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5Berkeley : arguments for idealismIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.
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51On believing that I am thinkingProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2): 125-44. 1998.It is argued that a second-order belief to the effect that I now have some particular propositional attitude is always true (Incorrigibility). This is not because we possess an infallible cognitive faculty of introspection, but because that x believes that he himself now has attitude A to proposition P entails that x has A to P. Incorrigibility applies only to second-order beliefs and not to mere linguistic avowals of attitudes. This view combines a necessary asymmetry between 1st and 3rd person…Read more
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140Berkeley's world: an examination of the Three dialoguesOxford University Press. 2002.Tom Stoneham offers a clear and detailed study of Berkeley's metaphysics and epistemology, as presented in his classic work Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, originally published in 1713 and still widely studied. Stoneham shows that Berkeley is an important and systematic philosopher whose work is still of relevance to philosophers today.
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18Self-knowledgeIn Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen & Jan Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology, Kluwer Academic. pp. 647--672. 2004.
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29Comment on Davies: A general dilemma?Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 225-231. 1992.Tom Stoneham; Comment on Davies: A General Dilemma?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 225–232, https://doi.org/10.
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102Berkeley's "Esse Is Percipi" and Collier's "Simple" ArgumentHistory of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (3): 211-224. 2006.
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9Transparency, Sense and Self-KnowledgeIn Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 103--112. 1995.
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71On equivocationPhilosophy 78 (4): 515-519. 2003.Equivocation is often described as a fallacy. In this short note I argue that it is not a logical concept but an epistemic one. The argument of one who equivocates is not logically flawed, but it is unpersuasive in a very distinctive way.
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1Berkeley’s World: An Examination of the Three DialoguesPhilosophical Quarterly 54 (217): 629-631. 2004.
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110A neglected account of perceptionDialectica 62 (3): 307-322. 2008.I aim to draw the reader's attention to an easily overlooked account of perception, namely that there are no perceptual experiences, that to perceive something is to stand in an external, purely non-Leibnizian relation to it. I introduce the Purely Relational account of perception by discussing a case of it being overlooked in the writings of G.E. Moore, though we also find the same move in J. Cook Wilson, so it has nothing to do with an affection for sense-data. I then discuss the relation betw…Read more