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Barbara Tversky

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  •  Publications
    36
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  • All publications (36)
  •  93
    Structuring information interfaces for procedural learning
    with Jeffrey M. Zacks
    Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 9 (2): 88. 2003.
    Conscious and Unconscious Memory
  •  56
    The Cognitive Design of Tools of Thought
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1): 99-116. 2015.
    When thought overwhelms the mind, the mind puts it into the world, notably in diagrams and gestures.Both use space and arrays of elements, depictive and non-depictive, to convey ideas, concrete and abstract,clear and sketchy. The arrays and the non-depictive elements like boxes and arrows serve to showrelationships and organizations, thematic, categorical, and more. on paper, in the air, in the diagrammedworld. Human actions organize space to convey abstractions: spraction.
    Cognitive Sciences
  •  43
    Noun-modifier order in a semantic verification task
    with Simha Havousha and Arin Poller
    Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 13 (1): 31-34. 1979.
    Philosophy of Linguistics
  •  1608
    Ontology and geographic objects: An empirical study of cognitive categorization
    with David M. Mark and Barry Smith
    In Freksa C. & Mark David M. (eds.), Spatial Information Theory. Cognitive and Computational Foundations of Geographic Information Science (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1661), . pp. 283-298. 1999.
    Cognitive categories in the geographic realm appear to manifest certain special features as contrasted with categories for objects at surveyable scales. We have argued that these features reflect specific ontological characteristics of geographic objects. This paper presents hypotheses as to the nature of the features mentioned, reviews previous empirical work on geographic categories, and presents the results of pilot experiments that used English-speaking subjects to test our hypotheses. Our e…Read more
    Cognitive categories in the geographic realm appear to manifest certain special features as contrasted with categories for objects at surveyable scales. We have argued that these features reflect specific ontological characteristics of geographic objects. This paper presents hypotheses as to the nature of the features mentioned, reviews previous empirical work on geographic categories, and presents the results of pilot experiments that used English-speaking subjects to test our hypotheses. Our experiments show geographic categories to be similar to their non-geographic counterparts in the ways in which they generate instances of different relative frequencies at different levels. Other tests, however, provide preliminary evidence for the existence of important differences in subjects’ categorizations of geographic and non-geographic objects, and suggest further experimental work especially with regard to the role in cognitive categorization of different types of object-boundaries at different scales.
    Philosophy of GeographyOntologyPrototype and Exemplar Theories of Concepts
  •  54
    Assessing spatial frameworks with object and direction probes
    with David J. Bryant
    Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 30 (1): 29-32. 1992.
    Spatial Experience
  • Locating objects from memory or from sight
    with D. J. Bryant
    Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (6): 529-529. 1991.
    Aspects of Consciousness
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