Russ Shafer-Landau

This chapter presents a new explanationist argument for moral skepticism, the predictive explanationist argument. Unlike the traditional explanationist argument, which holds that we cannot have moral knowledge because moral facts lack explanatory power, the predictive explanationist argument says that moral beliefs cannot amount to knowledge because they do not facilitate predictive success. The problem is not with the nature of moral facts but with the nature of our moral beliefs and concepts. This argument makes special trouble for moral naturalists who are committed to naturalist realism as a general philosophical thesis, since the key epistemic premise of the predictive explanationist argument is arguably constitutive of general naturalist realism.

A central project in epistemology is to spell out the conditions under which a belief is epistemically justified. By contrast, ethicists have not given much attention to the conditions under which an action is morally justified. This state of affairs is surprising, given the way we use the term “justified” in everyday discourse. This chapter argues that the concept of moral justification has an important role to play in ethics—a role that closely parallels the role epistemic justification plays in epistemology. After articulating this role, the chapter takes some first steps toward providing a unified theory of moral and epistemic justification. Along the way, it highlights the theoretical payoff of adding moral justification to our conceptual toolkit.

According to metaethical contextualism, normative sentence types do not express complete truth-evaluable contents but rather only a sentence token as uttered in a context does so. This is because, on this view, the context is required to supplement the missing elements of the sentence-type meaning to complete the content. After explaining this currently popular view, this chapter makes three objections to it. It argues that metaethical contextualism seems incompatible with the intuitive felicity conditions of normative utterances, threatens to lead to regresses of analysis, and fails to fit the modular explanations of our linguistic abilities. This chapter then concludes by outlining a minimalist alternative and several strategies for how semantic minimalists can accommodate many of the central motivations for metaethical contextualism.

Theories of moral worth assume that when two agents perform the same right action yet differ in praiseworthiness, the difference must lie in the content of their motivating reasons. But this assumption is false. Agents who act for identical reasons may nonetheless differ in whether they deserve moral credit for the act. This chapter argues that moral worth requires taking a categorical rather than “hobbyist” stance toward the right-making feature: a stance in which the agent treats the reasons for which she acts as (in a certain sense) independent of her contingent desires. No content-based view of moral worth can account for this structural difference in motivation. So no content-based view can succeed. Debates focusing on content (in particular, whether the agent cares about the right “de re” or “de dicto”) rest on a false presupposition and obscure a critical dimension of moral worth.

According to commonly endorsed “enkratic principles,” one is practically irrational if one judges that one ought to φ without intending to φ, or judges that one has a normative reason to φ without being motivated to φ. Such principles are often considered both a priori or conceptually true and revelatory of the nature of reason-implying judgments, including moral judgments. This chapter, however, argues that: (1) There is intuitive ground for expanding these familiar enkratic principles to a principle the authors call EnkrasiaPlus. (2) EnkrasiaPlus is particularly plausible on the assumption that reason judgments have a motivational function. (3) However, it is a priori possible that actual reason judgments instead have a political function. (4) If they do, EnkrasiaPlus, including its more familiar components, loses its plausibility. (5) Practical rationality is thus at least partly a posteriori. (6) This has important implications for philosophical debates about moral motivation and moral worth.

According to the Balancing View of Ought, we ought to perform an action if and only if performing the action is most strongly supported by the balance of our reasons. The Balancing View faces the objection from exclusionary reasons, which are second-order reasons not to act for certain other reasons. According to Joseph Raz, the existence of exclusionary reasons undermines the Balancing View: a reason might tip the balance in favour of performing an act but at the same time be excluded by an undefeated second-order reason, in which case one ought not conform to the balance of reasons. This chapter argues that the Balancing View can be defended against this objection and that the existence of exclusionary reasons is compatible with the Balancing View.

This chapter explores some avenues for developing Kantian views in metaethics in a more post-Kantian direction. In doing so, it focuses on motivating a broadly idealist approach to metaethics through the idea that the normative domain is essentially intelligible—so that reasons and values are necessarily apt objects of certain forms of practical understanding. It provides several reasons for thinking that an intelligibility constraint of this sort is plausible, focusing on three ideas: (1) that we should not be deeply alienated from the normative domain; (2) that the normative domain must be free of arbitrariness; and (3) that reasons and values can play their characteristic functions only if they are intelligible. Then the chapter turns to whether this supports a form of metaethical idealism. Finally, it turns to a worry about these claims and explains why this actually supports the post-Kantian picture against more thoroughgoing forms of normative realism.

When I say that some action is morally wrong, and you say that it isn’t, we appear to be disagreeing, and indeed to be doing so in a particularly robust way—more so than if we were to “disagree” about the tastiness of blue cheese, for instance. This chapter considers whether the anti-realist can do justice to the phenomenon of moral disagreement. Seen from the outside, moral disagreement presents itself as a robust but nonetheless fundamentally symmetrical clash between two parties. But from the perspective of a party to the disagreement, the situation displays an important asymmetry: I hold not only that our attitudes clash but also that I am right and you are wrong. Capturing this asymmetry requires, the chapter argues, something with a fundamentally realist structure. As a result, the anti-realist is forced to adopt an error theory about a central part of our ordinary moral experience.

This chapter challenges the contingentist response to the supervenience problem for non-naturalists. Some philosophers argue that non-naturalists should embrace contingentism—the view that normative facts are metaphysically contingent—to avoid the burden of explaining why normative properties supervene on non-normative ones. This chapter shows that this move backfires: because contingentism renders the normative authority of moral principles contingent, non-naturalists who accept it can’t explain why those principles have authority in the actual world, whereas naturalists can. As a result, naturalists retain an explanatory edge regardless of supervenience. The chapter then defends necessitarianism for non-naturalists by refuting two main claims: (i) that the conceivability of competing ethical theories supports contingentism and (ii) that non-naturalist commitments entail it. In refuting the latter claim, it develops a non-naturalist strategy for vindicating necessitarianism that the literature has been too quick to dismiss. Finally, the chapter shows that its discussion highlights an important lesson about how we should understand the supervenience thesis in the first place.

You’re required to grieve your friend’s death, permitted to regret spilling the milk, and forbidden to envy your colleague’s enviable publication record. What explains this variability in the demandingness of the norms on emotion? Although the fact that you’ve lost your friend doesn’t change, it’s appropriate for your grief to fade over time. How can emotions fittingly diminish in intensity when their objects’ properties remain constant? This chapter provides a principled, unified solution to both puzzles. On the “Enticing Emotions” view, fit-related reasons for emotion are always enticing: they commend and justify emotions without requiring them. By contrast, moral and prudential reasons can require emotions. While the fit-related reasons for emotion are always enticing, moral and prudential reasons explain the variable demandingness of the norms on emotion. And although the fit-related reasons for emotion often remain constant, emotions can fade over time while remaining rationally justified and fitting.

Can the moral be causally efficacious? When my friend does something morally wrong, is it the moral wrongness of her action that causes me to think, my friend did something morally wrong? It is generally assumed that how one should answer these questions depends on one’s metaethical commitments. Moral naturalism is taken to let us account for moral causation, while moral non-naturalism is taken not to. This chapter argues that this assumption is false. According to widely accepted difference-making accounts of causation, the moral may be causally efficacious on standard non-naturalist views.

Some actions are fitting: giving a moving and mournful eulogy at a funeral; the calling out of an overlooked injustice. Some actions are unfitting: praising someone you know to be evil; laughing during a minute’s silence. But what is it for an action to be fitting or unfitting? There has been little discussion of fitting actions, rather than fitting attitudes, in the recent explosion of literature on fittingness. This chapter first explores existing accounts of fitting action and argues that there are reasons to reject them. It then proposes a new deontic account of fitting action and argues that this account shows that whether an action is fitting matters and has implications for the debate about the authoritative normativity of fittingness.

This article argues that there are two fundamentally different types of alethic and epistemic progress in philosophy. It is widely assumed that such progress is to be assessed by reference to the quantity or quality of philosophy's product (i.e., a type of output or outcome, such as true answers, coherent views, knowledge, or understanding), rather than to the manner in which philosophy is done—its performance. That assumption is mistaken. Performance progress is not reducible to product progress. This carries implications for debates about peer disagreement, epistemic consequentialism, philosophical methods, and the idea of philosophy as a “spiritual exercise.”

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

This article argues that there are two fundamentally different types of alethic and epistemic progress in philosophy. It is widely assumed that such progress is to be assessed by reference to the quantity or quality of philosophy's product (i.e., a type of output or outcome, such as true answers, coherent views, knowledge, or understanding), rather than to the manner in which philosophy is done—its performance. That assumption is mistaken. Performance progress is not reducible to product progress. This carries implications for debates about peer disagreement, epistemic consequentialism, philosophical methods, and the idea of philosophy as a “spiritual exercise.”

The contents of the inaugural volume of Oxford Studies in Metaethics nicely mirror the variety of issues that make this area of philosophy so interesting. The volume opens with Peter Railton's exploration of some central features of normative guidance, the mental states that underwrite it, and its relationship to our reasons for feeling and acting. In the next offering, Terence Cuneo takes up the case against expressivism, arguing that its central account of the nature of moral judgments is badly mistaken. Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons, two of the most prominent contemporary expressivists, then offer their take on how expressivism manages to avoid a different objection-that of collapsing into an objectionable form of relativism. Daniel Jacobson and Justin D'Arms next offer an article that continues their research program devoted to exploring the extent to which values might depend upon, or be constrained by, human psychology. Ralph Wedgwood engages in some classical metaethical conceptual analysis, seeking to explicate the meaning of ought. Mark van Roojen then contributes a new take on the Moral Twin Earth Argument, a prominent anti-realist puzzle advanced in the early 1990s by Horgan and Timmons.Allan Gibbard next presents his latest thoughts on the nature of moral feelings and moral concepts, crucial elements in the overall project of defending the expressivism he is so well known for. James Dreier then takes up the details of Gibbard's recent efforts to provide a solution to what many view as the most serious difficulty for expressivism, namely, the Frege-Geach problem. Dreier identifies difficulties in Gibbard's expressivist account, and offers a suggestion for their solution. Sergio Tenenbaum explores the concept of a direction of fit, relied on so heavily nowadays in accounts of moral motivation. Nadeem Hussain and Nishiten Shah then consider the merits of Christine Korsgaard's influential critique of moral realism. T. M. Scanlon's widely-discussed buck-passing account of value attracts the critical eye of Pekka Väyrynen, who attempts to reveal the reasons that we might resist it. Derek Parfit's contribution concludes this volume, with an article on normativity that presents his most recent thinking on this fundamental notion.

The second edition of_ Ethical Theory: An Anthology_ features a comprehensive collection of more than 80 essays from classic and contemporary philosophers that address questions at the heart of moral philosophy. Brings together 82 classic and contemporary pieces by renowned philosophers, from seminal works by Hume and Kant to contemporary views by Derek Parfit, Susan Wolf, Judith Jarvis Thomson, and many more Features updates and the inclusion of a new section on feminist ethics, along with a general introduction and section introductions by Russ Shafer-Landau Guides readers through key areas in ethical theory including consequentialism, deontology, contractarianism, and virtue ethics Includes underrepresented topics such as moral knowledge, moral standing, moral responsibility, and ethical particularism.

Simon Blackburn has developed an interesting challenge to moral realism based on its alleged inability to account for supervenience relations between the moral and nonmoral. If supervenience holds, then any base property once giving rise to a supervening one must always do so. The realist accepts supervenience, but also (according to Blackburn) accepts the claim that nonmoral base properties do not necessitate the moral ones that supervene on them. This combination is thought deadly, because it leaves the realist without an explanation of why ethical supervenience should be true. I offer three responses on behalf of the moral realist. The first rejects the need for explanation, arguing that supervenience should be understood as closely analogous to Leibniz's law, which, I argue, needs no defense. I next argue that ethical naturalism may be right, and if so, would provide an adequate response to Blackburn. Lastly, I show that the success of Blackburn's arguments implies a global antirealism, and so does not, as he claims, amount to a special problem for realism in ethics.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The important chapters included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

REASON AND RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS IN SOME BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY, 16th Edition, has a well-earned reputation for clarity and breadth, with a selection of high-quality readings that cover centuries of philosophical debate. The anthology covers the central issues in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and ethics, as well as debates over the value of philosophy and the meaning of life. The book is clearly organized: the readings complement each other, guiding you through contrasting positions on key philosophical issues. Clear, concise introductions provide reading tips and background information to help you engage directly and meaningfully with the primary sources.