University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
CV
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
  •  24
    Review: Smith's Moral Problem (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185). 1996.
  •  24
    The Rejection of Consequentialism by Samuel Scheffler (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 81 (4): 220-226. 1984.
  •  24
    Reason, Judgment, and the Desire to Be Rational
    Journal of Philosophy 80 (9999): 652-653. 1983.
  •  24
    The authority of reason
    Philosophical Review 109 (4): 583-586. 2000.
    At the time of her death in 1996, Jean Hampton was working on a book on practical reason she had tentatively titled, A Theory of Reasons. The above volume consists of the materials she left, together with useful editorial clues to the state of their relative completeness. Computer file dates make it clear that Hampton was engaged in a significant revision of the text and had gotten as far as Chapter 3 of a nine-chapter book. Revisions of two-thirds of the text lay before her, and, as Richard Hea…Read more
  •  21
    An adequate moral psychology of obligation must bear in mind that although the “sense of obligation” is psychological, what it is a sense of, moral obligation itself, is not. It is irreducibly normative. I argue, therefore, that the “we” whose demands the sense of obligation presupposes must be an ideal rather than an actual “we.”
  •  21
    Reason and Value
    with E. J. Bond
    Philosophical Review 94 (2): 286. 1985.
  •  19
    Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition
    with Jean Hampton
    Philosophical Review 98 (3): 401. 1989.
  •  19
    Contractualism, Root and Branch: A Review Essay
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2): 193-214. 2006.
  •  17
    The Inference to the Best Means
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1). 1976.
    Some recent writers on practical reasoning have had it that reasoning about what to do differs in logical structure from theoretical reasoning. In particular, Anthony Kenny and G.E.M. Anscombe have argued that there are permissible inferences in practical reasoning which lack analogues in theoretical reasoning. Such discussions seem inevitably to draw their impetus from what Aristotle had to say on the topic, both in the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere.
  •  17
    Precis: The Second-Person Standpoint
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 216-228. 2010.
  •  16
    Human Morality’s Authority
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4). 1995.
    A central theme of Samuel Scheffler’s impressive Human Morality is that “a considered view of the relation between morality and the individual” requires distinguishing frequently confused issues concerning morality’s content, scope, authority, and deliberative role, and appreciating interrelations among these. He suggests a nice example of the latter. Some are inclined to believe morality lacks the overriding authority others claim it to have because they assume that morality’s content is string…Read more
  •  16
    Review: From Morality to Virtue and Back? (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3). 1994.
  •  15
    Harm to Others
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4): 691-694. 1987.
  •  15
    The Authority of Reason
    Philosophical Review 109 (4): 583. 2000.
    At the time of her death in 1996, Jean Hampton was working on a book on practical reason she had tentatively titled, A Theory of Reasons. The above volume consists of the materials she left, together with useful editorial clues to the state of their relative completeness. Computer file dates make it clear that Hampton was engaged in a significant revision of the text and had gotten as far as Chapter 3 of a nine-chapter book. Revisions of two-thirds of the text lay before her, and, as Richard Hea…Read more
  •  15
    Impartial Reason
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (3): 507-515. 1989.
  •  14
    Practical Skepticism and the Reasons for Action
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2). 1978.
    At least since Descartes's Meditations philosophers in the West have been concerned to defend the rationality of our beliefs from the threat of epistemological skepticism. The idea that there might be nothing which we know, or more radically, which we have even the slightest reason to believe, is one that many philosophers have thought to be deserving of serious attention. It seems somewhat odd, therefore, that there has not been similar attention given to what one might call practical skepticis…Read more
  •  14
    Book reviews and critical studies (review)
    with Virginia Black and L. Baronovitch
    Philosophia 9 (3-4): 339-373. 1981.
  •  14
    Reply to Honneth
    European Journal of Philosophy 29 (3): 592-596. 2021.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  14
    The Foundations of Morality
    In Donald Rutherford (ed.), British Journal of Educational Studies, Cambridge University Press. pp. 221--49. 2006.
  •  10
    Conrad Johnson 1943-1992
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (5). 1993.
  •  8
    How should ethics relate to philosophy?: Moore's Legacy
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (Supplement): 1-20. 2003.
  •  8
    From Morality to Virtue
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3): 695-701. 1994.
  •  7
    William Klaas Frankena 1908-1994
    with Louis E. Loeb
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (5). 1995.
  •  7
    Free Will
    with John Thorp
    Philosophical Review 92 (4): 627. 1983.