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104Berkeley's "Esse Is Percipi" and Collier's "Simple" ArgumentHistory of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (3): 211-224. 2006.
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9Transparency, Sense and Self-KnowledgeIn Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference one Hundred Years later, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 103--112. 1995.
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71On equivocationPhilosophy 78 (4): 515-519. 2003.Equivocation is often described as a fallacy. In this short note I argue that it is not a logical concept but an epistemic one. The argument of one who equivocates is not logically flawed, but it is unpersuasive in a very distinctive way.
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1Berkeley’s World: An Examination of the Three DialoguesPhilosophical Quarterly 54 (217): 629-631. 2004.
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95A neglected account of perceptionDialectica 62 (3): 307-322. 2008.I aim to draw the reader's attention to an easily overlooked account of perception, namely that there are no perceptual experiences, that to perceive something is to stand in an external, purely non-Leibnizian relation to it. I introduce the Purely Relational account of perception by discussing a case of it being overlooked in the writings of G.E. Moore, though we also find the same move in J. Cook Wilson, so it has nothing to do with an affection for sense-data. I then discuss the relation betw…Read more
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463Time and truth: The presentism-eternalism debatePhilosophy 84 (2): 201-218. 2009.There are many questions we can ask about time, but perhaps the most fundamental is whether there are metaphysically interesting differences between past, present and future events. An eternalist believes in a block universe: past, present and future events are all on an equal footing. A gradualist believes in a growing block: he agress with the eternalist about the past and the present but not about the future. A presentist believes that what is present has a special status. My first claim is t…Read more
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90Boghossian on empty natural kind conceptsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1): 119-22. 1999.Paul Boghossian has argued that Externalism is incompatible with privileged self-knowledge because (i) the Externalist can cite no property to be the reference of an empty natural kind concept such as the ether; (ii) without reference there is no content; hence (iii) either we do know on the basis of introspection alone whether an apparent natural kind thought has content or not, in which case we can infer from self-knowledge and a priori knowledge of Externalism alone to the existence in our en…Read more
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37When did Collier read Berkeley?British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (2). 2007.This Article does not have an abstract
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32Conditionals and biconditionals in constitutive theories of self-knowledgePhilosophical Papers 32 (2): 149-55. 2003.Philosophical Papers Vol.32(2) 2003: 149-155
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279A reductio of coherentismAnalysis 67 (3). 2007.An argument is presented which shows that coherence theories of justification are committed to a conception of epistemic support which conflicts with an axiom of probability theory
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102Temporal externalismPhilosophical Papers 32 (1): 97-107. 2003.Abstract Temporal Externalism is the view that future events can contribute to determining the present content of our thoughts and utterances. Two objections to Temporal Externalism are discussed and rejected. The first is that Temporal Externalism has implausible consequences for the epistemology of biology and other taxonomic sciences (Brown, 2000). The second is that it is committed to implausible claims about dispositions