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Philip Pettit

Australian National UniversityPrinceton University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    463
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  •  News and Updates
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 More details
  • Australian National University
    School of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty (Part-time)
  • Princeton University
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty (Part-time)
Queen's University, Belfast
School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics
PhD, 1970
Homepage
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind
Normative Ethics
Social and Political Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Social and Political Philosophy
Philosophy of Law
Normative Ethics
Meta-Ethics
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Action
Metaphysics
17th/18th Century Philosophy
5 more
  • All publications (463)
  •  48
    Theory and Understanding: A Critique of Interpretive Social Science
    with Finn Collin
    Philosophical Review 98 (2): 266. 1989.
    Social and Political Philosophy
  • Liberty and Liberties
    In Matthew H. Kramer (ed.), The legacy of H.L.A. Hart: legal, political, and moral philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    John RawlsEconomics and EthicsRawls on Distributive Justice
  •  173
    Contractualism and Consequentialism
    Theoria 66 (3): 228-236. 2000.
    Topics in ConsequentialismMoral Contractualism
  •  140
    Universalizability without utilitarianism
    Mind 96 (381): 74-82. 1987.
    Utilitarianism
  • PRATT, V. "The Philosophy of the Social Sciences" (review)
    Mind 90 (n/a): 149. 1981.
    Philosophy of Social Science, General Works
  •  133
    Freedom and probability: A comment on Goodin and Jackson
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (2): 206-220. 2008.
    No Abstract
    Freedom and Liberty
  •  156
    The feasibility issue
    with Geoffrey Brennan
    In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 258--279. 2007.
    Political FeasibilityPolitical Theory
  •  93
    Social Holism and Moral Theory: A Defence of Bradley's Thesis
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86 (1). 1986.
    Philip Pettit; X*—Social Holism and Moral Theory: A Defence of Bradley's Thesis, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages.
    Meaning Holism
  •  86
    J. J. C. Smart AC
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4): 825-826. 2012.
    Mind-Brain Identity Theory
  •  22
    Backmatter
    with Christopher Hookway
    In Philip Pettit & Christopher Hookway (eds.), Handlung Und Interpretation: Studien Zur Philosophie der Sozialwissenschaften, De Gruyter. pp. 225-226. 1982.
  •  136
    The Robust Demands of the Good: Ethics with Attachment, Virtue, and Respect
    Oxford University Press. 2015.
    Philip Pettit offers a new insight into moral psychology. He shows that attachments such as love, and certain virtues such as honesty, require their characteristic behaviours not only as things actually are, but also in cases where things are different from how they actually are. He explores the implications of this idea for key moral issues.
    Ethics
  •  166
    Practical belief and philosophical theory
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1). 1998.
    Philosophy invariably starts with the attempt to spell out ideas and beliefs that we already hold, whether on topics like time or causality, colour or value, consciousness or free will, democracy or justice or freedom. It may go well beyond such pre-philosophical assumptions in its further developments, regimenting them in unexpected ways, revising them on novel lines, even discarding them entirely in favour of other views. But philosophy always begins with the articulation of ordinary ideas and…Read more
    Philosophy invariably starts with the attempt to spell out ideas and beliefs that we already hold, whether on topics like time or causality, colour or value, consciousness or free will, democracy or justice or freedom. It may go well beyond such pre-philosophical assumptions in its further developments, regimenting them in unexpected ways, revising them on novel lines, even discarding them entirely in favour of other views. But philosophy always begins with the articulation of ordinary ideas and beliefs. This is where its ladder starts. As the name suggests, articulation requires that the ideas and beliefs articulated were already there waiting to be spelled out, and that identifying them is a matter of analysing..
    MetaepistemologyPhilosophical Methods
  •  1721
    Decision theory and folk psychology
    In Michael Bacharach & Susan Hurley (eds.), Essays in the Foundations of Decision Theory, Blackwell. pp. 147-175. 1991.
    The Nature of Folk Psychology
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