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2Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in SpinozaRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 189 (4): 555-557. 1996.
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427Two spheres, twenty spheres, and the identity of indiscerniblesPacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4). 2005.I argue that the standard counterexamples to the identity of indiscernibles fail because they involve a commitment to a certain kind of primitive or brute identity that has certain very unpalatable consequences involving the possibility of objects of the same kind completely overlapping and sharing all the same proper parts. The only way to avoid these consequences is to reject brute identity and thus to accept the identity of indiscernibles. I also show how the rejection of the identity of indi…Read more
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28Review: Descartes-Inseparability-Almog (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3). 2005.Joseph Almog’s elegant and concise monograph, What am I?, simultaneously advances a new interpretation of Descartes’ dualism and offers a powerful articulation of the bearing of essentialist metaphysics on the mind-body problem. Some may object to Almog’s endeavor to see Descartes so much in light of recent, Kripkean developments in metaphysics. Some may object to this, but not me. The study of the history of philosophy is tough, and we cannot afford to neglect any potential source of insight. S…Read more
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156Interpreting Spinoza: The Real is the RationalJournal of the History of Philosophy 53 (3): 523-535. 2015.in his characteristically generous and searching discussion of my book, Spinoza, Daniel Garber rightly points out that I structure my interpretation of Spinoza’s system around the principle of sufficient reason. This is the principle that, as I and others sometimes put it, each fact has an explanation and is thus not brute, or the principle that each thing has an explanation. The ‘or’ will soon be important. Indeed, it might seem that I am too focused on the PSR—certainly I seem that way to Garb…Read more
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57Part of Nature (review)Philosophical Review 105 (1): 116-118. 1996.Writing to Henry Oldenburg in 1665, Spinoza says that he regards the human body as a part of nature. “But,” he adds significantly, “as far as the human mind is concerned, I think it is a part of nature too.” Genevieve Lloyd’s elegantly written book aims to investigate the meaning, implications and attractions of these characteristic Spinozistic claims.
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70Review of John Carriero, Between Two Worlds: A Reading of Descartes's Meditations (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7). 2009.
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101Die erklärbarkeit Von erfahrung. Realismus und subjektivität in spinozas theorie Des menschlichen geistes (review)Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (3): 377-378. 2011.Can one have one's rationalism and subjectivity too? That is, can one endorse a full-blooded Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)—the claim that everything is intelligible—and yet regard experience of the world from a finite, subjective perspective as a genuine feature of that world? Many have thought not. Viewing the world sub specie aeternitatis—as rationalism seems to require—leaves no room for the arbitrary privileging of a particular spatio-temporal location that is often the hallmark of su…Read more
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |