Hanne Andersen

(1) Rescher's processual account of science depicts scientific inquiry as an epitome of the processual nature of knowledge. On this view, science is not seen as a body of theories, but as a process, as an ongoing venture in inquiry whose products are ever changing. (2) Traditionally within philosophy of science, discussions of the development of science are closely connected to discussions of scientific realism. Realists assume that there exists some fixed realm of theory-independent entities, and argue that the aim of science is to improve the accordance between our concepts and these entities, to 'cut the world at its joints.' Anti-realists reject the assumption that some fixed realm of theory-independent entities exist. I shall argue that recent attempts at developing positions between realism and anti-realism that 'carve joints in the world' only in a historical process lead to conclusions about the development of science that are very similar to the view described by Rescher. (3) Further, I shall show that some anti-realist scholars focus on actions rather than on entities. (4) Finally, I shall argue that on this basis a developmental view can be developed that seems compatible with both process and substance ontologies.