Jonardon Ganeri

The thesis of this paper is that the capacity to think of one’s perceptions as cross-modally integrated is incompatible with a reductionist account of the self. In §2 I distinguish three versions of the argument from cross-modality. According to the ‘unification’ version of the argument, what needs to be explained is one’s capacity to identify an object touched as the same as an object simultaneously seen. According to the ‘recognition’ version, what needs to be explained is one’s capacity, having once seen an object, to reidentify that same object by touch alone. According to the ‘objectivity’ version, what needs to be explained is one’s capacity to think of one’s perceptions in different modalities as perceptions of one and the same object. The third version seems to establish that one must conceive of oneself substantially, as the numerically identical owner of one’s experiences, a conclusion in agreement with recent work in developmental psychology claiming to show that an infant’s cross-modal capacities are essentially implicated in their development of a sense of self. There is further work to be done if this is to be tumed into an argument against reductionism: there is no swift route from the epistemology of self-consciousness to the metaphysics of the self. In the §3, I will claim that there is, nevertheless, an argument linking the two. What I propose is an argument derived, not from the token-reflexive rule for the first-person, but resting on its anaphoric behaviour spanning intensional operators.

When J. L. Austin introduced two “shining new tools to crack the crib of reality”—the theory of performative utterances and the doctrine of infelicities—he could not have imagined that he was also about to inaugurate a shining new industry in the philosophy of the social sciences. But with its evident concern for the features to which “all acts are heir which have the general character of ritual or ceremonial,” Austin’s theory soon became indispensable in the analysis of ritual, linguistic and every kind of social action. While Indianists such as Frits Staal, Bimal Matilal and David Seyfort Ruegg have made good use of the work of Austin and his “ordinary language” school, it is Quentin Skinner who has attempted to turn Austin’s insights into a general “theory and method” for the study of intellectual cultures. The question I want to address in this paper has to do with the applicability of Skinnerian techniques to the study of literary and intellectual Sanskrit culture in premodern India. If not all of Skinner’s methods transfer to the new context, identification of the points at which they breakdown helps to clarify the distinctive contours of Indian intellectual history, and suggests appropriate methodological innovation

It has become a common-place to read the ‘no-self’ theory of the Buddhist philosophers as a reductionist account of persons. In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit himself seemed to endorse the association, having learned of the Buddhist theory from his colleague at All Souls College, Bimal Krishna Matilal. The Buddha’s denial that there are real selves metaphysically distinct from continuous streams of psycho-physical constituents lends itself, to be sure, to a reductionist interpretation. I believe, nevertheless, that there are good grounds for scepticism, and I think it is time for scholars of Buddhism to be more cautious about the identification than they have been up until now. Different Buddhist schools, not to mention different thinkers within particular schools, have given widely varying philosophical construals of the Buddha’s claim about ‘no-self’, and, while some thinkers and some schools might favor a reductionist reading of the claim, others, I would argue, do not. In this paper, I will examine the theory of persons of one such, the Mādhyamika Buddhist Candrakīrti. Candrakīrti’s interpretation of the “no self” slogan is, I believe, anti-reductionist but irrealist: persons are not reducible to psycho-physical streams, nor are they real existents distinct from the stream. How is it possible for him to say both these things? Let us see.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Epistemology in Pracīna and Navya NyāyaJonardon GaneriEpistemology in Pracīna and Navya Nyāya. By Sukharanjan Saha. Kolkata: Jadavpur University, 2003. Pp. 166.Epistemology in Pracīna and Navya Nyāya, by Sukharanjan Saha, usefully collates ten previously published essays on Indian epistemology: two longer essays first published in 1986 and a series of more recent shorter pieces. The leading thesis of the book is that the epistemology of the older writers in the tradition of Nyāya-Vaiṣesika is, in important respects, better than the "new epistemology" originating with Gaṅgeśa. Sustained attention is given to the epistemology of the Vaiśeṣika thinker Praśastapāda (ca. A.D. 660), and the first six essays all "seek to show that Praśastapāda's views are more acceptable than those of Gaṅgeśa considered from the point of view of contemporary epistemology" (p. 4). The remaining essays argue in support of a similar conclusion with regard to certain ideas found in the older Nyāya of Gautama and Vātsyāyana. The titles of the essays collected here are: (1) "Epistemology in Pracīna and Navya Nyāya"; (2) "Kindred Points in an Old Epistemology" (1986); (3) "Gaṅgeśa's Reactions to Some Gettier-like Problems" (1986); (4) "The Unestab-lished Reason in Nyāya"; (5) "The Savyabhicāra Hetvābhāsa in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Schools"; (6) "The Thesis of Nirvikalpaka in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika"; (7) "Truth as Avyabhicāritatva"; (8) "A Note on the Definition of Pramā; (9) "Nyāya Theory of Predication"; (10) "The Present and Its Knowledge"; and (11) "Types of Inference in Gautama and Vātsyāyana."Whether or not one finds oneself in agreement with Saha's specific arguments, the general conception of the book seems to me to be laudable. The astonishing [End Page 120] continuity of the Indian philosophical tradition makes it all too easy to survey the history of Indian philosophy and assume that historical development runs in tandem with philosophical progression. It is tempting to think, for example, that Gaṅśa, reviewing the epistemology of the older tradition, and considering the various objections that had been brought against it by external critics like Śrīharṣa and the later Buddhists, produced a new theory that was both an improvement on and a systematization of earlier Nyāya epistemology. To succumb to this temptation would be a mistake, however, for at least two reasons. First, it might be that the discussion of the earlier thinkers was, though less sophisticated, "closer to the ground," so to speak, than that of their successors. The comparative absence of theoretical baggage may have enabled those earlier writers to remain true to the facts, even when they could not easily be explained or systematized. This does indeed seem to be the case with the sūtra texts, and it is also very noticeably the case with Praśastapāda, who exhibited, for instance in his discussion of motion, an openness to the facts rather than closure born of theoretical over-commitment.Second and relatedly, it might be that the earlier thinkers had not yet closed down the range of topics and approaches deemed worthy of philosophical discussion or exploration. Thus, again in the sūtras, we find the beginnings of discussions on an enormous array of issues and hypotheses, not all of which were subsequently picked up or extended in later theory. Saha, for example, argues that Gaṅgeśa committed the later tradition to a rigid causal theory of knowledge, and suggests further that because of this he "failed to appreciate the richness of the philosophical insight of the founders of the system of philosophy to which he owes his allegiance" (p. 69). If this is right, then a return to the earlier strata of the tradition might well lead to an enrichment of our understanding of the range of philosophical possibility. Saha's approach, then, helps to guard the modern student of Indian philosophy from mistakenly thinking that "newer is always better," just as we have learned to be on guard against the older and contrary...

The thesis of this paper is that the capacity to think of one’s perceptions as cross-modally integrated is incompatible with a reductionist account of the self. In §2 I distinguish three versions of the argument from cross-modality. According to the ‘unification’ version of the argument, what needs to be explained is one’s capacity to identify an object touched as the same as an object simultaneously seen. According to the ‘recognition’ version, what needs to be explained is one’s capacity, having once seen an object, to reidentify that same object by touch alone. According to the ‘objectivity’ version, what needs to be explained is one’s capacity to think of one’s perceptions in different modalities as perceptions of one and the same object. The third version seems to establish that one must conceive of oneself substantially, as the numerically identical owner of one’s experiences, a conclusion in agreement with recent work in developmental psychology claiming to show that an infant’s cross-modal capacities are essentially implicated in their development of a sense of self. There is further work to be done if this is to be tumed into an argument against reductionism: there is no swift route from the epistemology of self-consciousness to the metaphysics of the self. In the §3, I will claim that there is, nevertheless, an argument linking the two. What I propose is an argument derived, not from the token-reflexive rule for the first-person, but resting on its anaphoric behaviour spanning intensional operators.

'Empty are the words of that philosopher who offers therapy for no human suffering. For just as there is no use in medical expertise if it does not give therapy for bodily diseases, so too there is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the soul.' The philosopher Epicurus gave famous voice to a conception of philosophy as a cure or remedy for the maladies of the human soul. What has not until now received attention is just how prominent an idea this has been across a whole spectrum of philosophical tradition. Philosophy as Therapeia presents a collection of papers by leading scholars, providing a new reading of the history of philosophy, one which perhaps contradicts those who have wanted to maintain that philosophy is a peculiarly European cultural product, and instead affirms its identity as a global intellectual practice.

Jaegwon Kim has argued (Kim 2006a) that the two key issues for emergentism are to give a positive characterization of the emergence relation and to explain the possibility of downward causation. This paper proposes an account of emergence which provides new answers to these two key issues. It is argued that an appropriate emergence relation is characterized by a notion of ‘transformation’, and that the real key issue for emergentism is located elsewhere than the places Kim identifies. The paper builds on Victor Caston’s important work on ancient philosophy of mind (Caston 1997, 2001), but appeals to sources he has not considered.