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20Hurka, Thomas. British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 310. $49.95 (review)Ethics 127 (2): 496-502. 2017.
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87Eine Antwort auf Monika Betzier, Sebastian Rödl und Peter SchaberDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1): 173-179. 2009.
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9Joseph Butler: Five Sermons (edited book)Hackett Publishing Company. 1983._CONTENTS:__ Introduction Selected Bibliography Five Sermons:_ The Preface_ Sermon I - Upon Human Nature Sermon II - Upon Human Nature Sermon III - Upon Human Nature Sermon IV - Upon The Love Of Our Neighbor Sermon V - Upon The Love Of Our Neighbor A dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue_
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13Review of Stephen L. Darwall: Equal Freedom: selected Tanner lectures on human values (review)Ethics 107 (2): 353-356. 1997.
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11Human Morality’s AuthorityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4): 941-948. 1995.A central theme of Samuel Scheffler’s impressive Human Morality is that “a considered view of the relation between morality and the individual” requires distinguishing frequently confused issues concerning morality’s content, scope, authority, and deliberative role, and appreciating interrelations among these. He suggests a nice example of the latter. Some are inclined to believe morality lacks the overriding authority others claim it to have because they assume that morality’s content is string…Read more
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2Ethics and MoralityIn Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 552-566. 2017.
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344The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and AccountabilityHarvard University Press. 1996.The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality's supreme authority--an account that ...
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28Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics IOxford University Press. 2013.Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the view that morality is second-personal, entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He illustrates the power of the second-personal framework to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy
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20Review: From Morality to Virtue and Back? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3). 1994.
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11Conrad Johnson 1943-1992Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (5). 1993.
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Intuitionism and the Motivation ProblemIn Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations, Clarendon Press. 2002.
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39Comment on Stephen Darwall's The Second Person StandpointPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 246-252. 2010.
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143Agent-centered restrictions from the inside outPhilosophical Studies 50 (3). 1986.Peer Reviewed.
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6Susan S. Lipschutz 1942-1997Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (2). 1998.
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1How is Moorean Value Related to Reasons for Action?In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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46On Sterba’s Argument from Rationality to MoralityThe Journal of Ethics 18 (3): 243-252. 2014.James Sterba argues for morality as a principled compromise between self-regarding and other-regarding reasons and that either egoists or altruists, who always give overriding weight to self-regarding and other-reasons, respectively, can be shown to beg the question against morality. He concludes that moral conduct is “rationally required.” Sterba’s dialectic assumes that both egoists and altruists accept that both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations are genuine pro tanto reasons, …Read more
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204Authority, Accountability, and PreemptionJurisprudence 2 (1): 103-119. 2011.Joseph Raz's 'normal justification thesis' is that the normal way of justifying someone's claim to authority over another person is that the latter would comply better with the reasons that apply to him anyway were he to treat the former's directives as authoritative. Darwall argues that this provides 'reasons of the wrong kind' for authority. He turns then to Raz's claim that the fact that treating someone as an authority would enable one to comply better with reasons that apply to him anyway c…Read more
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83Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy (review)Legal Theory 19 (1): 89-99. 2013.
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Moore to StevensonIn Robert J. Cavalier, James Gouinlock & James P. Sterba (eds.), Ethics in the history of western philosophy, St. Martin's Press. pp. 366--397. 1989.
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33Reply to TerzisCanadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1). 1988.George Terzis makes several objections to claims and arguments I advanced in Impartial Reason. I cannot take them all up, but I would like to respond to some, which I shall group into three: whether reasons depend on norms applying to all rational agents; how the unity of agency relates to such norms; and the self-support condition. Since the objections concerning cut most deeply against the central thesis of Impartial Reason, I shall begin with them. Before I do that, however, I should make som…Read more
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355Desires, reasons, and causes (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2). 2003.Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality makes a significant contribution to clarifying the relationship between desire and reasons for acting, both the normative reasons we seek in deliberation and the motivating reasons we cite in explanation. About the former, Dancy argues that, not only are normative reasons not all grounded in desires, but, more radically, the fact that one desires something is never itself a normative reason. And he argues that desires fail to figure in motivating reasons also, …Read more
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202Morality and practical reason: A Kantian approachIn David Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory, Oxford University Press. pp. 282--320. 2006.A central theme of Kant’s approach to moral philosophy is that moral obligations are categorical, by which he means that they provide supremely authoritative reasons for acting independently of an agent’s ends or interests. Kant argues that this is a reflection of our distinctive freedom or autonomy, as he calls it, as moral agents. A less, well- appreciated aspect of the Kantian picture of morality and respect for the dignity of each individual person is the idea of reciprocal accountability, t…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
History of Western Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |
History of Western Philosophy |