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15Science: Process and historyIn Michel Weber (ed.), After Whitehead: Rescher on process metaphysics, Ontos Verlag. pp. 1--197. 2004.(1) Rescher's processual account of science depicts scientific inquiry as an epitome of the processual nature of knowledge. On this view, science is not seen as a body of theories, but as a process, as an ongoing venture in inquiry whose products are ever changing. (2) Traditionally within philosophy of science, discussions of the development of science are closely connected to discussions of scientific realism. Realists assume that there exists some fixed realm of theory-independent entities, a…Read more
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64New Challenges to Philosophy of Science (edited book)Springer Verlag. 2013.This fourth volume of the Programme “The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective” deals with new challenges in this field. In this regard, it seeks to broaden the scope of the philosophy of science in two directions. On the one hand, ...
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80Incommensurability and Dynamic Conceptual StructuresPhilosophia Scientiae 8 (1): 153-168. 2004.Un problème important à propos de l’incommensurabilité est d’expliquer comment des théories qui sont incommensurables peuvent néanmoins entrer en compétition. Dans cet article, on examine brièvement le compte rendu kuhnien de la différence entre transitions conceptuelles révolutionnaires et non révolutionnaires. On argue que l’approche taxonomique kuhnienne et le principe de non-recouvrement qui le sous-tend ne suffisent pas à distinguer entre ces deux types de transition. On montre que cette ap…Read more
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136Stabilizing and changing phenomenal worlds: Ludwik Fleck and Thomas Kuhn on scientific literatureJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 32 (1): 109-129. 2001.In the work of both Ludwik Fleck and Thomas Kuhn the scientific literature plays important roles for stability and change of scientific phenomenal worlds. In this article we shall introduce the analyses of scientific literature provided by Fleck and Kuhn, respectively. From this background we shall discuss the problem of how divergent thinking can emerge in a dogmatic atmosphere. We shall argue that in their accounts of the factors inducing changes of scientific phenomenal worlds Fleck and Kuhn …Read more
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789 Scientific Concepts and Conceptual ChangeIn Vasō Kintē & Theodore Arabatzis (eds.), Kuhn's The structure of scientific revolutions revisited, Routledge. pp. 179. 2012.
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272Kuhn's mature philosophy of science and cognitive psychologyPhilosophical Psychology 9 (3). 1996.Drawing on the results of modem psychology and cognitive science we suggest that the traditional theory of concepts is no longer tenable, and that the alternative account proposed by Kuhn may now be seen to have independent empirical support quite apart from its success as part of an account of scientific change. We suggest that these mechanisms can also be understood as special cases of general cognitive structures revealed by cognitive science. Against this background, incommensurability is no…Read more
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151Epistemic dependence in interdisciplinary groupsSynthese 190 (11): 1881-1898. 2013.In interdisciplinary research scientists have to share and integrate knowledge between people and across disciplinary boundaries. An important issue for philosophy of science is to understand how scientists who work in these kinds of environments exchange knowledge and develop new concepts and theories across diverging fields. There is a substantial literature within social epistemology that discusses the social aspects of scientific knowledge, but so far few attempts have been made to apply the…Read more
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105EDWIN H.-C. HUNG Beyond Kuhn. Scientific Explanation, Theory Structure, Incommensurability and Physical Necessity (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1): 237-239. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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25Book reviews (review)International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (3). 2007.This Article does not have an abstract
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21On KuhnWadsworth. 2001.This brief text assists students in understanding Kuhn's philosophy and thinking so they can more fully engage in useful, intelligent class dialogue and improve their understanding of course content. Part of the Wadsworth Notes Series, (which will eventually consist of approximately 100 titles, each focusing on a single "thinker" from ancient times to the present), ON KUHN is written by a philosopher deeply versed in the philosophy of this key thinker. Like other books in the series, this concis…Read more
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8Incommensurability and Dynamic Conceptual StructuresPhilosophia Scientiae 8 153-168. 2004.Un problème important à propos de l’incommensurabilité est d’expliquer comment des théories qui sont incommensurables peuvent néanmoins entrer en compétition. Dans cet article, on examine brièvement le compte rendu kuhnien de la différence entre transitions conceptuelles révolutionnaires et non révolutionnaires. On argue que l’approche taxonomique kuhnienne et le principe de non-recouvrement qui le sous-tend ne suffisent pas à distinguer entre ces deux types de transition. On montre que cette ap…Read more
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765Collaboration, interdisciplinarity, and the epistemology of contemporary scienceStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56 1-10. 2016.Over the last decades, science has grown increasingly collaborative and interdisciplinary and has come to depart in important ways from the classical analyses of the development of science that were developed by historically inclined philosophers of science half a century ago. In this paper, I shall provide a new account of the structure and development of contemporary science based on analyses of, first, cognitive resources and their relations to domains, and second of the distribution of cogni…Read more
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304Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions and cognitive psychologyPhilosophical Psychology 11 (1). 1998.In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re-reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, accordi…Read more
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134The Cognitive Structure of Scientific RevolutionsCambridge University Press. 2006.Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions became the most widely read book about science in the twentieth century. His terms 'paradigm' and 'scientific revolution' entered everyday speech, but they remain controversial. In the second half of the twentieth century, the new field of cognitive science combined empirical psychology, computer science, and neuroscience. In this book, the theories of concepts developed by cognitive scientists are used to evaluate and extend Kuhn's most influent…Read more
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36Learning by ostension: Thomas Kuhn on science educationScience & Education 9 (1-2): 91-106. 2000.Significant claims about science education form an integral part of Thomas Kuhn's philosophy. Since the late 1950s, when Kuhn started wrestling with the ideas of ‘normal research’ and ‘convergent thought’, the nature of science education has played an important role in his argument. Hence, the nature of science education is an essential aspect of the phase-model of scientific development developed in his famous The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, just as his later work on categories and con…Read more
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44Empirical Philosophy of Science: Introducing Qualitative Methods into Philosophy of Science (edited book)Springer International Publishing. 2015.The book examines the emerging approach of using qualitative methods, such as interviews and field observations, in the philosophy of science. Qualitative methods are gaining popularity among philosophers of science as more and more scholars are resorting to empirical work in their study of scientific practices. At the same time, the results produced through empirical work are quite different from those gained through the kind of introspective conceptual analysis more typical of philosophy. This…Read more
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44Conceptual Development and Dynamic RealismStudia Philosophica Estonica 5 (2): 133-151. 2012.This paper focuses on Thomas S. Kuhn's work on taxonomic concepts and how it relates to empirical work from the cognitive sciences on categorization and conceptual development. I shall first review the basic features of Kuhn's family resemblance account and compare to work from the cognitive sciences. I shall then show how Kuhn's account can be extended to cover the development of new taxonomies in science, and I shall illustrate by a detailed case study that Kuhn himself mentioned only briefly …Read more
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65Conceptual change and incommensurability: A cognitive-historical viewDanish Yearbook of Philosophy 32 (1): 111-152. 1997.
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29Women in the History of Philosophy of Science: What We Do and Do Not KnowHopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 3 (1): 136-139. 2013.
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84Reference and resemblanceProceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3). 2001.Many discussions between realists and non-realists have centered on the issue of reference, especially whether there is referential stability during theory change. In this paper, I shall summarize the debate, sketching the problems that remain within the two opposing positions, and show that both have ended on their own slippery slope, sliding away from their original position toward that of their opponents. In the search for a viable intermediate position, I shall then suggest an account of ref…Read more
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110Joint Acceptance and Scientific Change: A Case StudyEpisteme 7 (3): 248-265. 2010.Recently, several scholars have argued that scientists can accept scientific claims in a collective process, and that the capacity of scientific groups to form joint acceptances is linked to a functional division of labor between the group members. However, these accounts reveal little about how the cognitive content of the jointly accepted claim is formed, and how group members depend on each other in this process. In this paper, I shall therefore argue that we need to link analyses of joint ac…Read more
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222Critical Notice: Kuhn, Conant and Everything—A Full or Fuller AccountPhilosophy of Science 68 (2): 258-262. 2001.
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41Scientific ChangeInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2013.Scientific Change How do scientific theories, concepts and methods change over time? Answers to this question have historical parts and philosophical parts. There can be descriptive accounts of the recorded differences over time of particular theories, concepts, and methods—what might be called the shape of scientific change. Many stories of scientific change attempt to give […]
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1202The Second Essential Tension: on Tradition and Innovation in Interdisciplinary ResearchTopoi 32 (1): 3-8. 2013.In his analysis of “the essential tension between tradition and innovation” Thomas S. Kuhn focused on the apparent paradox that, on the one hand, normal research is a highly convergent activity based upon a settled consensus, but, on the other hand, the ultimate effect of this tradition-bound work has invariably been to change the tradition. Kuhn argued that, on the one hand, without the possibility of divergent thought, fundamental innovation would be precluded. On the other hand, without a str…Read more
Copenhagen, Denmark
Areas of Specialization
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |