•  43
    Terms, things and response-dependence
    European Review of Philosophy 3 55-66. 1998.
  •  306
    Group agents have been represented as expressive fictions by those who treat ascriptions of agency to groups as metaphorical; as pragmatic fictions by those who think that the agency ascribed to groups belongs in the first place to a distinct individual or set of individuals; and as theoretical fictions by those who think that postulating group agents serves no indispensable role in our theory of the social world. This paper identifies, criticizes and rejects each of these views, defending a str…Read more
  •  29
    Mind 109 (435): 640-644. 2000.
    The long republican tradition is characterized by a conception of freedom as non‐domination, which offers an alternative, both to the negative view of freedom as non‐interference and to the positive view of freedom as self‐mastery. The first part of the book traces the rise and decline of the conception, displays its many attractions and makes a case for why it should still be regarded as a central political ideal. The second part of the book looks at the sorts of political and civil institution…Read more
  •  140
    In a recent discussion of Amartya Sen's concept of the capabilities of people for functioning in their society – and the idea of targeting people's functioning capabilities in evaluating the society – G. A. Cohen accuses Sen of espousing an inappropriate, ‘athletic’ image of the person (Cohen, 1993, pp. 24–5). The idea is that if Sen's formulations are to be taken at face value, then life is valuable only so far as people actively choose most facets of their existence: if they fare well in the m…Read more
  •  25
    Collective persons and powers
    Legal Theory 8 (4): 443-470. 2002.
  •  8
    A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy
    Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178): 111. 1995.
  •  31
    Trust, Reliance, and the Internet1
    In M. J. van den Joven & J. Weckert (eds.), Analyse & Kritik, Cambridge University Press. pp. 161. 2004.
    Trusting someone in an intuitive, rich sense of the term involves not just relying on that person, but manifesting reliance on them in the expectation that this manifestation of reliance will increase their reason and motive to prove reliable. Can trust between people be formed on the basis of Internet contact alone? Forming the required expectation in regard to another person, and so trusting them on some matter, may be due to believing that they are trustworthy; to believing that they seek est…Read more
  •  2
    Freedom in the spirit of sen
    In Christopher W. Morris (ed.), Amartya Sen, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
  •  3
    Prisons, Politicians and Democracy
    In Joseph Dunne, Attracta Ingram, Frank Litton & Fergal O'Connor (eds.), Questioning Ireland: Debates in Political Philosophy and Public Policy, Institute of Public Administration. pp. 155. 2000.
  •  210
    This chapter sketches what is considered the best interpretation of physicalism, rehearses the best way of defending it, and shows that the physicalism forthcoming is still going to be less than fully satisfying; it is going to leave us short of the satisfaction that might be expected from a philosophical theory. The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section gives an interpretation of physicalism in the spirit of Frank Jackson's; this involves a rich version under which the way…Read more
  •  38
    The Inescapability of Consequentialism
    In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 41. 2012.
  •  652
    Freedom as antipower
    Ethics 106 (3): 576-604. 1996.
  •  145
    Keeping Republican Freedom Simple
    Political Theory 30 (3): 339-356. 2002.
    There has recently been a good deal of interest in the republican tradition, particularly in the political conception of freedom maintained within that tradition. I look here at the characterisation of republican liberty in a recent work of Quentin Skinner1and argue on historical and conceptual grounds for a small amendment—a simplification—that would make it equivalent to the view that freedom in political contexts should be identified with nondomination.
  •  182
    Reworking Sandel's republicanism
    Journal of Philosophy 95 (2): 73-96. 1998.
  •  29
    My thanks to the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. I also had the benefit of an exchange with Christopher McMahon. 1. Christopher McMahon, “The Indeterminacy of Republican Policy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33 (2005): 67–93, at p. 89. All parenthetical references in the text are to this article.
  •  161
    Descriptivism, rigidified and anchored
    Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2): 323-338. 2004.
    Stalnaker argues that, while the two-dimensional framework can be used to give expression to the claims associated with rigidified descriptivism, it cannot be used to support that position. He also puts forward some objections to rigidified descriptivism. I agree that rigidified descriptivism cannot be supported by appeal to the two-dimensional framework. But I think that Stalnaker’s objections can be avoided under a descriptivism that introduces a causal as well as a descriptive element – a descri…Read more
  •  51
    This new edition of A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy has been extended significantly to include 55 chapters across two volumes written by some of today's most distinguished scholars. New contributors include some of today’s most distinguished scholars, among them Thomas Pogge, Charles Beitz, and Michael Doyle Provides in-depth coverage of contemporary philosophical debate in all major related disciplines, such as economics, history, law, political science, international relations…Read more
  •  38
    Discourse theory and republican freedom
    Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 6 (1): 72-95. 2003.
    This essay outlines some of the main issues that arise in the theory of freedom and, in particular, those that divide the liberal conception of freedom as non-interference from the republican conception of freedom as non-domination. It goes on to explore the idea that discourse theory provides reasons for favouring the republican conception. Discourse theory is taken for these purposes to be a theory that subsumes, but goes beyond decision theory. It accepts the decision-theoretic view that huma…Read more
  •  1
    ŤIntroductionŤ, u: Philip Pettit & John McDowell (ur.)
    In John McDowell & Philip Pettit (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context, Clarendon Press. 1986.
  •  100
    Review: On thinking how to live: A cognitivist view (review)
    Mind 115 (460): 1083-1106. 2006.
    Allan Gibbard’s strategy in his new book is to begin by describing a psychology of thinking and planning that certain agents might instantiate, then to argue that this psychology involves an ‘expressivism’ about thought that bears on what to do, and, finally, to try to show that ascribing that same psychology to human beings would explain the way we deploy various concepts in practical and normative deliberation. The idea is to construct an imaginary normative psychology, purportedly conforming t…Read more
  •  98
    Broome on reasoning and rule-following
    Philosophical Studies 173 (12): 3373-3384. 2016.
    John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning is a trail-blazing study of the nature of rationality, the nature of reasoning and the connection between the two. But it may be somewhat misleading in two respects. First, his theory of reasoning is consistent with the meta-propositional view that he rejects; it develops a broadly similar theory but in much greater detail. And while his discussion of rule-following helps to explain the role of rules in reasoning, it does not constitute a response to t…Read more
  • Pettit argues for an original way of marking off thinking subjects, in particular human beings, from other intentional systems, natural and artificial.
  •  51
    Defining and defending social holism
    Philosophical Explorations 1 (3). 1998.
    This paper offers a definition of social holism that makes the doctrine non-trivial but possibly true. According to that definition, the social holist maintains that people depend non-causally on interaction with one another for possession of the capacity to think; the thesis is meant to be a contingent truth but one, like physicalism, that is plausible in the light of some a priori argument and some plausible empirical assumptions. The paper also sketches an argument in support of social holism…Read more