•  52
  •  494
    Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 1997.
    This is the first full-length presentation of a republican alternative to the liberal and communitarian theories that have dominated political philosophy in recent years. The latest addition to the acclaimed Oxford Political Theory series, Pettit's eloquent and compelling account opens with an examination of the traditional republican conception of freedom as non-domination, contrasting this with established negative and positive views of liberty. The first part of the book traces the rise and d…Read more
  •  211
    Freedom in the market
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (2): 131-149. 2006.
    The market is traditionally hailed as the very exemplar of a system under which people enjoy freedom, in particular the negative sort of freedom associated with liberal and libertarian thought: freedom as noninterference. But how does the market appear from the perspective of a rival conception of freedom (freedom as non-domination) that is linked with the Roman and neo-Roman tradition of republicanism? The republican conception of freedom argues for important normative constraints on property, …Read more
  •  14
    'A Definition of Physicalism ', Analysis, Vol. 53, 1993, pp. 213-23. 'A Problem for Expressivists ' (with Frank Jackson), Analysis, Vol. 58, 1998, pp. 239-51. 'A Sensible Perspectivism ' in Maria Baghramian and Attracta Ingram, eds., Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity , New York, Routledge, 2000, pp. 60-82.
  • Kelsen on Justice. A Charitable Reading
    In Richard Tur & William L. Twining (eds.), Essays on Kelsen, Clarendon Press. 1986.
  •  3
    Philip Pettit offers a new insight into moral psychology. He shows that attachments such as love, and certain virtues such as honesty, require their characteristic behaviours not only as things actually are, but also in cases where things are different from how they actually are. He explores the implications of this idea for key moral issues.
  •  3
    Frontmatter
    In Philip Pettit & Christopher Hookway (eds.), Handlung Und Interpretation: Studien Zur Philosophie der Sozialwissenschaften, De Gruyter. 1982.
  •  68
    Bare functional desire
    with Huw Price
    Analysis 49 (4): 162-69. 1989.
    The purpose of this paper is to sound two notes of caution about a beguiling argument for the negative answer: for the Humean view that desires cannot be beliefs, or cognitive states more generally.
  •  28
    The Paradox of Loyalty
    American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (2). 1988.
  •  55
    On Thinking How to Live: A Cognitivist View (review)
    Mind 115 (460). 2006.
    Allan Gibbard’s strategy in his new book is to begin by describing a psychology of thinking and planning that certain agents might instantiate, then to argue that this psychology involves an ‘expressivism’ about thought that bears on what to do, and, finally, to try to show that ascribing that same psychology to human beings would explain the way we deploy various concepts in practical and normative deliberation. The idea is to construct an imaginary normative psychology, purportedly conforming …Read more
  •  2
    This new edition of _A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy_ has been extended significantly to include 55 chapters across two volumes written by some of today's most distinguished scholars. New contributors include some of today’s most distinguished scholars, among them Thomas Pogge, Charles Beitz, and Michael Doyle Provides in-depth coverage of contemporary philosophical debate in all major related disciplines, such as economics, history, law, political science, international relatio…Read more
  •  3
    Reply to Christman
    Philosophical Books 37 (2): 98-101. 1996.
  •  22
    Habermas on Truth and Justice: Philip Pettit
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 14 207-228. 1982.
    The problem which motivates this paper bears on the relationship between Marxism and morality. It is not the well-established question of whether the Marxist's commitments undermine an attachment to ethical standards, but the more neglected query as to whether they allow the espousal of political ideals. The study and assessment of political ideals is pursued nowadays under the title of theory of justice, the aim of such theory being to provide a criterion for distinguishing just patterns of soc…Read more
  •  71
    A theory of normal and ideal conditions
    Philosophical Studies 96 (1): 21-44. 1999.
    It is a priori on many accounts of colour concepts that something is red if and only if it is such that it would look red to normal observers in normal circumstances: it is such that it would look red, as we can say, under normal conditions of observation. And as this sort of formula is widely applied to colour concepts, so similar schemas are commonly defended in relation to a variety of other concepts too. Not only are colour concepts connected in such a fashion with human responses, so by man…Read more
  • The doctrinal paradox
    Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. forthcoming.
  •  107
    Noumenalism and Response-Dependence
    The Monist 81 (1): 112-132. 1998.
    The question with which I shall be concerned in this paper is whether global response-dependence entails the truth of a certain noumenal form of realism: for short, a certain noumenalism. I accept that it does, at least under a plausible assumption, endorsing an argument presented by Michael Smith and Daniel Stoljar. But I try to show that, while the connection with noumenalism is undeniable, it is neither distinctive of a belief in global response-dependence nor particularly disturbing for thos…Read more
  •  55
    Desire
    Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1998.
    If an agent is to be moved to action, then two requirements have to be fulfilled: first, the agent must possess beliefs about the way things actually are, about the actions possible given the way things are, and about the likely effects of those actions on how things are; and, second, the agent must have or form desires to change the way things are by resorting to this or that course of action. The beliefs tell the agent about how things are and about how they can be altered; the desires attract…Read more
  •  108
    The hidden economy of esteem
    Economics and Philosophy 16 (1): 77-98. 2000.
    A generation of social theorists have argued that if free-rider considerations show that certain collective action predicaments are unresolvable under individual, rational choice – unresolvable under an arrangement where each is free to pursue their own relative advantage – then those considerations will equally show that the predicaments cannot be resolved by recourse to norms (Buchanan, 1975, p. 132; Heath, 1976, p. 30; Sober and Wilson, 1998, 156ff; Taylor, 1987, p. 144). If free-rider consid…Read more
  •  184
    Rationality, Reasoning and Group Agency
    Dialectica 61 (4): 495-519. 2007.
    The rationality of individual agents is secured for the most part by their make-up or design. Some agents, however – in particular, human beings – rely on the intentional exercise of thinking or reasoning in order to promote their rationality further; this is the activity that is classically exemplified in Rodin’s sculpture of Le Penseur. Do group agents have to rely on reasoning in order to maintain a rational profile? Recent results in the theory of judgment aggregation show that under a range o…Read more
  •  75
    This paper is a defence of the view that action explanation deploys (relatively) a priori principles. The argument is that this is so because action explanation succeeds, Not just through revealing regularity, But through exhibiting the presence of an expected and privileged pattern. Its job is to 'normalise' action, Not just 'regularise' it
  •  137
    The Cunning of Trust
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (3): 202-225. 1995.
  •  81
    In a now famous thought experiment, Frank jackson asked us t0 imagine an omniscient scientist, Mary, who is coniincd in a black-and-white room and then released into the world 0f color . Assuming that she is omniscicnt in respect of all physical facts—roughiy, all the facts available to physics and all the facts that they in turn Hx or determine-physicalism would suggest that there is no new fact Mary can discover after emancipation; physicalism holds that all facts are physical in the relevant …Read more
  •  24
    Causal Relevance and Event Identity
    Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 33 131-141. 1991.
  •  125
    Winch’s double-edged idea of a social science
    History of the Human Sciences 13 (1): 63-77. 2000.
    Peter Winch’s 1958 book The Idea of a Social Science contains two distinguishable sets of theses, one set bearing on the individual-level understanding of human beings, the other on the society-level understanding of the regularities and institutions to which human beings give rise. The first set of claims is persuasive and significant but the second is a mixed bunch: none is well established and only some are sound