University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
  •  41
    Desires, Reasons, and Causes
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2): 436-443. 2003.
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality makes a significant contribution to clarifying the relationship between desire and reasons for acting, both the normative reasons we seek in deliberation and the motivating reasons we cite in explanation. About the former, Dancy argues that, not only are normative reasons not all grounded in desires, but, more radically, the fact that one desires something is never itself a normative reason. And he argues that desires fail to figure in motivating reasons also, …Read more
  •  36
    Respect, Concern, and Membership
    In Hans Bernhard Schmid, Christoph Henning & Dieter Thomä (eds.), Social Capital, Social Identities: From Ownership to Belonging, De Gruyter. pp. 93-104. 2014.
  •  527
    Consequentialism (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2002.
    Consequentialism collects, for the first time, both the main classical sources and the central contemporary expressions of this important position. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative ethics.
  •  24
    The Rejection of Consequentialism by Samuel Scheffler (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 81 (4): 220-226. 1984.
  •  8
    How should ethics relate to philosophy?: Moore's Legacy
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (Supplement): 1-20. 2003.
  •  14
    Practical Skepticism and the Reasons for Action
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2). 1978.
    At least since Descartes's Meditations philosophers in the West have been concerned to defend the rationality of our beliefs from the threat of epistemological skepticism. The idea that there might be nothing which we know, or more radically, which we have even the slightest reason to believe, is one that many philosophers have thought to be deserving of serious attention. It seems somewhat odd, therefore, that there has not been similar attention given to what one might call practical skepticis…Read more
  •  154
    Abolishing morality
    Synthese 72 (1). 1987.
    Peer Reviewed.
  •  72
    The Development of Ethics
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (1): 131-147. 2011.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  86
    Sidgwick, Concern, and the Good
    Utilitas 12 (3): 291. 2000.
    Sidgwick maintains, plausibly, that the concept of a person's good is a normative one and takes for granted that it is normative for the agent's own choice and action. I argue that the normativity of a person's good must be understood in relation to concern for someone for that person's own sake. A person's good, I suggest, is what one should want for that person in so far as one cares about him, or what one should want for him for his sake. I examine Sidgwick's defence of the axioms of rational…Read more
  •  1
    New model publishing
    with J. David Velleman
    The Philosophers' Magazine 14 11-12. 2001.
  •  25
    Scheffler on Morality and Ideals of the Person
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2). 1982.
    Scheffler's paper divides into two parts. In the first, he argues that Parfit's argument from the complex view of personal identity neither can, nor is intended to, establish any moral theory; in particular, it cannot establish utilitarianism. Rather, Parfit's aim must have been simply to weaken our attachment to non-utilitarian theories. In discovering that the only philosophically respectable view of personal identity holds it to consist simply in bodily or psychological continuities and conne…Read more
  •  19
    Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition
    with Jean Hampton
    Philosophical Review 98 (3): 401. 1989.
  •  138
  •  49
    Reply to Schapiro, smith/strabbing, and Yaffe (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 253-264. 2010.
  •  32
    Expressivist Relativism?Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 183-188. 1998.
  •  311
    The value of autonomy and autonomy of the will
    Ethics 116 (2): 263-284. 2006.
    It is a commonplace that ‘autonomy’ has several different senses in contemporary moral and political discussion. The term’s original meaning was political: a right assumed by states to administer their own affairs. It was not until the nineteenth century that ‘autonomy’ came (in English) to refer also to the conduct of individuals, and even then there were, as now, different meanings.1 Odd as it may seem from our perspective, one that was in play from the beginning was Kant’s notion of “autonomy…Read more
  •  77
    Motive and obligation in Hume's ethics
    Noûs 27 (4): 415-448. 1993.
    :Hume distinguishes natural obligation, the motive of self-interest, from moral obligation, the sentiment of approbation and disapprobation. I argue that his discussion of justice makes use of a third notion, in addition to the other two: rule-obligation. For Hume, the just person regulates her conduct by mutually advantageous rules of justice. Rule-obligation is the notion she requires to express her acceptance of these rules in so regulating herself. I place these ideas in relation to Hume's o…Read more
  •  24
    Reason, Judgment, and the Desire to Be Rational
    Journal of Philosophy 80 (9999): 652-653. 1983.
  •  19
    Contractualism, Root and Branch: A Review Essay
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2): 193-214. 2006.
  •  107
    Justice and Retaliation
    Philosophical Papers 39 (3): 315-341. 2010.
    Punishment and Reparations are sometimes held to express retaliatory emotions whose object is to strike back against a victimizer. I begin by examining a version of this idea in Mill's writings about natural resentment and the sense of justice in Chapter V of Utilitarianism. Mill's view is that the ?natural? sentiment of resentment or ?vengeance? that is at the heart of the concept of justice is essentially retaliatory, therefore has ?nothing moral in it,? and so must be disciplined or moralized…Read more
  •  52
    Rational agent, rational act
    Philosophical Topics 14 (2): 33-57. 1986.
  •  1
    The Inventions of Autonomy
    European Journal of Philosophy 7 (3): 339-350. 1999.
    Book reviewed in this article:J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy.
  •  62
    Hutcheson on Practical Reason
    Hume Studies 23 (1): 73-89. 1997.
    I describe the various ways in which Hume's critique of practical reason derives from Hutcheson and then consider a tension that arises between Hutcheson's (and Hume's) critique of noninstrumental reasons and his account of calm passions.
  •  265
    Why is ethics part of philosophy? Stephen Darwall's Philosophical Ethics introduces students to ethics from a distinctively philosophical perspective, one that weaves together central ethical questions such as "What has value?" and "What are our moral obligations?" with fundamental philosophical issues such as "What is value?" and "What can a moral obligation consist in?"With one eye on contemporary discussions and another on classical texts,Philosophical Ethics shows how Hobbes, Mill, Kant, Ari…Read more
  •  3
    Authority and second personal reasons for acting
    In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
  •  24
    The authority of reason
    Philosophical Review 109 (4): 583-586. 2000.
    At the time of her death in 1996, Jean Hampton was working on a book on practical reason she had tentatively titled, A Theory of Reasons. The above volume consists of the materials she left, together with useful editorial clues to the state of their relative completeness. Computer file dates make it clear that Hampton was engaged in a significant revision of the text and had gotten as far as Chapter 3 of a nine-chapter book. Revisions of two-thirds of the text lay before her, and, as Richard Hea…Read more