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286Another Failed Refutation of ScepticismTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 36 (2): 19-30. 2017.Jessica Wilson has recently offered a more sophisticated version of the self-defeat objection to Cartesian scepicism. She argues that the assertion of Cartesian scepticism results in an unstable vicious regress. The way out of the regress is to not engage with the Cartesian sceptic at all, to stop the regress before it starts, at the warranted assertion that the external world exists. We offer three reasons why this objection fails: first, the sceptic need not accept Wilson’s characterization of…Read more
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27Response to Atherton: No Atheism Without SkepticismIn Stewart Duncan & Antonia LoLordo (eds.), Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses, Routledge. pp. 216. 2013.
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107Catching Berkeley's shadowSouthern Journal of Philosophy 49 (2): 116-136. 2011.Berkeley thinks that we only see the size, shape, location, and orientation of objects in virtue of the correlation between sight and touch. Shadows have all of these spatial properties and yet are intangible. In Seeing Dark Things (2008), Roy Sorensen argues that shadows provide a counterexample to Berkeley's theory of vision and, consequently, to his idealism. This paper shows that Berkeley can accept both that shadows are intangible and that they have spatial properties
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5Berkeley : arguments for idealismIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.
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51On believing that I am thinkingProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2): 125-44. 1998.It is argued that a second-order belief to the effect that I now have some particular propositional attitude is always true (Incorrigibility). This is not because we possess an infallible cognitive faculty of introspection, but because that x believes that he himself now has attitude A to proposition P entails that x has A to P. Incorrigibility applies only to second-order beliefs and not to mere linguistic avowals of attitudes. This view combines a necessary asymmetry between 1st and 3rd person…Read more
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140Berkeley's world: an examination of the Three dialoguesOxford University Press. 2002.Tom Stoneham offers a clear and detailed study of Berkeley's metaphysics and epistemology, as presented in his classic work Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, originally published in 1713 and still widely studied. Stoneham shows that Berkeley is an important and systematic philosopher whose work is still of relevance to philosophers today.
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18Self-knowledgeIn Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen & Jan Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology, Kluwer Academic. pp. 647--672. 2004.
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29Comment on Davies: A general dilemma?Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 225-231. 1992.Tom Stoneham; Comment on Davies: A General Dilemma?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 225–232, https://doi.org/10.
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103Berkeley's "Esse Is Percipi" and Collier's "Simple" ArgumentHistory of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (3): 211-224. 2006.
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9Transparency, Sense and Self-KnowledgeIn Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference one Hundred Years later, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 103--112. 1995.