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2The Reality of Rule-FollowingIn Alexander Miller & Crispin Wright (eds.), Rule-Following and Meaning, Mcgill-queen's University Press. pp. 188-208. 2002.
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5Participation, Deliberation, and We-thinkingIn Daniel I. O'Neill, Mary Lyndon Shanley & Iris Marion Young (eds.), Illusion of Consent: Engaging with Carole Pateman, Pennsylvania State University Press. pp. 185-204. 2008.
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55Review Essays: The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and PoliticsThe Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3): 689. 1995.The dustjacket of The Common Mind bears a photograph of the traffic at a Sydney intersection on a wet winter’s evening in 1938. It is rush hour, and the homeward traffic conveys a fine sense of common purpose. The scene has a special resonance for me, for I stood at that very spot with my parents and brothers one similar evening in 1966, on the day we first arrived in Australia. There was a marked pedestrian crossing there then, which we set out to negotiate, taking it for granted that the relev…Read more
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25Precis of the Argument of On the people’s termsCritical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18 (6): 642-643. 2015.
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38On the People’s Terms: A reply to five critiquesCritical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18 (6): 687-696. 2015.
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303Joint actions and group agentsPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1): 18-39. 2006.University of Cologne, Germany Joint action and group agency have emerged as focuses of attention in recent social theory and philosophy but they have rarely been connected with one another. The argument of this article is that whereas joint action involves people acting together to achieve any sort of result, group agency requires them to act together for the achievement of one result in particular: the construction of a centre of attitude and agency that satisfies the usual constraints of cons…Read more
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7Is the Reduction Necessary for Phenomenology: Husserl's and Pfänder's Replies: A Reply to Herbert SpiegelbergJournal of the British Society for Phenomenology 4 (1): 16-19. 1973.
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83Bare functional desireAnalysis 49 (4): 162-69. 1989.The purpose of this paper is to sound two notes of caution about a beguiling argument for the negative answer: for the Humean view that desires cannot be beliefs, or cognitive states more generally.
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243Moral functionalism, supervenience and reductionismPhilosophical Quarterly 46 (182): 82-86. 1996.We respond to Mark van Roojen's discussion of our 'Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation', "Philosophical Quarterly", 45 (January, 1995): 20-40. There we assumed that ethical language makes claims about how things are and sought to make plausible under this assumption a view of moral language modelled on David Lewis's treatment of theoretical terms. Van Roojen finds the idea of treating ethical terms as theoretical terms attractive but doubts that we 'have succeeded in offering a reduction of…Read more
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158Causation and the philosophy of mindPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (n/a): 195-214. 1990.
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155Locke, expressivism, conditionalsAnalysis 63 (1): 86-92. 2003.The sentence ‘x is square’ might have had different truth conditions from those it in fact has. It might have had no truth conditions at all. Its having truth conditions and its having the ones it has rest on empirical facts about our use of ‘x is square’. What empirical facts? Any answer that goes into detail is inevitably highly controversial, but we think that there is a rough answer that is, by philosophers’ standards, relatively uncontroversial. It goes back to Locke 1689 and beyond, and is…Read more
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356In defense of folk psychologyPhilosophical Studies 59 (1): 31-54. 1990.It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes} We say no. In part one we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires.
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62Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and GovernmentPhilosophical Review 108 (1): 90. 1999.In his most recent book, Philip Pettit presents and defends a “republican” political philosophy that stems from a tradition that includes Cicero, Machiavelli, James Harrington, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Madison. The book provides an interpretation of what is distinctive about republicanism—namely, Pettit claims, its notion of freedom as nondomination. He sketches the history of this notion, and he argues that it entails a unique justification of certain political arrangements and the vir…Read more
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21Causation in the Philosophy of MindIn Andy Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Clarendon Press. pp. 195-214. 1996.
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230A problem for expressivismAnalysis 58 (4). 1998.Expressivists hold that ethical sentences express attitudes. We argue that it is very hard for expressivists to give an account of the relevant sense of 'express' which has some plausibility and also delivers the kind of noncognitivist account of ethical sentences they affirm. Our argument draws on Locke's point that words are voluntary signs
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8Critical noticesInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (2). 1994.Rationality, Symbolism and EvolutionThe Nature of Rationality By Robert Nozick Princeton University Press, 1993. Pp. xvi + 226. ISBN 0–691–07424–0. £19.95No Nonsense RightsThe Realm of Rights By Judith Jarvis Thomson Harvard University Press, 1990. Pp. viii + 383. ISBN 0–674–74948–0. £27.95.In Search of the Common MindThe Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics By Philip Pettit Oxford University Press, 1993. Pp. xvi + 365. ISBN 0–19–507818–7. £30.In elucidation of the common mi…Read more
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53Five elements of group agencyInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.Group agency requires a number of people to combine in pursuit of shared goals across varied scenarios. Thus, a group or corporate agent must be organized (1) to act flexibly as its goals require, (2) with the intentional, if not always voluntary, acquiescence of members in the guidance of (3) an authorized spokesperson or (4) a constructed voice, thereby (5) becoming capable of making and honoring commitments.
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47Three Methods of Ethics: A DebatePhilosophical Review 109 (1): 125. 2000.In The Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick took seriously egoism, utilitarianism, and commonsense morality. Virtue ethics was treated as part of commonsense morality. Three Methods, reflecting recent tastes, considers Kant, consequentialism, and virtue ethics. Oddly, it does not reflect the major development since Sidgwick—the revival of contractualism.
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |