational inference, or because they are analogous to perceptions, or because they are based on understanding—individualistic claims that have elsewhere been used (controversially) in defense of the thesis that moral intuitions are in good epistemic standing. Rather, our argument appeals to the idea that moral intuitions are trustworthy because they are the outputs of a cognitive practice, which has epistemically-fecund social elements, that is in good working order.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

We offer a reconstruction of Richard Price’s intuition-based epistemology of normative essences, highlighting its key elements and showing how it differs from the approaches taken by other intuitionists such as Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore, as well as sentimentalists such as Francis Hutcheson and David Hume. While our analysis aims to shed light on Price’s moral epistemology, it also seeks to contribute to contemporary debates about the epistemology of essence, advancing a general intuition-based theory. These two goals are related, for the former operates in the service of the latter. In this way, our discussion illustrates the role that historical research might play in contemporary inquiries into intuition.