University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
CV
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
  •  31
    On Sterba’s Argument from Rationality to Morality
    The Journal of Ethics 18 (3): 243-252. 2014.
    James Sterba argues for morality as a principled compromise between self-regarding and other-regarding reasons and that either egoists or altruists, who always give overriding weight to self-regarding and other-reasons, respectively, can be shown to beg the question against morality. He concludes that moral conduct is “rationally required.” Sterba’s dialectic assumes that both egoists and altruists accept that both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations are genuine pro tanto reasons, …Read more
  •  184
    Authority, Accountability, and Preemption
    Jurisprudence 2 (1): 103-119. 2011.
    Joseph Raz's 'normal justification thesis' is that the normal way of justifying someone's claim to authority over another person is that the latter would comply better with the reasons that apply to him anyway were he to treat the former's directives as authoritative. Darwall argues that this provides 'reasons of the wrong kind' for authority. He turns then to Raz's claim that the fact that treating someone as an authority would enable one to comply better with reasons that apply to him anyway c…Read more
  •  5
    On Schiffer’s Desires
    with Richard E. Grandy
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (2): 193-198. 1979.
  • Moore to Stevenson
    In Robert J. Cavalier, James Gouinlock & James P. Sterba (eds.), Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy, St. Martin's Press. pp. 366--397. 1989.
  •  25
    Reply to Terzis
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1). 1988.
    George Terzis makes several objections to claims and arguments I advanced in Impartial Reason. I cannot take them all up, but I would like to respond to some, which I shall group into three: whether reasons depend on norms applying to all rational agents; how the unity of agency relates to such norms; and the self-support condition. Since the objections concerning cut most deeply against the central thesis of Impartial Reason, I shall begin with them. Before I do that, however, I should make som…Read more
  •  326
    Desires, reasons, and causes (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2). 2003.
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality makes a significant contribution to clarifying the relationship between desire and reasons for acting, both the normative reasons we seek in deliberation and the motivating reasons we cite in explanation. About the former, Dancy argues that, not only are normative reasons not all grounded in desires, but, more radically, the fact that one desires something is never itself a normative reason. And he argues that desires fail to figure in motivating reasons also, …Read more
  •  3
    Virtue by Consensus
    with Vincent Hope
    Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162): 113. 1991.
  •  166
    Morality and practical reason: A Kantian approach
    In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford University Press. pp. 282--320. 2006.
    A central theme of Kant’s approach to moral philosophy is that moral obligations are categorical, by which he means that they provide supremely authoritative reasons for acting independently of an agent’s ends or interests. Kant argues that this is a reflection of our distinctive freedom or autonomy, as he calls it, as moral agents. A less, well- appreciated aspect of the Kantian picture of morality and respect for the dignity of each individual person is the idea of reciprocal accountability, t…Read more
  •  701
    Two kinds of respect
    Ethics 88 (1): 36-49. 1977.
    S. 39: "My project in this paper is to develop the initial distinction which I have drawn between recognition and appraisal respect into a more detailed and specific account of each. These accounts will not merely be of intrinsic interest. Ultimately I will use them to illuminate the puzzles with which this paper began and to understand the idea of self-respect." 42 " Thus, insofar as respect within such a pursuit will depend on an appraisal of the participant from the perspective of whatever st…Read more
  •  152
    Kantian practical reason defended
    Ethics 96 (1): 89-99. 1985.
    There are two ways in which philosophical controversialists can approach a classical opponent of their views. They can attempt to refute him, or they can try to show that, while generally assumed to be an opponent, the philosopher really was not, at least when he was thinking clearly. Of these two strategies, the latter, if it can be pulled off, is dialectically..
  •  21
    Reason and Value
    with E. J. Bond
    Philosophical Review 94 (2): 286. 1985.
  •  106
    Being With
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1). 2011.
    What is it for two or more people to be with one another or together? And what role do empathic psychological processes play, either as essential constituents or as typical elements? As I define it, to be genuinely with each other, persons must be jointly aware of their mutual openness to mutual relating. This means, I argue, that being with is a second-personal phenomenon in the sense I discuss in The Second-Person Standpoint. People who are with each other are in one another's presence, where …Read more
  •  78
    This book is a major work in the history of ethics, and provides the first study of early modern British philosophy in several decades. Professor Darwall discerns two distinct traditions feeding into the moral philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the one hand, there is the empirical, naturalist tradition, comprising Hobbes, Locke, Cumberland, Hutcheson, and Hume, which argues that obligation is the practical force that empirical discoveries acquire in the process of deliber…Read more
  •  75
    Précis of Welfare and Rational Care
    Philosophical Studies 130 (3): 579-584. 2006.
  •  103
    Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (2): 139-164. 1999.
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  • Harman and Moral Relativism
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3): 199. 1977.
  •  45
    Review of Skorupski's Ethical Explorations (review)
    Utilitas 14 (1): 113. 2002.
  •  39
    New model publishing
    with J. David Velleman
    The Philosophers' Magazine 14 (14): 11-12. 2001.
  •  3
  •  7
    William Klaas Frankena 1908-1994
    with Louis E. Loeb
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (5). 1995.
  •  171
    Moore, normativity, and intrinsic value
    Ethics 113 (3): 468-489. 2003.
    Principia Ethica set the agenda for analytical metaethics. Moore’s unrelenting focus on fundamentals both brought metaethics into view as a potentially separate area of philosophical inquiry and provided a model of the analytical techniques necessary to pursue it.1 Moore acknowledged that he wasn’t the first to insist on a basic irreducible core of all ethical concepts. Although he seems not to have appreciated the roots of this thought in eighteenth-century intuitionists like Clarke, Balguy, and…Read more
  •  130
    The Second-Person Standpoint An Interview with Stephen Darwall
    The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1): 118-138. 2009.