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Philip Pettit

Australian National UniversityPrinceton University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
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 More details
  • Australian National University
    School of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty (Part-time)
  • Princeton University
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty (Part-time)
Queen's University, Belfast
School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics
PhD, 1970
Homepage
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind
Normative Ethics
Social and Political Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Social and Political Philosophy
Philosophy of Law
Normative Ethics
Meta-Ethics
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Action
Metaphysics
17th/18th Century Philosophy
5 more
  • All publications (467)
  •  18
    Inhaltsverzeichnis
    with Christopher Hookway
    In Philip Pettit & Christopher Hookway (eds.), Handlung Und Interpretation: Studien Zur Philosophie der Sozialwissenschaften, De Gruyter. 1982.
  •  273
    A republican right to basic income?
    Basic Income Studies 2 (2). 2007.
    The basic income proposal provides everyone in a society, as an unconditional right, with access to a certain level of income. Introducing such a right is bound to raise questions of institutional feasibility. Would it lead too many people to opt out of the workforce, for example? And even if it did not, could a constitution that allowed some members of the society to do this – at whatever relative cost – prove acceptable in a society of mutually reciprocal, equally positioned members? I assume …Read more
    The basic income proposal provides everyone in a society, as an unconditional right, with access to a certain level of income. Introducing such a right is bound to raise questions of institutional feasibility. Would it lead too many people to opt out of the workforce, for example? And even if it did not, could a constitution that allowed some members of the society to do this – at whatever relative cost – prove acceptable in a society of mutually reciprocal, equally positioned members? I assume in this short essay, however, that none of these problems is insurmountable. I concentrate on the question of how far republicanism makes room for justifying something like a right to basic income, assuming that there are no problems of this kind with introducing and establishing such a right. Any satisfactory argument for a basic income should satisfy two desiderata. First is that of adequacy: the argument should establish a right to an intuitively..
    Social and Political PhilosophyEconomics and Ethics
  •  130
    The prisoner's dilemma is an unexploitable newcomb problem
    Synthese 76 (1). 1988.
    Prisoner's DilemmaNewcomb's Problem
  •  76
    5 Neuroscience and Agent-Control
    In David Spurrett, Don Ross, Harold Kincaid & Lynn Stephens (eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context, Mit Press. pp. 77. 2007.
    Motivation and WillThe Nature of Action
  • Contemporary Political Philosophy (edited book)
    Wiley. 1990.
    Political TheoryBasic Equality
  •  98
    The elements of responsibility
    Philosophical Books 46 (3): 210-219. 2005.
    Social and Political PhilosophyEthicsMotivation and WillMoral ResponsibilityFree Will and Responsibi…Read more
    Social and Political PhilosophyEthicsMotivation and WillMoral ResponsibilityFree Will and Responsibility
  •  53
    Rights, constraints and trumps
    Analysis 46 (4): 8-14. 1986.
  •  1545
    Group Agents are Not Expressive, Pragmatic or Theoretical Fictions
    Erkenntnis 79 (9): 1641-1662. 2014.
    Group agents have been represented as expressive fictions by those who treat ascriptions of agency to groups as metaphorical; as pragmatic fictions by those who think that the agency ascribed to groups belongs in the first place to a distinct individual or set of individuals; and as theoretical fictions by those who think that postulating group agents serves no indispensable role in our theory of the social world. This paper identifies, criticizes and rejects each of these views, defending a str…Read more
    Group agents have been represented as expressive fictions by those who treat ascriptions of agency to groups as metaphorical; as pragmatic fictions by those who think that the agency ascribed to groups belongs in the first place to a distinct individual or set of individuals; and as theoretical fictions by those who think that postulating group agents serves no indispensable role in our theory of the social world. This paper identifies, criticizes and rejects each of these views, defending a strong realist position
    Collective Intentionality
  •  217
    Akrasia, Collective and Individual
    In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, Oxford University Press. pp. 68--97. 2007.
    Examines what is necessary for a group to constitute an agent that can display akrasia, and what steps such a group might take to establish self‐control. The topic has some interest in itself, and the discussion suggests some lessons about how we should think of akrasia in the individual as well as in the collective case. Under the image that the lessons support, akrasia is a sort of constitutional disorder: a failure to achieve a unity projected in the avowal of agency. This image fits well wit…Read more
    Examines what is necessary for a group to constitute an agent that can display akrasia, and what steps such a group might take to establish self‐control. The topic has some interest in itself, and the discussion suggests some lessons about how we should think of akrasia in the individual as well as in the collective case. Under the image that the lessons support, akrasia is a sort of constitutional disorder: a failure to achieve a unity projected in the avowal of agency. This image fits well with the constitutional model of the soul in Plato's Republic.
    Motivation and Will
  •  174
    The Determinacy of Republican Policy: A Reply to McMahon
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (3): 275-283. 2006.
    Republicanism
  •  59
    Can Contract Theory Ground Morality?
    In James Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 6--77. 2008.
    Contracts
  •  22
    Why and How Philosophy Matters
    In Robert E. Goodin & Charles Tilly (eds.), The Oxford handbook of contextual political analysis, Oxford University Press. pp. 35. 2006.
  •  18
    Review (review)
    Theory and Decision 12 (2): 207-214. 1980.
  •  1057
    Freedom in Hobbes's Ontology and Semantics: A Comment on Quentin Skinner
    Journal of the History of Ideas 73 (1): 111-126. 2012.
    Hobbes: Social and Political Philosophy
  • Action and Interpretation: Studies in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences
    with Christopher Hookway
    Philosophy and Rhetoric 13 (3): 219-221. 1980.
  •  343
    The consequentialist can recognise rights
    Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150): 42-55. 1988.
    consequentialist, even being a utilitarian, allows one still to recognise rights.' I believe that these efforts are well motivated, for I think that any moral doctrine is suspect if one of its effects is to make agents unable to take one another's rights seriously
    RightsEthicsRights and Values
  •  1
    Liberal/communitarianism : Macintyre's mesmeric dichotomy
    In John Horton & Susan Mendus (eds.), After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, University of Notre Dame Press. 1995.
    Communitarianism
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