Philip Pettit

Philip Pettit has drawn together here a series of interconnected essays on three subjects to which he has made notable contributions. The first part of the book discusses the rule-following character of thought. The second considers how choice can be responsive to different sorts of factors, while still being under the control of thought and the reasons that thought marshals. The third examines the implications of this view of choice and rationality for the normative regulation of social behaviour. Rules, Reasons, and Norms makes original and illuminating connections across a large swathe of territory, from metaphysics to philosophical psychology to the theory of rational regulation.

This book is in three sections, with two chapters in each. It begins with questions of psychology: questions to do with what it means to be an intentional agent and, in particular, what it means to be an agent with the capacity for thought. Having sketched an overall view of the intentional, thinking agent, it then goes on to explore the difference that social life makes to the mentality of such agents; in effect, it outlines a social ontology. And, having developed a picture of the mind in society – of the common or social mind – it turns, finally, to the lessons of this picture for the pursuit of social and political theory: for the explanation of what happens on the social scene and for the evaluation of the different ways in which that scene may be structured.

Whether the interpretations made by social scientists of the thoughts, utterances and actions of other people, including those from an alien culture or a different period in history, are objectively correct, whether the forms of explanation they employ conform to those of the natural sciences, and whether values have a role in arriving at the theory that delivers the interpretations, are the main questions addressed by the contributors to this volume. Of particular importance in the discussion of the issues are developments in the philosophy of language and mind. The eight essays converge on the themes of intentionality, realism and theory choice, reflecting the amount of attention being given to these matters when this book was first published in 1980. Together they make a distinguished contribution to discussion in the area and serve to underline the importance of intellectual collaboration on such discussion between philosophy and the social sciences.

One of the hallmark themes of Karl Popper’s approach to the social sciences was the insistence that when social scientists are members of the society they study, then they are liable to affect that society. In particular, they are liable to affect it in such a way that the claims they make lose their validity. “The interaction between the scientist’s pronouncements and social life almost invariably creates situations in which we have not only to consider the truth of such pronouncements, but also their actual influence on future developments. The social scientist may be striving to find the truth; but, at the same time, he must always be exerting a definite influence upon society. The very fact that his pronouncements do exert an influence destroys their objectivity.” (Popper 1963.

HLA Hart tells us about how law would have emerged in a world of primary rules—informal, beneficial norms—by adjustments that the primary rules would naturally require; these adjustments would have introduced secondary rules for regulating the primary. But he does little to explain how the primary rules would themselves have emerged and, by most accounts, does not expand appropriately on the idea that the relevant players in his story would have taken an internal point of view, as he calls it, on the rules involved. This article, presented as the Hart Memorial Lecture on 14 June 2018, argues that both problems can be resolved at once. Elaborating on Hart’s story with an account of how primary rules might have emerged, it also explains why those regularities would have attracted such a point of view. It argues that the emerging primary rules would have come to be perceived, internalised and ratified by all, and would even have been seen as rules to which each was personally committed.

In recent times, the idea of popular sovereignty has figured prominently in the rhetoric of neo-populist thinkers and activists who argue that legal and political authority must be concentrated in one single body or individual elected by the people to act in its name. The thesis of this article is that, while the notion of popular sovereignty may seem to offer some support to the neo-populist image of democracy, it serves more persuasively to support the idea of a polycentric, constitutional democracy. The constitutional state can be polycentric and yet feature a sovereign. And if this constitutional state is democratic in the sense of distributing power relatively equally amongst individual citizens, thus empowering the people-several, then it will establish the people-corporate in the role of sovereign..

It is great honor to be even a virtual part of an event to celebrate the work of Leslie Zines, and especially to celebrate it in such august company. Leslie was a colleague that I greatly admired and liked. The disciplinary divide between us was not any bar to affection, though Leslie never let me forget that the constitutional-law terrain was sacred ground on which outsiders ventured at their peril. I particularly enjoyed the way that he, like our mutual, recently departed friend, Paul Finn, gently mocked the pretensions of a philosopher to declaim on topics jurisprudential. I fear I’m going to tread on his ground again in this little paper and I can only beg his, and Paul’s, posthumous indulgence. My topic is the dispersion of power within the state. This ideal has a long history but has ceased to be much celebrated by those who endorse it and has come in for fierce attack among populist opponents. It’s not an exaggeration to say, in Yeats’s words, that on this subject ‘The best lack all conviction, while the worst Are full of passionate intensity’. In this short paper I would like to rehearse reasons why we should warmly endorse the dispersive ideal. And endorse it, regardless of how we dub it: whether, for example, we describe it in a mainly twentieth-century formula, as the separation of powers; in an eighteenth-century antecedent as a regime of checks and balances; in an earlier name that goes back to the Roman Republic as a mixed constitution; or in a term I myself favor as a polycentric arrangement or system.

Free speech is sometimes conceptualized as unhindered speech, sometimes as protected speech. On the first view, the protection of the law is just one of many possible means for removing hindrances to speech; on the second it is essential. Free speech is better conceptualized in the second way, albeit the first has become more popular in jurisprudence and politics. In that second conception, you cannot enjoy free speech by the gift or tolerance or indifference of others: to enjoy it is to have the robustly entrenched rights of a free speaker. That ideal fits better with traditional assumptions and has more compelling credentials. Let the right to speak be legally protected and speakers gain a publicly marked status as persons with opinions of their own; silence becomes enfranchised, so that someone’s saying nothing can say a lot; and people cannot easily duck responsibility for what they choose to say or not to say. To illustrate them with a case study, these are benefits that argue, in the context of a suitable culture, for the importance of academic freedom.

Philip Pettit develops an account of the fundamental nature and basis of respect. Pettit’s “conversive” theory of respect draws on the fact that our unique command of language provides us with a “special means of mutual influence,” making us accessible to each other’s understanding. Cooperative, conversive practice inevitably generates some shared expectations and standards for what you ought to believe and even, allowing for individual variation, for what you ought to desire or intend. We will respect you in the conversive sense when we are robustly guided and constrained by your responsiveness to such standards. We will be guided to the extent that, in conversive exchange, we seek to shape your attitudes of belief and desire only in accordance with those standards. We will be constrained to the extent that in relating to you in other ways, we robustly avoid any behavior that is precluded or prohibited by the standards.

Even in a regulated and competitive market economy the behavior of firms leaves much to be desired. Looking beyond the invisible hand of the market and the iron hand of the law, this chapter outlines and assesses arguments for the intangible hand of civil society. The central mechanisms in our model depend on the importance of social esteem and self-esteem. Such esteem depends on assessments of true intentions and dispositions for costly pro-social actions. Instrumental or reputation-shaping pro-social actions matter little in the economy of esteem. What is required is a common belief that conformity to certain costly standards benefits all; and that conformity is observable and elicits social approval (and vice versa). We acknowledge and review why in the realm of competitive commercial organizations, the challenges may be considerable for the intangible hand model to take hold. Moralizing (or professionalizing) the firm’s agents, inducting the voice of affected parties in the deliberation of firms, public (if strategically delayed) disclosure of internal deliberations, and public commitments by senior leaders all offer promise in enacting an economy of esteem in the world of competitive commercial firms.