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2Causation in the Philosophy of MindIn Andy Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology: The Legacy of Alan Turing, Oxford University Press. pp. 195-214. 1996.
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9A problem for expressivismAnalysis 58 (4). 1998.Expressivists hold that ethical sentences express attitudes. We argue that it is very hard for expressivists to give an account of the relevant sense of 'express' which has some plausibility and also delivers the kind of noncognitivist account of ethical sentences they affirm. Our argument draws on Locke's point that words are voluntary signs
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2Critical noticesInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (2). 1994.Rationality, Symbolism and EvolutionThe Nature of Rationality By Robert Nozick Princeton University Press, 1993. Pp. xvi + 226. ISBN 0–691–07424–0. £19.95No Nonsense RightsThe Realm of Rights By Judith Jarvis Thomson Harvard University Press, 1990. Pp. viii + 383. ISBN 0–674–74948–0. £27.95.In Search of the Common MindThe Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics By Philip Pettit Oxford University Press, 1993. Pp. xvi + 365. ISBN 0–19–507818–7. £30.In elucidation of the common mi…Read more
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53Five elements of group agencyInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.Group agency requires a number of people to combine in pursuit of shared goals across varied scenarios. Thus, a group or corporate agent must be organized (1) to act flexibly as its goals require, (2) with the intentional, if not always voluntary, acquiescence of members in the guidance of (3) an authorized spokesperson or (4) a constructed voice, thereby (5) becoming capable of making and honoring commitments.
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47Three Methods of Ethics: A DebatePhilosophical Review 109 (1): 125. 2000.In The Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick took seriously egoism, utilitarianism, and commonsense morality. Virtue ethics was treated as part of commonsense morality. Three Methods, reflecting recent tastes, considers Kant, consequentialism, and virtue ethics. Oddly, it does not reflect the major development since Sidgwick—the revival of contractualism.
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8Trzy błędy dotyczące demokracjiRoczniki Filozoficzne 71 (1): 111-124. 2023.Artykuł jest poświęcony trzem poglądom na temat demokracji, często przyjmowanym przez współczesnych decydentów, politologów i teoretyków polityki. Poglądy te, w mojej opinii, są błędne, ale błędne w sposób pouczający. Ukazują one bowiem poważne niezrozumienie natury i walorów demokracji. Jeśli uświadomimy sobie, dlaczego są one błędne, dostrzeżemy istnienie tych wymiarów demokracji, które zwykle łatwo umykają naszej uwadze. Do nazwania tych błędów używam nazwisk wybitnych myślicieli, którzy je p…Read more
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Substantive moral theoryIn Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Objectivism, subjectivism, and relativism in ethics, Cambridge University Press. 2008.
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The inescapability of consequentialismIn Ulrike Heuer & Gerald R. Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Oxford University Press Usa. 2012.
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Ethics without transcendenceIn Fran O'Rourke & Patrick Masterson (eds.), Ciphers of transcendence: essays in philosophy of religion in honour of Patrick Masterson, Irish Academic Press. 2019.
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The general will, the common good, and a democracy of standardsIn Yiftah Elazar & Geneviève Rousselière (eds.), Republicanism and the Future of Democracy, Cambridge University Press. 2019.
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23My Three SelvesPhilosophy 95 (3): 363-389. 2020.Having a self means being able think of myself under a certain profile that that is me: that is who I am, that is how I am. But if I raise the question as to who or how I am, there are three salient profiles in which I can cast myself, three selves with which we can identify. I can see myself just as an agent identified over time by the linkages between my experiences, my attitudes and my actions. I can see myself as the persona that I invite others to rely on and that, if sincere, I internalize…Read more
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35The statePrinceton University Press. 2023.In this work, the prominent political philosopher Philip Pettit embarks on a massive undertaking to offers major new accounts of the foundations of the state and the nature of justice. In doing so Pettit builds a new theory of what the state is and what it ought to be, addresses the normative question of how justice serves as a measure of the success of a state, and the way it should operate in relation to its citizens and other people.
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59On Three Dogmas of NormativityJournal of Applied Philosophy 40 (2): 205-210. 2023.Ruth Chang argues against three dogmas of normativity. Her argument, as least about the first two, is defensible, but defensible on a naturalistic account of normativity that she may not find congenial.
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Consciousness and the frustrations of physicalismIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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Causation in the Philosophy of MindIn Andy Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology: The Legacy of Alan Turing, Volume 2, Clarendon Press. 1996.
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5Causation in the Philosophy of MindIn Andy Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology: The Legacy of Alan Turing, Volume Ii, Clarendon Press. 1999.
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456The Prisoner's Dilemma and Social Theory: An Overview of Some IssuesPolitics (Currently Australian Journal of Political Science) 20 1-11. 1985.
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180Program explanation: A general perspectiveAnalysis 50 (2): 107-17. 1990.Some properties are causally relevant for a certain effect, others are not. In this paper we describe a problem for our understanding of this notion and then offer a solution in terms of the notion of a program explanation
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42A hard choice for TomaselloBehavioral and Brain Sciences 43. 2020.Michael Tomasello explains the human sense of obligation by the role it plays in negotiating practices of acting jointly and the commitments they underwrite. He draws in his work on two models of joint action, one from Michael Bratman, the other from Margaret Gilbert. But Bratman's makes the explanation too difficult to succeed, and Gilbert's makes it too easy.
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387Desire Beyond BeliefAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1): 77-92. 2004.David Lewis [1988; 1996] canvases an anti-Humean thesis about mental states: that the rational agent desires something to the extent that he or she believes it to be good. Lewis offers and refutes a decision-theoretic formulation of it, the 'Desire-as-Belief Thesis'. Other authors have since added further negative results in the spirit of Lewis's. We explore ways of being anti-Humean that evade all these negative results. We begin by providing background on evidential decision theory and on Lewi…Read more
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25Habermas on Truth and JusticeRoyal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 14 207-228. 1982.The problem which motivates this paper bears on the relationship between Marxism and morality. It is not the well-established question of whether the Marxist's commitments undermine an attachment to ethical standards, but the more neglected query as to whether they allow the espousal of political ideals. The study and assessment of political ideals is pursued nowadays under the title of theory of justice, the aim of such theory being to provide a criterion for distinguishing just patterns of soc…Read more
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |