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120Selection never dominates driftBiology and Philosophy 28 (4): 577-592. 2013.The probability that the fitter of two alleles will increase in frequency in a population goes up as the product of N (the effective population size) and s (the selection coefficient) increases. Discovering the distribution of values for this product across different alleles in different populations is a very important biological task. However, biologists often use the product Ns to define a different concept; they say that drift “dominates” selection or that drift is “stronger than” selection w…Read more
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34Evolution without NaturalismIn Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 3, Oxford University Press. 2011.God and numbers provide two challenges to metaphysical naturalism–the former if God exists and is a supernatural being, the latter if numbers exist and mathematical Platonism is true. Evolutionary theory is often described as having a commitment to naturalism, but this is doubly wrong. The theory is neutral on the question of whether God exists and mathematical evolutionary theory entails that numbers exist. The chapter develops the point about theistic neutrality by considering what evolutionar…Read more
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59The Design ArgumentCambridge University Press. 2019.This Element analyzes the various forms that design arguments for the existence of God can take, but the main focus is on two such arguments. The first concerns the complex adaptive features that organisms have. Creationists who advance this argument contend that evolution by natural selection cannot be the right explanation. The second design argument - the argument from fine-tuning - begins with the fact that life could not exist in our universe if the constants found in the laws of physics ha…Read more
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37Causal Factors, Causal Inference, Causal ExplanationAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1). 1986.There are two concepts of causes, property causation and token causation. The principle I want to discuss describes an epistemological connection between the two concepts, which I call the Connecting Principle. The rough idea is that if a token event of type Cis followed by a token event of type E, then the support of the hypothesis that the first event token caused the second increases as the strength of the property causal relation of C to E does. I demonstrate the principle, illustrate its ap…Read more
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514Causal Factors, Causal Inference, Causal ExplanationAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1): 97-136. 1986.
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196Against proportionalityAnalysis 72 (1): 89-93. 2012.A statement of the form ‘C caused E’ obeys the requirement of proportionality precisely when C says no more than what is necessary to bring about E. The thesis that causal statements must obey this requirement might be given a semantic or a pragmatic justification. We use the idea that causal claims are contrastive to criticize both
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316Prediction versus accommodation and the risk of overfittingBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1): 1-34. 2004.an observation to formulate a theory, it is no surprise that the resulting theory accurately captures that observation. However, when the theory makes a novel prediction—when it predicts an observation that was not used in its formulation—this seems to provide more substantial confirmation of the theory. This paper presents a new approach to the vexed problem of understanding the epistemic difference between prediction and accommodation. In fact, there are several problems that need to be disent…Read more
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274Models and Reality—A Review of Brian Skyrms’s Evolution of the Social ContractPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 237. 1999.Human beings are peculiar. In laboratory experiments, they often cooperate in one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas, they frequently offer 1/2 and reject low offers in the ultimatum game, and they often bid 1/2 in the game of divide-the-cake All these behaviors are puzzling from the point of view of game theory. The first two are irrational, if utility is measured in a certain way.1 The last isn’t positively irrational, but it is no more rational than other possible actions, since there are infinitely ma…Read more
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308How Not to Detect DesignThe Design Inference. William A. DembskiPhilosophy of Science 66 (3): 472-488. 1999.As every philosopher knows, “the design argument” concludes that God exists from premisses that cite the adaptive complexity of organisms or the lawfulness and orderliness of the whole universe. Since 1859, it has formed the intellectual heart of creationist opposition to the Darwinian hypothesis that organisms evolved their adaptive features by the mindless process of natural selection. Although the design argument developed as a defense of theism, the logic of the argument in fact encompasses …Read more
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55Aristotle on “Nature Does Nothing in Vain”Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (2): 246-271. 2017.Aristotle’s principle that “nature does nothing in vain” (NDNIV) is central to his teleological approach to understanding organisms. First, we argue that James G. Lennox’s influential account of NDNIV is unsuccessful. Second, we propose an alternative account that includes a natural state model. According to a natural state model of development, an organism will develop toward its natural state unless interfering forces prevent that from happening. Third, we argue that this account also fits Ari…Read more
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26Similarities as Evidence for Common Ancestry: A Likelihood EpistemologyBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (3): 617-638. 2017.ABSTRACT Darwin claims in the Origin that similarity is evidence for common ancestry, but that adaptive similarities are ‘almost valueless’ as evidence. This second claim seems reasonable for some adaptive similarities but not for others. Here we clarify and evaluate these and related matters by using the law of likelihood as an analytic tool and by considering mathematical models of three evolutionary processes: directional selection, stabilizing selection, and drift. Our results apply both to …Read more
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1092Explanation = Unification? A New Criticism of Friedman’s Theory and a Reply to an Old OnePhilosophy of Science 84 (3): 391-413. 2017.According to Michael Friedman’s theory of explanation, a law X explains laws Y1, Y2, …, Yn precisely when X unifies the Y’s, where unification is understood in terms of reducing the number of independently acceptable laws. Philip Kitcher criticized Friedman’s theory but did not analyze the concept of independent acceptability. Here we show that Kitcher’s objection can be met by modifying an element in Friedman’s account. In addition, we argue that there are serious objections to the use that Fri…Read more
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648Is Explanatoriness a Guide to Confirmation? A Reply to ClimenhagaJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (4): 581-590. 2017.We argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in the following sense: Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then our claim is that Pr = Pr. We defended this screening-off thesis by discussing an example concerning smoking and cancer. Climenhaga argues that SOT is mistaken because it delivers the wrong verdict about a slightly different smoking-and-cancer case. He also considers a variant of SOT, called “SOT*”, and …Read more
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Summary of: ‘Unto Others. The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior’Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2): 185-206. 2000.The hypothesis of group selection fell victim to a seemingly devastating critique in 1960s evolutionary biology. In Unto Others, we argue to the contrary, that group selection is a conceptually coherent and empirically well documented cause of evolution. We suggest, in addition, that it has been especially important in human evolution. In the second part of Unto Others, we consider the issue of psychological egoism and altruism -- do human beings have ultimate motives concerning the well-being o…Read more
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Morality and ‘Unto Others'. Response to commentary discussionJournal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2): 257-268. 2000.We address the following issues raised by the commentators of our target article and book: the problem of multiple perspectives; how to define group selection; distinguishing between the concepts of altruism and organism; genetic versus cultural group selection; the dark side of group selection; the relationship between psychological and evolutionary altruism; the question of whether the psychological questions can be answered; psychological experiments. We thank the contributors for their comme…Read more
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135TestabilityProceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (2): 47-76. 1999.That some propositions are testable, while others are not, was a fundamental idea in the philosophical program known as logical empiricism. That program is now widely thought to be defunct. Quine’s (1953) “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” and Hempel’s (1950) “Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning” are among its most notable epitaphs. Yet, as we know from Mark Twain’s comment on an obituary that he once had the pleasure of reading about himself, the report of a death can be an exag…Read more
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The Nature of Selection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical FocusBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (3): 397-399. 1987.
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289Realism, Conventionalism, and Causal Decomposition in Units of Selection: Reflections on Samir Okasha’s Evolution and the Levels of SelectionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1): 221-231. 2010.I discuss two subjects in Samir Okasha’s excellent book, Evolution and the Levels of Selection. In consonance with Okasha’s critique of the conventionalist view of the units of selection problem, I argue that conventionalists have not attended to what realists mean by group, individual, and genic selection. In connection with Okasha’s discussion of the Price equation and contextual analysis, I discuss whether the existence of these two quantitative frameworks is a challenge to realism.
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11Group selection and “the pious gene”Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (4): 782-787. 1996.The six commentaries raise five issues about multi-level selection theory that we attempt to address: (1) replicators without vehicles, (2) group selection and movement between groups, (3) absolute versus relative fitness, (4) group-level psychological adaptions, and (5) multi-level selection as a predictive theory.
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48Is the theory of natural selection unprincipled? A reply to ShimonyBiology and Philosophy 4 (3): 275-279. 1989.Without.
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94Popper’s Shifting Appraisal of Evolutionary TheoryHopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (1): 31-55. 2017.Karl Popper argued in 1974 that evolutionary theory contains no testable laws and is therefore a metaphysical research program. Four years later, he said that he had changed his mind. Here we seek to understand Popper’s initial position and his subsequent retraction. We argue, contrary to Popper’s own assessment, that he did not change his mind at all about the substance of his original claim. We also explore how Popper’s views have ramifications for contemporary discussion of the nature of laws…Read more
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111In S. Psillos and M. Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, forthcoming.
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33Instrumentalism, Parsimony, and the Akaike FrameworkPhilosophy of Science 69 (S3). 2002.Akaike's framework for thinking about model selection in terms of the goal of predictive accuracy and his criterion for model selection have important philosophical implications. Scientists often test models whose truth values they already know, and they often decline to reject models that they know full well are false. Instrumentalism helps explain this pervasive feature of scientific practice, and Akaike's framework helps provide instrumentalism with the epistemology it needs. Akaike's criteri…Read more
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168Artifact, cause and genic selectionPhilosophy of Science 49 (2): 157-180. 1982.Several evolutionary biologists have used a parsimony argument to argue that the single gene is the unit of selection. Since all evolution by natural selection can be represented in terms of selection coefficients attaching to single genes, it is, they say, "more parsimonious" to think that all selection is selection for or against single genes. We examine the limitations of this genic point of view, and then relate our criticisms to a broader view of the role of causal concepts and the dangers …Read more
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165To give a surprise exam, use game theorySynthese 115 (3): 355-373. 1998.This paper proposes a game-theoretic solution of the surprise examination problem. It is argued that the game of “matching pennies” provides a useful model for the interaction of a teacher who wants her exam to be surprising and students who want to avoid being surprised. A distinction is drawn between prudential and evidential versions of the problem. In both, the teacher should not assign a probability of zero to giving the exam on the last day. This representation of the problem provides a di…Read more
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297Putting the function back into functionalismIn William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition, Blackwell. 1990.This paper describes how functionalism as a view of the mind/body problem changes, if the concept of Turing machine functionalism is replaced by teleological functionalism. The latter is evaluated in light of the on0going debate about adaptationism in evolutoinary biology.
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55Multilevel selection and the return of group-level functionalismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2): 305-306. 1998.We reinforce Thompson's points by providing a second example of the paradox that makes group selection appear counterintuitive and by discussing the wider implications of multilevel selection theory.
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