-
159Causation and the philosophy of mindPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (n/a): 195-214. 1990.
-
51Locke, expressivism, conditionalsAnalysis 63 (1): 86-92. 2003.The sentence ‘x is square’ might have had different truth conditions from those it in fact has. It might have had no truth conditions at all. Its having truth conditions and its having the ones it has rest on empirical facts about our use of ‘x is square’. What empirical facts? Any answer that goes into detail is inevitably highly controversial, but we think that there is a rough answer that is, by philosophers’ standards, relatively uncontroversial. It goes back to Locke 1689 and beyond, and is…Read more
-
356In defense of folk psychologyPhilosophical Studies 59 (1): 31-54. 1990.It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes} We say no. In part one we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires.
-
63Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and GovernmentPhilosophical Review 108 (1): 90. 1999.In his most recent book, Philip Pettit presents and defends a “republican” political philosophy that stems from a tradition that includes Cicero, Machiavelli, James Harrington, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Madison. The book provides an interpretation of what is distinctive about republicanism—namely, Pettit claims, its notion of freedom as nondomination. He sketches the history of this notion, and he argues that it entails a unique justification of certain political arrangements and the vir…Read more
-
21Causation in the Philosophy of MindIn Andy Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology: The Legacy of Alan Turing, Oxford University Press. pp. 195-214. 1996.
-
230A problem for expressivismAnalysis 58 (4). 1998.Expressivists hold that ethical sentences express attitudes. We argue that it is very hard for expressivists to give an account of the relevant sense of 'express' which has some plausibility and also delivers the kind of noncognitivist account of ethical sentences they affirm. Our argument draws on Locke's point that words are voluntary signs
-
8Critical noticesInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (2). 1994.Rationality, Symbolism and EvolutionThe Nature of Rationality By Robert Nozick Princeton University Press, 1993. Pp. xvi + 226. ISBN 0–691–07424–0. £19.95No Nonsense RightsThe Realm of Rights By Judith Jarvis Thomson Harvard University Press, 1990. Pp. viii + 383. ISBN 0–674–74948–0. £27.95.In Search of the Common MindThe Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics By Philip Pettit Oxford University Press, 1993. Pp. xvi + 365. ISBN 0–19–507818–7. £30.In elucidation of the common mi…Read more
-
53Five elements of group agencyInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.Group agency requires a number of people to combine in pursuit of shared goals across varied scenarios. Thus, a group or corporate agent must be organized (1) to act flexibly as its goals require, (2) with the intentional, if not always voluntary, acquiescence of members in the guidance of (3) an authorized spokesperson or (4) a constructed voice, thereby (5) becoming capable of making and honoring commitments.
-
48Three Methods of Ethics: A DebatePhilosophical Review 109 (1): 125. 2000.In The Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick took seriously egoism, utilitarianism, and commonsense morality. Virtue ethics was treated as part of commonsense morality. Three Methods, reflecting recent tastes, considers Kant, consequentialism, and virtue ethics. Oddly, it does not reflect the major development since Sidgwick—the revival of contractualism.
-
8Trzy błędy dotyczące demokracjiRoczniki Filozoficzne 71 (1): 111-124. 2023.Artykuł jest poświęcony trzem poglądom na temat demokracji, często przyjmowanym przez współczesnych decydentów, politologów i teoretyków polityki. Poglądy te, w mojej opinii, są błędne, ale błędne w sposób pouczający. Ukazują one bowiem poważne niezrozumienie natury i walorów demokracji. Jeśli uświadomimy sobie, dlaczego są one błędne, dostrzeżemy istnienie tych wymiarów demokracji, które zwykle łatwo umykają naszej uwadze. Do nazwania tych błędów używam nazwisk wybitnych myślicieli, którzy je p…Read more
-
Substantive moral theoryIn Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Objectivism, subjectivism, and relativism in ethics, Cambridge University Press. 2008.
-
The inescapability of consequentialismIn Ulrike Heuer & Gerald R. Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Oxford University Press Usa. 2012.
-
Ethics without transcendenceIn Fran O'Rourke & Patrick Masterson (eds.), Ciphers of transcendence: essays in philosophy of religion in honour of Patrick Masterson, Irish Academic Press. 2019.
-
The general will, the common good, and a democracy of standardsIn Yiftah Elazar & Geneviève Rousselière (eds.), Republicanism and the Future of Democracy, Cambridge University Press. 2019.
-
23My Three SelvesPhilosophy 95 (3): 363-389. 2020.Having a self means being able think of myself under a certain profile that that is me: that is who I am, that is how I am. But if I raise the question as to who or how I am, there are three salient profiles in which I can cast myself, three selves with which we can identify. I can see myself just as an agent identified over time by the linkages between my experiences, my attitudes and my actions. I can see myself as the persona that I invite others to rely on and that, if sincere, I internalize…Read more
-
36The statePrinceton University Press. 2023.In this work, the prominent political philosopher Philip Pettit embarks on a massive undertaking to offers major new accounts of the foundations of the state and the nature of justice. In doing so Pettit builds a new theory of what the state is and what it ought to be, addresses the normative question of how justice serves as a measure of the success of a state, and the way it should operate in relation to its citizens and other people.
-
36On Three Dogmas of NormativityJournal of Applied Philosophy 40 (2): 205-210. 2023.Ruth Chang argues against three dogmas of normativity. Her argument, as least about the first two, is defensible, but defensible on a naturalistic account of normativity that she may not find congenial.
-
Consciousness and the frustrations of physicalismIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
-
Causation in the Philosophy of MindIn Andy Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology: The Legacy of Alan Turing, Volume 2, Clarendon Press. 1996.
-
5Causation in the Philosophy of MindIn Andy Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology: The Legacy of Alan Turing, Volume Ii, Clarendon Press. 1999.
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |