-
136Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam SmithPhilosophy and Public Affairs 28 (2): 139-164. 1999.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http: //www.jstor.org/about/terms. html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use
-
4Ethical Intuitionism and the Motivation Problem,”In Phillip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations, Oxford University Press. 1972.
-
15William Klaas Frankena 1908-1994Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (5). 1995.
-
206Moore, normativity, and intrinsic valueEthics 113 (3): 468-489. 2003.Principia Ethica set the agenda for analytical metaethics. Moore’s unrelenting focus on fundamentals both brought metaethics into view as a potentially separate area of philosophical inquiry and provided a model of the analytical techniques necessary to pursue it.1 Moore acknowledged that he wasn’t the first to insist on a basic irreducible core of all ethical concepts. Although he seems not to have appreciated the roots of this thought in eighteenth-century intuitionists like Clarke, Balguy, and…Read more
-
148The Second-Person Standpoint An Interview with Stephen DarwallThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1): 118-138. 2009.
-
Morality and its criticsIn John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics, Routledge. 2010.
-
229Because I Want ItSocial Philosophy and Policy 18 (2): 129-153. 2001.How can an agent's desire or will give him reasons for acting? Not long ago, this might have seemed a silly question, since it was widely believed that all reasons for acting are based in the agent's desires. The interesting question, it seemed, was not how what an agent wants could give him reasons, but how anything else could. In recent years, however, this earlier orthodoxy has increasingly appeared wrongheaded as a growing number of philosophers have come to stress the action-guiding role of…Read more
-
187“But it would be wrong”Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2): 135-157. 2010.Is the fact that an action would be wrong itself a reason not to perform it? Warranted attitude accounts of value suggest about value, that being valuable is not itself a reason but to the reasons for valuing something in which its value consists. Would a warranted attitude account of moral obligation and wrongness, not entail, therefore, that being morally obligatory or wrong gives no reason for action itself? I argue that this is not true. Although warranted attitude theories of normative conc…Read more
-
49The inventions of autonomyEuropean Journal of Philosophy 7 (3). 1999.Book reviewed in this article:J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy
-
60Pleasure as Ultimate Good in Sidgwick’s EthicsThe Monist 58 (3): 475-489. 1974.The notion of pleasure lies at the very heart of Sidgwick’s moral philosophy. For Sidgwick holds not merely that pleasure is a good, but that ultimately it is the only good. And hence it is the good of pleasure which grounds his utilitarianism.
-
25Human Morality’s AuthorityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4). 1995.A central theme of Samuel Scheffler’s impressive Human Morality is that “a considered view of the relation between morality and the individual” requires distinguishing frequently confused issues concerning morality’s content, scope, authority, and deliberative role, and appreciating interrelations among these. He suggests a nice example of the latter. Some are inclined to believe morality lacks the overriding authority others claim it to have because they assume that morality’s content is string…Read more
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
History of Western Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |
History of Western Philosophy |