Marilyn Friedman

This chapter explores some of the ways feminist conceptions of autonomy can combine relational and individualistic aspects. Special attention is given to the relational account of autonomy in Jennifer Nedelsky’s recent book, _Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law_. The first section of the chapter summarizes key ideas in Nedelsky’s rejection of liberal individualism and devaluation of the ideal of independence. The second section focuses on the idea of the “self-made man,” a particular target of Nedelsky’s anti-individualist account. This section argues that the idea of “self-made man” (or person) is not relevant to debates over autonomy but instead is significant in debates over capitalism. The third section of the chapter defends independence as an ideal for women and argues that it can cohere easily with relational accounts of autonomy.

Women in abusive relationships are highly vulnerable to coercion by their abusers in a variety of ways. This essay explores one way in which abusive relationships may compromise the moral agency of an abused woman in cases where the same man who is abusing the woman is also abusing children in her care. Courts have sometimes charged such women with "failure to protect" their children from this abuse. This essay considers three ways of assessing whether or not the women have diminished responsibility for the abuse inflicted on the children: justification, exemption, and excuse. It argues that although the women’s actions are not typically justified and the women are not typically exempt from moral responsibility altogether, nevertheless the women should usually be understood as excused for failing to protect their children from abuse because of the difficulty of resisting the abuser’s threat of further harm.

Several decades ago, feminists differentiated between the biologically given basis of sex identity (sex) and the socially constructed cultural practices anchored by sex identity (gender). In recent years, many feminists have challenged that distinction, arguing that biological sex is as much a social construct as are the practices comprising gender. I survey two examples from biological studies of sex identity that, by contrast (I maintain), warrant saving the concept of biologically given sex identity. The result is not antithetical to feminism, however, since these studies also suggest that sex identity proliferates beyond the rigid female/male dichotomy. If articulated carefully, this view can avoid metaphysically essentialist baggage while enriching feminist conceptions of sex identity.

Women have historically been prevented from living autonomously by systematic injustice, subordination, and oppression. The lingering effects of these practices have prompted many feminists to view autonomy with suspicion. This book defends the ideal of feminist autonomy. The book proposes that behavior is autonomous if it accords with the wants, cares, values, or commitments that the actor has reaffirmed and is able to sustain in the face of opposition. By this account, autonomy is socially grounded yet also individualizing and sometimes socially disruptive, qualities that can be ultimately advantageous for women. The book applies the concept of autonomy to domains of special interest to women. It defends the importance of autonomy in romantic love, considers how social institutions should respond to women who choose to remain in abusive relationships, and argues that liberal societies should tolerate minority cultural practices that violate women's rights so long as the women in question have chosen autonomously to live according to those practices.

This chapter surveys prominent feminist writings that call for a relational conception of autonomy and that criticize the philosophical mainstream for lacking such an account. It shows that prominent mainstream accounts of autonomy do acknowledge the importance of social relationships, thus tending to converge on this point with the prevalent feminist view. Feminists' objections to mainstream conceptions of autonomy are considered, focusing on the charge that mainstream accounts do not take account of social relationships.

Feminists, communitarians, and other social theorists have raised numerous challenges to the very possibility of the ideal of personal autonomy and its alleged value. This chapter offers a negative defense of autonomy by responding to six critical challenges that have been or may be leveled against it. These are that autonomy-self-determination is impossible because there are no selves; autonomy is impossible because selves cannot “determine” themselves: human actions are merely links in chains of interpersonal interactions; autonomy is impossible because selves cannot determine themselves: they cannot understand themselves accurately; autonomy is possible but not genuinely valuable, and may even be positively harmful, especially to socially subordinated or oppressed groups; autonomy is possible and genuinely valuable, but has been restricted in practice to elite social groups; and that autonomy is possible and genuinely valuable but can be, and has been, distorted in practice into something harmful.

This chapter develops a point made in preceding chapters that autonomy, although socially grounded, has an individualizing dimension — a dimension that is defend against the worries of critics. The main thesis is that: at the same time that we embrace relational accounts of autonomy, we should also be cautious about them. Autonomy increases the risk of disruption in interpersonal relationships. While this is an empirical and not a conceptual claim about autonomy, nevertheless, the risk is significant and its bearing on the value of autonomy is therefore empirically significant. It makes a difference in particular to whether the ideal of autonomy is genuinely hospitable to women.

This chapter presents a variety of considerations suggesting that autonomy is a valuable ideal, focusing on its value for women. The focus is on women for several reasons. First, autonomy has not always been idealized for women. Even though autonomy is more widely encouraged and supported in women than ever before, it is still not regarded as a particularly feminine value or virtue. If a case for autonomy can be made out for women in particular against this history, then the case for autonomy in general should prove easier to secure. Second, feminist philosophers have figured prominently among those who have expressed doubts and reservations about the value of autonomy. Focusing on the case of women's autonomy in particular helps to answer those criticisms.

Debates about how to incorporate the severely cognitively disabled into liberal theory typically focus on John Rawls’s assumption that citizens choosing the principles of justice should be understood as full social cooperators. In this paper, we argue that social cooperation is not the fundamental barrier to the inclusion of the severely cognitively disabled. We argue that these persons are excluded from the entire project of liberal legitimacy in virtue of the apparent inability of a severely cognitively disabled person to understand and evaluate the legitimacy of political principles for herself. Severely cognitively disabled persons lack a kind of access to political principles that is crucial, according to liberal theory, for political principles to be legitimate to someone, and not simply for someone