Monika Betzler

To what extent can conspiracy theories be understood as a political challenge in these pandemic times? In order to discuss this issue, I provide an explication of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ that allows it to be applied in an epistemically elucidating and politically fruitful way. Against this backdrop, I will demonstrate how conspiracy theories violate, among other things, the ethically relevant standards that are established through well-ordered political deliberation, such as standards of intersubjective justification, epistemic justice and respect. To conclude, I will show how the structural violation of these standards can lead to a rise in the number of people believing in conspiracy theories and deepens people’s mistrust of epistemic authorities.

Although collegial relationships are among the most prevalent types of interpersonal relationships in our lives, they have not been the subject of much philosophical study. In this paper, we take the first step in the process of developing an ethics of collegiality by establishing what qualifies two people as colleagues and then by determining what it is that gives value to collegial relationships. We argue that A and B are colleagues if both exhibit sameness regarding at least two of the following three features: the same work content or domain of activity; the same institutional affiliation or common purpose; and/or the same status or level of responsibility. Moreover, we describe how the potential value of collegial relationships is grounded in the relationship goods that two colleagues have reason to generate qua colleagues, namely, collegial solidarity and collegial recognition. Two interesting conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis are that one has to be proficient at one’s work if one is to be considered a good colleague and that we are also more likely to be better colleagues if we regard the work we do as valuable. Finally, we draw special attention to the working conditions that are conducive to the generation of good collegial relationships and suggest some policies to promote them.

Several authors have argued that friendship plays a distinct role in the justification of paternalism. But their accounts face several challenges, and they one-sidedly focus on cases in which friendship allegedly provides reasons in favor of paternalism. In response to these accounts, we develop a new Modifying View, according to which relationship-independent reasons determine the (im-)permissibility of paternalism in paradigmatic cases, while friendship only affects its moral quality, both positively and negatively. We then turn to borderline cases, in which relationship-independent reasons do not clearly settle questions of permissibility. We show that, in such cases, friendship can tip the balance for and against paternalism, and we specifically highlight the problematic character of ongoing patterns of paternalism in friendship.

Romantic partnerships are typically among the most important goods in our lives. But love sometime ends, and so too do relationships. Divorcing partners are particularly vulnerable to being wronged and harmed. The aim of this paper is to develop an ethics of divorce, by establishing that divorce is a condition for the possibility of the distinct value of romantic partnerships. Different sets of rights are specified here: the divorcee's right to explanation, the right to participation and the right to transitional goods; and the divorcer's right to relational freedom. Violations of these rights indicate the distinct wrongs and harms of divorce. The paper then explains the corresponding duties in divorce that might avoid these wrongs and mitigate these harms, and highlights the distinct status of these duties: while they continue to be special, they are residual duties grounded in the fact that the partners once committed to their partnership.

Die Frage nach dem Wert der Kindheit lässt sich prinzipiell in zwei verschiedenen Weisen verstehen. Zum einen geht es darum herauszufinden, ob und in welcher Hinsicht es gut oder schlecht ist, ein Kind zu sein. Das Interesse gilt daher dem speziellen oder distinkten Wert, welcher der Kindheit etwa im Unterschied zum Erwachsensein zukommt. Zum andern wird untersucht, ob und wenn ja, inwiefern Kindheit als erste Phase menschlicher Entwicklung ein wertvoller Teil eines guten Lebens ist und wie dieser genauer gefasst werden kann. Hierbei liegt der prudentielle Wert von Kindheit im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit.

To showaffective empathyis to share in another person's experiences, including her emotions. Most philosophers who write about emotions accept the broadly cognitivist view that emotions are rationally connected with beliefs. We argue that affective empathy is also rationally connected with belief; you can only share in another's emotions insofar as you can share certain of her beliefs. In light of that claim, we argue that affective empathy brings both epistemic dangers and epistemic benefits, that the ideal of universal empathy cannot be built upon affective empathy, and that affective empathy cannot be the basis of morality.

To what extent can conspiracy theories be understood as a political challenge in these pandemic times? In order to discuss this issue, I provide an explication of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ that allows it to be applied in an epistemically elucidating and politically fruitful way. Against this backdrop, I will demonstrate how conspiracy theories violate, among other things, the ethically relevant standards that are established through well-ordered political deliberation, such as standards of intersubjective justification, epistemic justice and respect. To conclude, I will show how the structural violation of these standards can lead to a rise in the number of people believing in conspiracy theories and deepens people’s mistrust of epistemic authorities.

Humans have a fundamental need to belong. This, need, as Kimberley Brownlee argues in her book Being Sure of Each Other grounds the human right against social deprivation. But in addition to having a human right against social deprivation, we also have a right to associational freedom, which is grounded in our right to autonomy. We cannot be forced into relationships; we are free to choose our friends and loved ones.? In this paper I discuss what our right to associational freedom morally permits us to do when are already in an intimate relationship and, relatedly, what our relationship-dependent duties require of us in such cases. What exactly are the constraints on our right to associational freedom? And what is the content and scope of our relationship-dependent duties, given that our right to associational freedom conflicts with the fulfillment of these duties?? After providing some clarifications as to how we should understand intimate relationships that have ended, I will first highlight what relationship-dependent duties are and how they correlate with a right to associational control. I will then discuss several break-up scenarios, the aim of which is to determine the conditions that justify constraints being imposed on the right to associational freedom and to delineate the scope of relationship-dependent duties.

ABSTRACT This article examines whether there is a morally relevant difference between adolescents and adults even if both are similarly autonomous. Understanding that difference accounts for the particular moral significance of adolescence and explains what we owe to adolescents as individual members of that age group. I first raise the plausibility of this morally relevant difference by highlighting the difficulties that any attempts would face which try to assimilate adolescents to either adults or children. I then consider two recent proposals that have been made in the literature in support of the moral significance of adolescence and show that none of them can adequately account for it. In light of this diagnosis, I advance the Relational View according to which it is necessary for the development of adolescents' autonomous capacities that they are supported in both their self‐governance and self‐authorisation in close relationships while they are adolescent. As a result, the morally relevant difference between adolescents and adults consists in the fact that close relationships and the support they provide are necessary for adolescents to become skilled autonomous agents but only causally relevant for adults. An implication of this view is that paternalism is justified only in rare cases, and that friendships and partnerships later in life are unable to make up for what has been missed during adolescence.