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6III-Moral Obligation: Form and SubstanceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1): 31-46. 2010.
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20Hurka, Thomas. British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 310. $49.95 (review)Ethics 127 (2): 496-502. 2017.
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30Eine Antwort auf Monika Betzier, Sebastian Rödl und Peter SchaberDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1): 173-179. 2009.
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9Joseph Butler: Five Sermons (edited book)Hackett Publishing Company. 1983._CONTENTS:__ Introduction Selected Bibliography Five Sermons:_ The Preface_ Sermon I - Upon Human Nature Sermon II - Upon Human Nature Sermon III - Upon Human Nature Sermon IV - Upon The Love Of Our Neighbor Sermon V - Upon The Love Of Our Neighbor A dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue_
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6Review of Stephen L. Darwall: Equal Freedom: selected Tanner lectures on human values (review)Ethics 107 (2): 353-356. 1997.
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11Human Morality’s AuthorityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4): 941-948. 1995.A central theme of Samuel Scheffler’s impressive Human Morality is that “a considered view of the relation between morality and the individual” requires distinguishing frequently confused issues concerning morality’s content, scope, authority, and deliberative role, and appreciating interrelations among these. He suggests a nice example of the latter. Some are inclined to believe morality lacks the overriding authority others claim it to have because they assume that morality’s content is string…Read more
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2Ethics and MoralityIn Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 552-566. 2017.
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360Desires, reasons, and causes (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2). 2003.Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality makes a significant contribution to clarifying the relationship between desire and reasons for acting, both the normative reasons we seek in deliberation and the motivating reasons we cite in explanation. About the former, Dancy argues that, not only are normative reasons not all grounded in desires, but, more radically, the fact that one desires something is never itself a normative reason. And he argues that desires fail to figure in motivating reasons also, …Read more
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317Virtue Ethics (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2002._ Virtue Ethics_ collects, for the first time, the main classical sources and the central contemporary expressions of virtue ethics approach to normative ethical theory. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative theory. Introduced by Stephen Darwall, this collection brings together classic and contemporary readings which define and advance the literature on virtue ethics. Includes six essays which respond to the classic sources. Inc…Read more
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204Morality and practical reason: A Kantian approachIn David Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory, Oxford University Press. pp. 282--320. 2006.A central theme of Kant’s approach to moral philosophy is that moral obligations are categorical, by which he means that they provide supremely authoritative reasons for acting independently of an agent’s ends or interests. Kant argues that this is a reflection of our distinctive freedom or autonomy, as he calls it, as moral agents. A less, well- appreciated aspect of the Kantian picture of morality and respect for the dignity of each individual person is the idea of reciprocal accountability, t…Read more
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139Being WithSouthern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1). 2011.What is it for two or more people to be with one another or together? And what role do empathic psychological processes play, either as essential constituents or as typical elements? As I define it, to be genuinely with each other, persons must be jointly aware of their mutual openness to mutual relating. This means, I argue, that being with is a second-personal phenomenon in the sense I discuss in The Second-Person Standpoint. People who are with each other are in one another's presence, where …Read more
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30The Rejection of Consequentialism by Samuel Scheffler (review)Journal of Philosophy 81 (4): 220-226. 1984.
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212Kantian practical reason defendedEthics 96 (1): 89-99. 1985.There are two ways in which philosophical controversialists can approach a classical opponent of their views. They can attempt to refute him, or they can try to show that, while generally assumed to be an opponent, the philosopher really was not, at least when he was thinking clearly. Of these two strategies, the latter, if it can be pulled off, is dialectically..
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60The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640–1740Cambridge University Press. 1995.This book is a major work in the history of ethics, and provides the first study of early modern British philosophy in several decades. Professor Darwall discerns two distinct traditions feeding into the moral philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the one hand, there is the empirical, naturalist tradition, comprising Hobbes, Locke, Cumberland, Hutcheson, and Hume, which argues that obligation is the practical force that empirical discoveries acquire in the process of deliber…Read more
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52How Should Ethics Relate to (the Rest of) Philosophy?: Moore's LegacySouthern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 1-20. 2003.
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74Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam SmithPhilosophy and Public Affairs 28 (2): 139-164. 1999.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http: //www.jstor.org/about/terms. html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use
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97Sidgwick, Concern, and the GoodUtilitas 12 (3): 291. 2000.Sidgwick maintains, plausibly, that the concept of a person's good is a normative one and takes for granted that it is normative for the agent's own choice and action. I argue that the normativity of a person's good must be understood in relation to concern for someone for that person's own sake. A person's good, I suggest, is what one should want for that person in so far as one cares about him, or what one should want for him for his sake. I examine Sidgwick's defence of the axioms of rational…Read more
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4Ethical Intuitionism and the Motivation Problem,”In Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations, Oxford University Press Uk. 2002.
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