Robert Streiffer

In her recent article, Does autonomy count in favor of labeling genetically modified food?, Kirsten Hansen argues that in Europe, voluntary negative labeling of non-GM foods respects consumer autonomy just as well as mandatory positive labeling of foods with GM content. She also argues that because negative labeling places labeling costs upon those consumers that want to know whether food is GM, negative labeling is better policy than positive labeling. In this paper, we argue that Hansens arguments are mistaken in several respects. Most importantly, she underestimates the demands of respecting autonomy and overestimates the cost of positive labeling. Moreover, she mistakenly implies that only a small minority of people desire information about GM content. We also explore the extent to which her arguments would apply to the US context, and argue that any discussion of the relationship between autonomy and labeling should include not just considerations of consumer autonomy but also considerations of what we call citizen autonomy.

I saw a poster the other day that said: “Living. It’s the only thing worth dying for.” Now, I’m not sure what that means really—in fact, I think it is an advertisement for a clothing company—but it brings up an interesting issue or cluster of issues. Are there things worth dying for? Or, and I know this is a very different question, are there things worth killing for? This is the question which we are going to talk about this week and next. Of course, we’ll be talking about it on an international scale, but I think its answer hinges in important ways on the individual scale. We’ll come back to this point and we can get at it in more detail in the question period if you like.

: Commercial academic-industry relationships (AIRs) are widespread in biotechnology and have resulted in a wide array of restrictions on academic research. Objections to such restrictions have centered on the charge that they violate academic freedom. I argue that these objections are almost invariably unsuccessful. On a consequentialist understanding of the value of academic freedom, they rely on unfounded empirical claims about the overall effects that AIRs have on academic research. And on a rights-based understanding of the value of academic freedom, they rely on excessively lavish assumptions about the kinds of activities that academic freedom protects

Discussions about the ethics of animal research usually focus on the significance of the knowledge produced by the research and on the harms the research procedures cause the animal subjects. These research procedures typically occupy only a small portion of the animals’ lives compared to the time they spend confined in their cages. This chapter clarifies both the conceptual and ethical issues raised by the confinement of laboratory animals. How should “confinement” be defined? Are the ethical costs and benefits of confinement relevant to the ethical evaluation of the later research in which the animals are used? In what ways are animals’ interests instrumentally related to their being confined? Do they have an intrinsic interest in liberty that is frustrated by confinement per se? And, finally, what are the ethical implications of the ways in which confinement is or is not related to animals’ interests?