-
15William Klaas Frankena 1908-1994Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (5). 1995.
-
9Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches (edited book)Oxford University Press USA. 1996.What are ethical judgments about? And what is their relation to practice? How can ethical judgment aspire to objectivity? The past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in metaethics, placing questions such as these about the nature and status of ethical judgment at the very center of contemporary moral philosophy. Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches is a unique anthology which collects important recent work, much of which is not easily available elsewhere, …Read more
-
126Reply to Griffin, Raz, and wolfUtilitas 18 (4): 434-444. 2006.I am honored that Jim Griffin, Joseph Raz, and Susan Wolf, all of whose work I greatly admire, have thought my ideas on welfare and care worth engaging, and I am very grateful to them for doing so. Each has raised searching and difficult questions. Rather than attempting to respond to them seriatim, I propose to discuss the issues under three broad headings: questions about the concept of welfare, questions about care or sympathetic concern, and the question of whether welfare claims have agent-…Read more
-
11Conrad Johnson 1943-1992Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (5). 1993.
-
148The Second-Person Standpoint An Interview with Stephen DarwallThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1): 118-138. 2009.
-
29Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics IOxford University Press. 2013.Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the view that morality is second-personal, entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He illustrates the power of the second-personal framework to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy
-
22Review: From Morality to Virtue and Back? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3). 1994.
-
Intuitionism and the Motivation ProblemIn Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations, Clarendon Press. 2002.
-
40Comment on Stephen Darwall's The Second Person StandpointPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 246-252. 2010.
-
145Agent-centered restrictions from the inside outPhilosophical Studies 50 (3). 1986.Peer Reviewed.
-
6Susan S. Lipschutz 1942-1997Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (2). 1998.
-
1How is Moorean Value Related to Reasons for Action?In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2007.
-
46On Sterba’s Argument from Rationality to MoralityThe Journal of Ethics 18 (3): 243-252. 2014.James Sterba argues for morality as a principled compromise between self-regarding and other-regarding reasons and that either egoists or altruists, who always give overriding weight to self-regarding and other-reasons, respectively, can be shown to beg the question against morality. He concludes that moral conduct is “rationally required.” Sterba’s dialectic assumes that both egoists and altruists accept that both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations are genuine pro tanto reasons, …Read more
-
204Authority, Accountability, and PreemptionJurisprudence 2 (1): 103-119. 2011.Joseph Raz's 'normal justification thesis' is that the normal way of justifying someone's claim to authority over another person is that the latter would comply better with the reasons that apply to him anyway were he to treat the former's directives as authoritative. Darwall argues that this provides 'reasons of the wrong kind' for authority. He turns then to Raz's claim that the fact that treating someone as an authority would enable one to comply better with reasons that apply to him anyway c…Read more
-
33Reply to TerzisCanadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1). 1988.George Terzis makes several objections to claims and arguments I advanced in Impartial Reason. I cannot take them all up, but I would like to respond to some, which I shall group into three: whether reasons depend on norms applying to all rational agents; how the unity of agency relates to such norms; and the self-support condition. Since the objections concerning cut most deeply against the central thesis of Impartial Reason, I shall begin with them. Before I do that, however, I should make som…Read more
-
84Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy (review)Legal Theory 19 (1): 89-99. 2013.
-
Moore to StevensonIn Robert J. Cavalier, James Gouinlock & James P. Sterba (eds.), Ethics in the history of western philosophy, St. Martin's Press. pp. 366--397. 1989.
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
History of Western Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |
History of Western Philosophy |