University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
CV
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
  •  6
    Expressivist Relativism? (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 183-188. 1998.
  •  244
    Moral psychology as accountability
    In Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 40-83. 2014.
    Recent work in moral philosophy has emphasized the foundational role played by interpersonal accountability in the analysis of moral concepts such as moral right and wrong, moral obligation and duty, blameworthiness, and moral responsibility (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b). Extending this framework to the field of moral psychology, we hypothesize that our moral attitudes, emotions, and motives are also best understood as based in accountability. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, we arg…Read more
  •  6
    Moral Obligation and Accountability
    In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Oxford University Press. 2010.
  •  2
    Reply to Schapiro, smith/strabbing, and Yaffe (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 253-264. 2010.
  •  5
    Valuing Activity
    Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1): 176. 1999.
    Call the proposition that the good life consists of excellent, distinctively human activity the Aristotelian Thesis. I think of a photograph I clipped from the New York Times as vividly depicting this claim. It shows a pianist, David Golub, accompanying two vocalists, Victoria Livengood and Erie Mills, at a tribute for Marilyn Home. All three artists are in fine form, exercising themselves at the height of their powers. The reason I saved the photo, however, is Mr. Golub's face. He is positively…Read more
  •  17
    Motive and obligation in Hume's ethics
    Noûs 27 (4): 415-448. 1993.
    :Hume distinguishes natural obligation, the motive of self-interest, from moral obligation, the sentiment of approbation and disapprobation. I argue that his discussion of justice makes use of a third notion, in addition to the other two: rule-obligation. For Hume, the just person regulates her conduct by mutually advantageous rules of justice. Rule-obligation is the notion she requires to express her acceptance of these rules in so regulating herself. I place these ideas in relation to Hume's o…Read more
  •  4
    Reason, Judgment, and the Desire to Be Rational
    Journal of Philosophy 80 (9999): 652-653. 1983.
  •  6
    The Inventions of Autonomy (review)
    European Journal of Philosophy 7 (3): 339-350. 1999.
    Book reviewed in this article:J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy.
  •  10
    Justice and Retaliation
    Philosophical Papers 39 (3): 315-341. 2010.
    Punishment and Reparations are sometimes held to express retaliatory emotions whose object is to strike back against a victimizer. I begin by examining a version of this idea in Mill's writings about natural resentment and the sense of justice in Chapter V of Utilitarianism. Mill's view is that the ?natural? sentiment of resentment or ?vengeance? that is at the heart of the concept of justice is essentially retaliatory, therefore has ?nothing moral in it,? and so must be disciplined or moralized…Read more
  •  4
    Rational Agent, Rational Act
    Philosophical Topics 14 (2): 33-57. 1986.
  •  11
    The authority of reason
    Philosophical Review 109 (4): 583-586. 2000.
    At the time of her death in 1996, Jean Hampton was working on a book on practical reason she had tentatively titled, A Theory of Reasons. The above volume consists of the materials she left, together with useful editorial clues to the state of their relative completeness. Computer file dates make it clear that Hampton was engaged in a significant revision of the text and had gotten as far as Chapter 3 of a nine-chapter book. Revisions of two-thirds of the text lay before her, and, as Richard Hea…Read more
  •  8
    Hutcheson on Practical Reason
    Hume Studies 23 (1): 73-89. 1997.
    I describe the various ways in which Hume's critique of practical reason derives from Hutcheson and then consider a tension that arises between Hutcheson's (and Hume's) critique of noninstrumental reasons and his account of calm passions.
  •  22
    Why is ethics part of philosophy? Stephen Darwall's Philosophical Ethics introduces students to ethics from a distinctively philosophical perspective, one that weaves together central ethical questions such as "What has value?" and "What are our moral obligations?" with fundamental philosophical issues such as "What is value?" and "What can a moral obligation consist in?"With one eye on contemporary discussions and another on classical texts,Philosophical Ethics shows how Hobbes, Mill, Kant, Ari…Read more
  •  4
    Authority and second personal reasons for acting
    In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
  •  10
    19. Self-Deception, Autonomy, and Moral Constitution
    In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception, University of California Press. pp. 407-430. 1988.
  •  8
    Free Will
    with John Thorp
    Philosophical Review 92 (4): 627. 1980.
  •  16
    Normativity and Projection in Hobbes’s Leviathan
    Philosophical Review 109 (3): 313-347. 2000.
    A perennial problem in interpreting Hobbes’s moral and political thought in Leviathan has been to square the apparently irreducible normativity of central Hobbesian concepts and premises with his materialism and empiricism. Thus, Hobbes defines a “law of nature” as a “precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life” and the “right of nature” as “the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preser…Read more