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55Desires, Reasons, and CausesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2): 436-443. 2003.Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality makes a significant contribution to clarifying the relationship between desire and reasons for acting, both the normative reasons we seek in deliberation and the motivating reasons we cite in explanation. About the former, Dancy argues that, not only are normative reasons not all grounded in desires, but, more radically, the fact that one desires something is never itself a normative reason. And he argues that desires fail to figure in motivating reasons also, …Read more
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112Welfare and Rational CarePrinceton University Press. 2002.What kind of life best ensures human welfare? Since the ancient Greeks, this question has been as central to ethical philosophy as to ordinary reflection. But what exactly is welfare? This question has suffered from relative neglect. And, as Stephen Darwall shows, it has done so at a price. Presenting a provocative new "rational care theory of welfare," Darwall proves that a proper understanding of welfare fundamentally changes how we think about what is best for people.Most philosophers have as…Read more
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46Morality and PrincipleIn David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, Oxford University Press. pp. 168. 2013.
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660Consequentialism (edited book)Blackwell. 2003.Consequentialism collects, for the first time, both the main classical sources and the central contemporary expressions of this important position. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative ethics.
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43The Social and the SociablePhilosophical Topics 42 (1): 201-217. 2014.Beginning from Kant’s famous idea that “unsociable sociability” stimulates human progress and civilization, the essay investigates Kant’s categories of the “unsociable” and the “sociable,” and argues that the fundamental difference between them is that the former presuppose a social perspective that is third personal, whereas the latter is always a second-personal affair, instantiated when people relate to one another in various ways, or manifest the disposition to do so. Kant’s “unsociable” att…Read more
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49Respect, Concern, and MembershipIn Hans Bernhard Schmid, Christoph Henning & Dieter Thomä (eds.), Social Capital, Social Identities: From Ownership to Belonging, De Gruyter. pp. 93-104. 2014.
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74The Development of EthicsBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (1): 131-147. 2011.This Article does not have an abstract
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11How Should Ethics Relate to (the Rest of) Philosophy?: Moore's LegacySouthern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 1-20. 2003.
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25Practical Skepticism and the Reasons for ActionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2). 1978.At least since Descartes's Meditations philosophers in the West have been concerned to defend the rationality of our beliefs from the threat of epistemological skepticism. The idea that there might be nothing which we know, or more radically, which we have even the slightest reason to believe, is one that many philosophers have thought to be deserving of serious attention. It seems somewhat odd, therefore, that there has not been similar attention given to what one might call practical skepticis…Read more
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53Scheffler on Morality and Ideals of the PersonCanadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2). 1982.Scheffler's paper divides into two parts. In the first, he argues that Parfit's argument from the complex view of personal identity neither can, nor is intended to, establish any moral theory; in particular, it cannot establish utilitarianism. Rather, Parfit's aim must have been simply to weaken our attachment to non-utilitarian theories. In discovering that the only philosophically respectable view of personal identity holds it to consist simply in bodily or psychological continuities and conne…Read more
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54Under Moore's SpellUtilitas 10 (3): 286. 1998.As David Wiggins points out, although Ross is best known for opposing Moore's consequentialism, Ross comes very close to capitulation to Moore when he accepts, as required by beneficence, a prima facie duty to maximize the good. I argue that what lies behind this is Ross's acceptance of Moore's doctrine of agent-neutral intrinsic value, a notion that is not required by, but is indeed is in tension with, beneficence as doing good to or for others
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52Reply to Schapiro, smith/strabbing, and Yaffe (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 253-264. 2010.
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38Expressivist Relativism? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 183-188. 1998.
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1387Moral psychology as accountabilityIn Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 40-83. 2014.Recent work in moral philosophy has emphasized the foundational role played by interpersonal accountability in the analysis of moral concepts such as moral right and wrong, moral obligation and duty, blameworthiness, and moral responsibility (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b). Extending this framework to the field of moral psychology, we hypothesize that our moral attitudes, emotions, and motives are also best understood as based in accountability. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, we arg…Read more
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165Moral Obligation and AccountabilityIn Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Clarendon Press. 2007.
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Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
History of Western Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |
History of Western Philosophy |