University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
CV
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
  •  230
    Motive and obligation in Hume's ethics
    Noûs 27 (4): 415-448. 1993.
    :Hume distinguishes natural obligation, the motive of self-interest, from moral obligation, the sentiment of approbation and disapprobation. I argue that his discussion of justice makes use of a third notion, in addition to the other two: rule-obligation. For Hume, the just person regulates her conduct by mutually advantageous rules of justice. Rule-obligation is the notion she requires to express her acceptance of these rules in so regulating herself. I place these ideas in relation to Hume's o…Read more
  •  112
    Reply to Schapiro, smith/strabbing, and Yaffe (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 253-264. 2010.