•  14
    Decision Theory, Political Theory and the Hats Hypothesis
    In Fred D'Agostino & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Freedom and Rationality, Reidel. pp. 23--34. 1989.
  •  17
    Rights, constraints and trumps
    Analysis 46 (4): 8-14. 1986.
  •  183
    Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 1997.
    This authoritative collection of the seminal texts in post-war political philosophy has now been updated and expanded. Reprints key articles, mainly unabridged, touching upon the nature of the state, democracy, justice, rights, liberty, equality and oppression. Includes work from politics, law and economics, as well as from continental and analytic philosophy. Now includes thirteen additional texts, taking account of recent developments in the field and reflecting the most pressing concerns in i…Read more
  •  132
    An esteemed philosopher discusses his theory of universal freedom, describing how even those who are members of free societies may find their liberties curtailed and includes tests of freedom including the eyeball test and the tough-luck test.
  •  2
    On Phenomenology as a Methodology of Philosophy
    In Wolfe Mays & Stuart C. Brown (eds.), Linguistic analysis and phenomenology, Bucknell University Press. pp. 241--255. 1972.
  •  51
    Two Sources of Morality
    Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2): 102. 2001.
    This essay emerges from consideration of a question in the epistemology of ethics or morality. This is not the common claim-centered question as to how moral claims are confirmed and whether their mode of confirmation gives us grounds to be confident about the prospects for ethical discourse. Instead, I am concerned with the less frequently posed concept-centered question of where in human experience moral terms or concepts are grounded — that is, where in experience the moral becomes salient to…Read more
  •  224
    Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma
    Noûs 35 (s1): 268-299. 2001.
    Taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions, the ideal of deliberative democracy is inherently ambiguous. Consider the idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion should be endorsed if and only if certain premises are admitted. Does deliberative democracy recommend that members of the group debate the premises and then individually vote, in the light of that debate, on whether or not to support the conclusion? Or does it recommend t…Read more
  •  2
    Review (review)
    Theory and Decision 12 (2): 207-214. 1980.
  •  156
    The hidden economy of esteem
    with Geoffrey Brennan
    Economics and Philosophy 16 (1): 77-98. 2000.
    A generation of social theorists have argued that if free-rider considerations show that certain collective action predicaments are unresolvable under individual, rational choice – unresolvable under an arrangement where each is free to pursue their own relative advantage – then those considerations will equally show that the predicaments cannot be resolved by recourse to norms (Buchanan, 1975, p. 132; Heath, 1976, p. 30; Sober and Wilson, 1998, 156ff; Taylor, 1987, p. 144). If free-rider consid…Read more
  •  6
    Index
    In Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics, Princeton University Press. pp. 177-183. 2009.
  •  15
  •  75
    He has an astonishing range, and in this book he expands it still further. More than a mere introduction, Made with Words offers a coherent and well-argued picture of most of the main components of Hobbes's wide-ranging philosophy.
  • The power of a democratic public
    In Reiko Gotoh & Paul Dumouchel (eds.), Against Injustice: The New Economics of Amartya Sen, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
  • Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice
    with John Braithwaite
    Mind 100 (3): 379-381. 1991.
  •  783
    Group agency and supervenience
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1): 85-105. 2006.
    Can groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must 'supervene' on the group members' contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members' individual judgments on th…Read more
  •  141
    Substantive moral theory
    Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1): 1-27. 2008.
    Philosophy can serve two roles in relation to moral thinking: first, to provide a meta-ethical commentary on the nature of moral thought, as the methodology or the philosophy of science provides a commentary on the nature of scientific thought; and second, to build on the common presumptions deployed in people's moral thinking about moral issues, looking for a substantive moral theory that they might support. The present essay addresses the nature of this second role; illustrates it with substan…Read more
  •  235
    A Republican Law of Peoples
    European Journal of Political Theory 9 (1): 70-94. 2010.
    Assuming that states will remain a permanent feature of our world, what is the ideal that we should hold out for the international order? An attractive proposal is that those peoples that are already organized under non-dominating, representative states should pursue a twin goal: first, arrange things so that they each enjoy the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination in relation to one another and to other multi-national and international agencies; and second, do everything possible and p…Read more
  •  182
    In Hobbes, freedom of choice requires nonfrustration: the option you prefer must be accessible. In Berlin, it requires noninterference: every option, preferred or unpreferred, must be accessible—every door must be open. But Berlin’s argument against Hobbes suggests a parallel argument that freedom requires something stronger still: that each option be accessible and that no one have the power to block access; the doors should be open, and there should be no powerful doorkeepers. This is freedom …Read more
  •  251
    Freedom in the market
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (2): 131-149. 2006.
    The market is traditionally hailed as the very exemplar of a system under which people enjoy freedom, in particular the negative sort of freedom associated with liberal and libertarian thought: freedom as noninterference. But how does the market appear from the perspective of a rival conception of freedom (freedom as non-domination) that is linked with the Roman and neo-Roman tradition of republicanism? The republican conception of freedom argues for important normative constraints on property, …Read more
  •  6
    Review: Slote on Consequentialism (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 36 (144). 1986.
  •  63
    Akrasia, collective and individual
    In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality, Oxford University Press. pp. 68--97. 2003.
    Examines what is necessary for a group to constitute an agent that can display akrasia, and what steps such a group might take to establish self‐control. The topic has some interest in itself, and the discussion suggests some lessons about how we should think of akrasia in the individual as well as in the collective case. Under the image that the lessons support, akrasia is a sort of constitutional disorder: a failure to achieve a unity projected in the avowal of agency. This image fits well wit…Read more
  •  55
    The Determinacy of Republican Policy: A Reply to McMahon
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (3): 275-283. 2006.
  •  62
    Preference, Deliberation and Satisfaction
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59 131-154. 2006.
    In his famous lecture on ‘The Concept of Preference’ Amartya Sen (1982) opened up the topic of preference and preference-satisfaction to critical, philosophical debate. He pointed out that preference in the sense in which choice reveals one’s preference need not be preference in the sense in which people are personally better off for having their preferences satisfied. And on the basis of that observation he built a powerful critique of some common assumptions in welfare economics.
  •  13
    Conclusion
    Mind 100 (400): 622-626. 1991.
  •  7
    Frontmatter
    In Philip Pettit & Christopher Hookway (eds.), Handlung Und Interpretation: Studien Zur Philosophie der Sozialwissenschaften, De Gruyter. 1982.