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82The paradox of methodsPolitics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (2): 148-168. 2018.Many proposed moral principles are such that it would be difficult or impossible to always correctly identify which act is required by that principle in a given situation. To deal with this problem, theorists typically offer various methods of determining what to do in the face of epistemic limitations, and we are then told that the right thing to do – given these limitations – is to perform the act identified by the given method. But since the method and the underlying principle can diverge, it…Read more
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9Vorlesungen zur marxistisch-leninistischen AsthetikJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 35 (3): 366-367. 1977.
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461The Limits of Well-BeingSocial Philosophy and Policy 9 (2): 169-189. 1992.What are the limits of well-being? This question nicely captures one of the central debates concerning the nature of the individual human good. For rival theories differ as to what sort of facts directly constitute a person's being well-off. On some views, well-being is limited to the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. But other views push the boundaries of well-being beyond this, so that it encompasses a variety of mental states, not merely pleasure alone. Some theories then draw the…Read more
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394Thinking about CasesSocial Philosophy and Policy 18 (2): 44. 2001.Anyone who reflects on the way we go about arguing for or against moral claims is likely to be struck by the central importance we give to thinking about cases. Intuitive reactions to cases—real or imagined—are carefully noted, and then appealed to as providing reason to accept various claims. When trying on a general moral theory for size, for example, we typically get a feel for its overall plausibility by considering its implications in a range of cases. Similarly, when we try to refine the s…Read more
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411Me and My LifeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 309-324. 1994.In this paper I take some initial steps toward exploring and motivating the suggestion that quality of life and level of well-being do not come to the same thing.
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549Does Consequentialism Demand too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of ObligationPhilosophy and Public Affairs 13 (3): 239-254. 1984.
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3The grasshopper, aristotle, Bob Adams, and meIn Samuel Newlands & Larry M. Jorgensen (eds.), Metaphysics and the good: themes from the philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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69Rethinking intrinsic valueThe Journal of Ethics 2 (4): 97--114. 2005.According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsic value must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsic value may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object's intrinsic value may sometimes depend on its instrumental value. If this is right, of course, then the traditional contrast …Read more
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19Donagan On The Sins Of ConsequentialismCanadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3): 643-653. 1987.Most intuitively forceful criticisms of utilitarianism, I believe, reduce to two basic objections. Both arise from the relentlessness of the utilitarian injunction to promote the overall good. On the one hand, this means that agents are permitted to perform an act of any kind whatsoever–provided only that the consequences of that act are better than those of any alternative. In particular, this means that it is permissible to impose tremendous sacrifices or injuries upon someone, if this is the …Read more
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484Infinite value and finitely additive value theoryJournal of Philosophy 94 (1): 5-26. 1997.000000001. Introduction Call a theory of the good—be it moral or prudential—aggregative just in case (1) it recognizes local (or location-relative) goodness, and (2) the goodness of states of affairs is based on some aggregation of local goodness. The locations for local goodness might be points or regions in time, space, or space-time; or they might be people, or states of nature.1 Any method of aggregation is allowed: totaling, averaging, measuring the equality of the distribution, measuring t…Read more
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68Normative EthicsWestview Press. 1998.Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Preliminaries -- 1.1 What Normative Ethics Is -- 1.2 What Normative Ethics Is Not -- 1.3 Defending Normative Theories -- 1.4 Factors and Foundations -- PART I FACTORS -- 2 The Good -- 2.1 Promoting the Good -- 2.2 Well-Being -- 2.3 The Total View -- 2.4 Equality -- 2.5 Culpability, Fairness, and Desert -- 2.6 Consequentialism -- 3 Doing Harm -- 3.1 Deontology -- 3.2 Thresholds -- 3.3 The Scope of the Cons…Read more
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843What’s Wrong with SpeciesismJournal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1): 1-21. 2015.Peter Singer famously argued in Animal Liberation that almost all of us are speciesists, unjustifiably favoring the interests of humans over the similar interests of other animals. Although I long found that charge compelling, I now find myself having doubts. This article starts by trying to get clear about the nature of speciesism, and then argues that Singer's attempt to show that speciesism is a mere prejudice is unsuccessful. I also argue that most of us are not actually speciesists at all, …Read more
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109The Geometry of DesertOxford University Press. 2005.Moral desert -- Fault forfeits first -- Desert graphs -- Skylines -- Other shapes -- Placing peaks -- The ratio view -- Similar offense -- Graphing comparative desert -- Variation -- Groups -- Desert taken as a whole -- Reservations.
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1230. Equality and DesertIn Louis P. Pojman & Owen McLeod (eds.), What Do We Deserve?: A Reader on Justice and Desert, Oxford University Press. pp. 298. 1999.
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4The Argument from LibertyIn Joel Feinberg, Jules L. Coleman & Allen E. Buchanan (eds.), In Harm's Way: Essays in Honor of Joel Feinberg, Cambridge University Press. pp. 16--41. 1994.
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45XIV*—Me and My LifeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1): 309-324. 1994.Shelly Kagan; XIV*—Me and My Life, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 309–324, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian.
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