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189Sidgwick, Concern, and the GoodUtilitas 12 (3): 291. 2000.Sidgwick maintains, plausibly, that the concept of a person's good is a normative one and takes for granted that it is normative for the agent's own choice and action. I argue that the normativity of a person's good must be understood in relation to concern for someone for that person's own sake. A person's good, I suggest, is what one should want for that person in so far as one cares about him, or what one should want for him for his sake. I examine Sidgwick's defence of the axioms of rational…Read more
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4Authority and second personal reasons for actingIn David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
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48William Klaas Frankena 1908-1994Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (5): 95-96. 1995.
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332Kantian practical reason defendedEthics 96 (1): 89-99. 1985.There are two ways in which philosophical controversialists can approach a classical opponent of their views. They can attempt to refute him, or they can try to show that, while generally assumed to be an opponent, the philosopher really was not, at least when he was thinking clearly. Of these two strategies, the latter, if it can be pulled off, is dialectically..
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308Respect and the Second-Person StandpointProceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78 (2): 43-59. 2004.
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213The Second-Person Standpoint An Interview with Stephen DarwallThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1): 118-138. 2009.
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193Human Morality’s AuthorityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4): 941-948. 1995.A central theme of Samuel Scheffler’s impressive Human Morality is that “a considered view of the relation between morality and the individual” requires distinguishing frequently confused issues concerning morality’s content, scope, authority, and deliberative role, and appreciating interrelations among these. He suggests a nice example of the latter. Some are inclined to believe morality lacks the overriding authority others claim it to have because they assume that morality’s content is string…Read more
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186Pufendorf on Morality, Sociability, and Moral PowersJournal of the History of Philosophy 50 (2): 213-238. 2012.Only in the last twenty-five years have scholars begun to appreciate Samuel Pufendorf’s importance for the history of ethics. The signal element of Pufendorf’s ethics for recent commentators is his idea that morality arises when God imposes his superior will on a world that can contain no moral value of or on its own. But how, exactly, is “imposition” accomplished? According to Pufendorf, human beings do not simply defer to God in the way elephant seals do to a dominant male. Rather, imposition …Read more
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164Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy (review)Legal Theory 19 (1): 89-99. 2013.
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1Moore to StevensonIn Robert J. Cavalier, James Gouinlock & James P. Sterba (eds.), Ethics in the history of western philosophy, St. Martin's Press. pp. 366--397. 1989.
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165Scheffler on Morality and Ideals of the PersonCanadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2): 247-255. 1982.Scheffler's paper divides into two parts. In the first, he argues that Parfit's argument from the complex view of personal identity neither can, nor is intended to, establish any moral theory; in particular, it cannot establish utilitarianism. Rather, Parfit's aim must have been simply to weaken our attachment to non-utilitarian theories. In discovering that the only philosophically respectable view of personal identity holds it to consist simply in bodily or psychological continuities and conne…Read more
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40Conrad Johnson 1943-1992Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (5): 81-82. 1993.
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1Morality and its criticsIn John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics, Routledge. 2012.
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240Agent-centered restrictions from the inside outPhilosophical Studies 50 (3): 291-319. 1986.Peer Reviewed.
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144Book Review:Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality. William L. Rowe (review)Ethics 103 (2): 389-. 1993.
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122Review: From Morality to Virtue and Back? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3): 695-701. 1994.
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539Virtue Ethics (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2008._ Virtue Ethics_ collects, for the first time, the main classical sources and the central contemporary expressions of virtue ethics approach to normative ethical theory. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative theory. Introduced by Stephen Darwall, this collection brings together classic and contemporary readings which define and advance the literature on virtue ethics. Includes six essays which respond to the classic sources. Inc…Read more
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Intuitionism and the Motivation ProblemIn Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations, Oxford University Press Uk. 2002.
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78Comment on Stephen Darwall's The Second Person StandpointPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 246-252. 2010.
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67The Rejection of Consequentialism by Samuel Scheffler (review)Journal of Philosophy 81 (4): 220-226. 1984.
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73On Sterba’s Argument from Rationality to MoralityThe Journal of Ethics 18 (3): 243-252. 2014.James Sterba argues for morality as a principled compromise between self-regarding and other-regarding reasons and that either egoists or altruists, who always give overriding weight to self-regarding and other-reasons, respectively, can be shown to beg the question against morality. He concludes that moral conduct is “rationally required.” Sterba’s dialectic assumes that both egoists and altruists accept that both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations are genuine pro tanto reasons, …Read more
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235The authority of reasonPhilosophical Review 109 (4): 583-586. 2000.At the time of her death in 1996, Jean Hampton was working on a book on practical reason she had tentatively titled, A Theory of Reasons. The above volume consists of the materials she left, together with useful editorial clues to the state of their relative completeness. Computer file dates make it clear that Hampton was engaged in a significant revision of the text and had gotten as far as Chapter 3 of a nine-chapter book. Revisions of two-thirds of the text lay before her, and, as Richard Hea…Read more
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132Equal Freedom: selected Tanner lectures on human valuesUniversity of Michigan Press. 1995.Issues at the major fault-line of political beliefs and debates.
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169Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches (edited book)Oxford University Press. 1997.What are ethical judgments about? And what is their relation to practice? How can ethical judgment aspire to objectivity? The past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in metaethics, placing questions such as these about the nature and status of ethical judgment at the very center of contemporary moral philosophy. Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches is a unique anthology which collects important recent work, much of which is not easily available elsewhere, …Read more
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10Responsibility within RelationsIn Brian Feltham & John Cottingham (eds.), Partiality and impartiality: morality, special relationships, and the wider world, Oxford University Press. pp. 150-168. 2010.Philosophical discussion of relationships of love and friendship has tended to focus on ways in which particularistic forms of care and concern seem to create problems for impartial ethical theories. This chapter explores ways in which regard and respect for one another as equal persons is no less central to love and friendship, and how these are best accounted for within an ethical theory that is grounded within a second-person standpoint. More specifically, it argues that central to loving and…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
| Value Theory |
| History of Western Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
| Value Theory |
| History of Western Philosophy |