University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
  •  83
    Pufendorf on Morality, Sociability, and Moral Powers
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (2): 213-238. 2012.
  •  15
    The Authority of Reason
    Philosophical Review 109 (4): 583. 2000.
    At the time of her death in 1996, Jean Hampton was working on a book on practical reason she had tentatively titled, A Theory of Reasons. The above volume consists of the materials she left, together with useful editorial clues to the state of their relative completeness. Computer file dates make it clear that Hampton was engaged in a significant revision of the text and had gotten as far as Chapter 3 of a nine-chapter book. Revisions of two-thirds of the text lay before her, and, as Richard Hea…Read more
  •  44
    How should ethics relate to (the rest of) philosophy? : Moore's legacy
    In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Southern Journal of Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 1-20. 2006.
  •  3
    Normativity and Projection in Hobbes’s Leviathan
    Philosophical Review 109 (3): 313-347. 2000.
    A perennial problem in interpreting Hobbes’s moral and political thought in Leviathan has been to square the apparently irreducible normativity of central Hobbesian concepts and premises with his materialism and empiricism. Thus, Hobbes defines a “law of nature” as a “precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life” and the “right of nature” as “the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preser…Read more
  •  91
    Self-Interest and Self-Concern
    Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1): 158. 1997.
    In what follows I consider whether the idea of a person's interest or good might be better understood through that of care or concern for that person for her sake, rather than conversely, as is ordinarily assumed. Contrary to desire-satisfaction theories of interest, such an account can explain why not everything a person rationally desires is part of her good, since what a person sensibly wants is not necessarily what we would sensibly want, insofar as we care about her. First, however, a tale:…Read more
  •  78
    Grotius at the Creation of Modern Moral Philosophy
    Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 94 (3): 296-325. 2012.
  •  121
    Reply to Griffin, Raz, and wolf
    Utilitas 18 (4): 434-444. 2006.
    I am honored that Jim Griffin, Joseph Raz, and Susan Wolf, all of whose work I greatly admire, have thought my ideas on welfare and care worth engaging, and I am very grateful to them for doing so. Each has raised searching and difficult questions. Rather than attempting to respond to them seriatim, I propose to discuss the issues under three broad headings: questions about the concept of welfare, questions about care or sympathetic concern, and the question of whether welfare claims have agent-…Read more
  •  51
    Equal Freedom: selected Tanner lectures on human values
    University of Michigan Press. 1995.
    Issues at the major fault-line of political beliefs and debates.
  •  97
    Why Ethics is Part of Philosophy
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1 19-28. 1999.
    Ethics is frequently divided into three parts: metaethics, normative ethical theory, and the more specific normative ethics. However, only metaethics is explicitly philosophical insofar as it is concerned with fundamental questions about the content, objects, and status of ethical thought and discourse. During the heyday of conceptual analysis, philosophers were admonished to restrict themselves entirely to metaethics. Since, it was said, they lacked any special expertise as philosophers on norm…Read more
  •  6
    Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches (edited book)
    with Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton
    Oxford University Press USA. 1996.
    What are ethical judgments about? And what is their relation to practice? How can ethical judgment aspire to objectivity? The past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in metaethics, placing questions such as these about the nature and status of ethical judgment at the very center of contemporary moral philosophy. Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches is a unique anthology which collects important recent work, much of which is not easily available elsewhere, …Read more
  •  16
    Review: From Morality to Virtue and Back? (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3). 1994.
  •  10
    Conrad Johnson 1943-1992
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (5). 1993.
  •  276
    The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality's supreme authority--an account that ...
  •  4
    Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the view that morality is second-personal, entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He illustrates the power of the second-personal framework to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy
  •  17
    Precis: The Second-Person Standpoint
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 216-228. 2010.
  •  116
    Agent-centered restrictions from the inside out
    Philosophical Studies 50 (3). 1986.
    Peer Reviewed.
  •  14
    The Foundations of Morality
    In Donald Rutherford (ed.), British Journal of Educational Studies, Cambridge University Press. pp. 221--49. 2006.
  •  31
    On Sterba’s Argument from Rationality to Morality
    The Journal of Ethics 18 (3): 243-252. 2014.
    James Sterba argues for morality as a principled compromise between self-regarding and other-regarding reasons and that either egoists or altruists, who always give overriding weight to self-regarding and other-reasons, respectively, can be shown to beg the question against morality. He concludes that moral conduct is “rationally required.” Sterba’s dialectic assumes that both egoists and altruists accept that both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations are genuine pro tanto reasons, …Read more
  •  184
    Authority, Accountability, and Preemption
    Jurisprudence 2 (1): 103-119. 2011.
    Joseph Raz's 'normal justification thesis' is that the normal way of justifying someone's claim to authority over another person is that the latter would comply better with the reasons that apply to him anyway were he to treat the former's directives as authoritative. Darwall argues that this provides 'reasons of the wrong kind' for authority. He turns then to Raz's claim that the fact that treating someone as an authority would enable one to comply better with reasons that apply to him anyway c…Read more
  •  4
    Susan S. Lipschutz 1942-1997
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (2). 1998.
  •  25
    Reply to Terzis
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1). 1988.
    George Terzis makes several objections to claims and arguments I advanced in Impartial Reason. I cannot take them all up, but I would like to respond to some, which I shall group into three: whether reasons depend on norms applying to all rational agents; how the unity of agency relates to such norms; and the self-support condition. Since the objections concerning cut most deeply against the central thesis of Impartial Reason, I shall begin with them. Before I do that, however, I should make som…Read more
  •  5
    On Schiffer’s Desires
    with Richard E. Grandy
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (2): 193-198. 1979.
  • Moore to Stevenson
    In Robert J. Cavalier, James Gouinlock & James P. Sterba (eds.), Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy, St. Martin's Press. pp. 366--397. 1989.
  •  326
    Desires, reasons, and causes (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2). 2003.
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality makes a significant contribution to clarifying the relationship between desire and reasons for acting, both the normative reasons we seek in deliberation and the motivating reasons we cite in explanation. About the former, Dancy argues that, not only are normative reasons not all grounded in desires, but, more radically, the fact that one desires something is never itself a normative reason. And he argues that desires fail to figure in motivating reasons also, …Read more