Jonardon Ganeri

I argue that as we move in the twenty-first century we need a new paradigm in global philosophy, which I call “interjacency.” Philosophical authenticity in an age of rapid globalization must take a new form, one which respects the fact that one’s intellectual location is to lie both among and between many worlds of thought. My argument will be that JanMohamed’s important typology for the border intellectual therefore needs to be supplemented; that, in addition to syncretic and specular border intellectuals, a third type must be recognized: the interjacent border intellectual. I detect early hints of a movement in this direction in the original philosophical writings of twentiethcentury philosophers in India, whose dominant paradigm of self-understanding nevertheless remained syncretism, transculturalism, and fusion, and have found more evident articulations in recent mixed-race philosophy and mestizo theory. Living in the cracks between cultures, it is increasingly evident, is a freeing and enabling way to live.

The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy tells the story of philosophy in India through a series of exceptional individual acts of philosophical virtuosity. It brings together forty leading international scholars to record the diverse figures, movements, and approaches that constitute philosophy in the geographical region of the Indian subcontinent, a region sometimes nowadays designated South Asia. The chapters provide a synopsis of the liveliest areas of contemporary research and set new agendas for nascent directions of exploration. Each of the chapters provides compelling evidence that in the global exercise of human intellectual skills India, throughout its history, has been a hugely sophisticated and important presence, host to an astonishing range of exceptionally creative minds engaged in an extraordinary diversity of the most astute philosophical exploration conceivable. It spans philosophy of law, logic, politics, environment, and society, but is most strongly associated with wide-ranging discussions in the philosophy of mind and language, epistemology and metaphysics (how we know and what is there to be known), ethics, meta-ethics, and aesthetics, and meta-philosophy. The reach of Indian ideas has been vast, both historically and geographically, and it has been and continues to be a major influence in world philosophy. In the breadth as well as the depth of its philosophical investigation, in the sheer bulk of surviving texts and in the diffusion of its ideas, the philosophical heritage of India easily stands comparison with that of China, Greece, the Latin West, or the Islamic world.

As the broader discipline of philosophy continues to evolve into a genuinely international field, "Indian Philosophy" stands for an unquantifiably precious part of the human intellectual biosphere. With a comprehensive introduction, newly written by the editor, this ambitious collection of major works simultaneously presents Indian philosophy as an autonomous intellectual tradition, with its own internal dynamic and approach, while also demonstrating how the richness of this tradition can have a crucial role in a newly emerging global and international discipline of philosophy. The materials gathered here will enable users to understand the remarkable range of Indian thinking about the structure of the world and its fundamental constitution, as well providing insight into fundamental Indian philosophical theories.

My aim in this paper is to discuss the imaginability of subjectless consciousness, and in particular the question of whether one can imagine de se being subjectlessly conscious. I will not engage here with the further issue as to whether imaginability entails possibility, and so with the possibility simpliciter of consciousness being subjectless. The question I am interested in is, in another formulation, whether I can imagine being no one. I shall begin by reviewing the literature on a related, if distinct, question, namely that as to whether I can imagine being someone other than the one that I am.

A natural way to think of epistemic virtue is by analogy with an archer. Just as a skilled archer is able to take aim and hit a target, a skilled epistemic agent will aim at truth and, if things go well, get things right. Here we highlight aspects of epistemic virtue that do not fit this model, particularly ways in which epistemic virtues can be non-voluntary and not goal-directed. In doing so, we draw on two important figures in the history of philosophy: the 6th-century Indian Buddhist Buddhaghosa and the 20th-century French philosopher Simone Weil. Despite many differences, both thinkers emphasize the importance of attention in moral and epistemic virtue. Their work highlights ways in which attention that is neither voluntary nor goal-directed can nevertheless play an important role in moral and epistemic life.

The author commences with a discussion on the connection between spiritual exercises and aestheticism. Acquiring knowledge of a certain privileged sort is the key spiritual exercise is the fundamental activity in what Hadot described as a “return to the self.” The section on philosophy and therapy talks about “spiritual exercise” as a practice of discrimination which leads to a “return to the self” in the form of the self's isolation from the perceptual world. The author then discusses returning oneself to the present moment based on the philosophy of Plutarch and the Buddha. With references from Santiparvan, the author explains philosophy and the ends of life, elucidating that philosophy enables us to see through the pretences of reason, making it possible for us to direct our efforts towards living of a life free of suffering.

ABSTRACT In a Buddhist treatise from around the fourth century CE there is a very remarkable story which serves as a thought experiment calling us to question the nature of self and the identity of persons. Lost in Sanskrit, the passage is fortunately preserved in a Chinese translation, the Dà zhìdù lùn. We here present the first reliable translation directly from the Classical Chinese, and discuss the philosophical significance of the story in its historical and literary context. We emphasise the philosophical importance of embedding the story in two framing narratives, and demonstrate that the story taps a range of intuitions, and indeed fears, about the survival of the self which have also played a large role in the history of the topic in the West, and which continue to be of great contemporary concern.

Fernando Pessoa (1888–1935) lived what was in many ways an astonishingly modern, transcultural, and translingual life. He was born in Lisbon, the point of departure for Vasco da Gama's voyage to India as commemorated by Pessoa's forebear, the poet Luís de Camões. Pessoa grew up in Anglophone Durban, acquiring a lifelong love for English poetry and language. Returning to Lisbon, from where he would never again leave, he set himself the goal of travelling throughout an infinitude of inner landscapes, to be an explorer of inner worlds. He published very little, but left behind a famous trunk containing a treasure trove of scraps, on which were written some of the greatest literary works of the twentieth century, mainly in Portuguese but also a substantial amount in English and French. Pessoa is now acknowledged as one of the greatest poets of the twentieth century, and he has emerged over the last decade as a forgotten voice in twentieth-century modernism, taking his rightful place alongside C.P. Cavafy, Franz Kafka, T.S. Eliot, James Joyce, and Jorge Luis Borges. Pessoa was also a serious student of philosophy and himself a very creative philosopher, yet his genius as a philosopher has as yet hardly been recognized at all.

Where do we look when we look inward? In what sort of space does our inner life take place? Augustine said that to turn inward is to find oneself in a library of memories, while the Indian Buddhist tradition holds that we are self-illuminating beings casting light onto a world of shadows. And a disquieting set of dissenters has claimed that inwardness is merely an illusion-or worse, a deceit. Jonardon Ganeri explores philosophical reflections from many of the world's intellectual cultures, ancient and modern, on how each of us creates an inner world. In brief and lively chapters, he ranges across an unexpected assortment of diverse thinkers: Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, Chinese, and Western philosophy and literature from the Upanishads, Socrates, and Avicenna to Borges, Simone Weil, and Rashomon. Ganeri examines the various metaphors that have been employed to explain interiority-shadows and mirrors, masks and disguises, rooms and enclosed spaces-as well as the interfaces and boundaries between inner and outer worlds. Written in a cosmopolitan spirit, this book is a thought-provoking consideration of the value-or peril-of turning one's gaze inward for all readers who have sought to map the geography of the mind.

This volume features new perspectives on the implications of cross-linguistic and cultural diversity for epistemology. It brings together philosophers, linguists, and scholars working on knowledge traditions to advance work in epistemology that moves beyond the Anglophone sphere. The first group of chapters provide evidence of cross-linguistic or cultural diversity relevant to epistemology and discuss its possible implications. These essays defend epistemic pluralism based on Sanskrit data as a commitment to pluralism about epistemic stances, analyze the use of two Japanese knowledge verbs in relation to knowledge how, explore the Confucian notion of justification, and surveys cultural differences about the testimonial knowledge. The second group of chapters defends "core monism"--which claims that despite the cross-linguistic diversity of knowledge verbs, there is certain core epistemological meaning shared by all languages--from both a Natural Semantic Metalanguage and skeptical perspective. The third cluster of essays considers the implications of cultural diversity for epistemology based on anthropological studies. These chapters explore real disparities in folk epistemology across cultures. Finally, the last two chapters discuss methods or perspectives to unify epistemology despite and based on the diversity of folk intuitions and epistemological concepts. Ethno-Epistemology is an essential resource for philosophers working in epistemology and comparative philosophy, as well as linguists and cultural anthropologists interested in the cultural-linguistic diversity of knowledge traditions.

The selection of essays in this volume aims to present Indian philosophy as an autonomous intellectual tradition, with its own internal dynamics, rhythms, techniques, problematics and approaches, and to show how the richness of this tradition has a vital role in a newly emerging global and international discipline of philosophy, one in which a diversity of traditions exchange ideas and grow through their interaction with one another. This new volume is an abridgement of the four-volume set, Indian Philosophy, published by Routledge in 2016. The selection of chapters was made in collaboration with the editors at Routledge. The purpose of this volume is to reintroduce the heritage of 'Indian Philosophy' to a contemporary readership by acquainting the reader with some of the core themes of Indian philosophy, such as the concept of philosophy, philosophy as a search for the self, Buddhist philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology, language and logic.

The phrase “cosmic consciousness” has a surprising and fascinating history. I will show how it first enters into circulation in the writings of the remarkable Englishman Edward Carpenter, a socialist, philosopher, and prescient activist for gay rights and prison reform. Carpenter made a trip to India and Sri Lanka in 1890, where he spent two months sitting at the feet of Ramaswami, an Indian sage and disciple of Tilleinathan Swami. Carpenter invents the phrase in order to paraphrase Ramaswami’s teaching, which was itself a commonplace among the Advaita-inspired sages of the period, that there is in human beings the possibility of an all-encompassing consciousness. Later still, in the writings of William James and others, the phrase acquires a new and different meaning in the idea that the cosmos itself exhibits a form of consciousness. James, indeed, uses just this phrase in his early formulation of cosmopsychism.

With the deepening crisis of physicalism and the decline in its status as a sustainable research programme, philosophers of mind have begun to investigate the alternative idea—now commonly designated panpsychism—that consciousness is a fundamental feature of nature, and that the mental states, properties, and events exhibited by human beings are metaphysically grounded in the conscious actuality of reality’s most basic entities. Cosmopsychism is the thesis that the cosmos as a whole displays psychological properties, cosmopsychological properties as we might call them, and that the mental states of human beings, and indeed human beings themselves as individual subjects of experience, are metaphysically grounded in the cosmopsychological properties of the cosmos. Richly sophisticated varieties of cosmopsychism can be found in the ancient Sanskrit classics, the Upaniṣads, and more particularly in those Vedānta philosophers who provide interpretations of these texts. The papers in this issue are explorations of the connections and explanatory potential between contemporary work on cosmopsychism and arguments from the Sanskrit tradition.

I thank Sean Smith and Monima Chadha for their reviews of Attention, Not Self and for their commentary. It has been rewarding to think through the issues they have raised, and I am grateful to both.Let me begin with the methodological principle that Sean Smith endorses at the beginning of his review. Smith says this: "My main argument is that Ganeri attributes views to Buddhaghosa that the latter does not hold. Embedded in this complaint is the assumption that we should try to get a thinker right and on their own terms as a precursor to seeing how their views interface with those of others. It is an assumption I will rely on throughout." Let me call this the Exegesis First assumption. The assumption takes the form...