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82The identity thesis: a reply to Prof. GarnettAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (n/a): 82. 1965.This Article does not have an abstract
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80ColoursPhilosophy 36 (April-July): 128-142. 1961.In this paper I wish first of all to argue against two possible views about colour qualities, which I shall label the Objectivist and Subjectivist views respectively. I find these views to be prevalent among philosophers of my acquaintance, though sometimes they are hidden by a veneer of post-Wittgensteinian sophistication. Part of my argument will depend on modern scientific theories of colour vision. In the second part of the paper I shall argue for a different view of my own
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80Realism v. IdealismPhilosophy 61 (237): 295-312. 1986.It is characteristic of realists to separate ontology from epistemology and of idealists to mix the two things up. By ‘idealists’ here I am mainly referring to the British neo-Hegelians but the charge of mixing up ontology and epistemology can be made against at least one ‘subjective idealist’, namely Bishop Berkeley, as his wellknown dictum ‘esse ispercipi’ testifies. The objective idealists rejected the correspondence theory of truth and on the whole accepted a coherence theory. The qualificat…Read more
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80The unity of space-time: Mathematics versus myth makingAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2). 1967.This Article does not have an abstract
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79Explanation—Opening AddressRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27 1-19. 1990.It is a pleasure for me to give this opening address to the Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference on ‘Explanation’ for two reasons. The first is that it is succeeded by exciting symposia and other papers concerned with various special aspects of the topic of explanation. The second is that the conference is being held in my old alma mater, the University of Glasgow, where I did my first degree. Especially due to C. A. Campbell and George Brown there was in the Logic Department a big emphasis …Read more
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75Science, history and methodology (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (3): 266-274. 1972.
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72Why Philosophers DisagreeCanadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (sup1): 67-82. 1993.Why is it that philosophers find it so hard to come to agreement? Many disputes that have gone on for centuries or even millennia are still unresolved, even though there has been increased conceptual sophistication on the part of the contending parties. Consider, for example, the question of free will, where libertarians still contest the field with determinists and compatibilists.
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70Is Occam's Razor a Physical Thing?Philosophy 53 (205). 1978.In his discussion note ‘J. J. C. Smart, Materialism and Occam's Razor’ Peter Glassen argues that it was inconsistent of me both to assert that realism is true and that Occam's razor is a reason for the materialist thesis. Glassen says that Occam's razor ‘ is not a physical thing, state or process at all ’. A little further down on the same page he uses the phrase ‘material or physical thing, state, or process’. It is possible, therefore, that Glassen regards the distinction between ‘material’ an…Read more
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66Atheism and TheismPhilosophical Review 107 (3): 462. 1998.In this volume, the sixth in Blackwell's Great Debates in Philosophy series, Smart and Haldane discuss the case for and against religious belief. The debate is unusual in beginning with the negative side. After a short jointly authored introduction, there is a fairly extended presentation of the atheist position by Smart. Haldane then offers an equally extended defense of theism. The authors respond to one another in the same order, and the book concludes with a brief co-authored treatment of an…Read more
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65The brain in the vat and the question of metaphysical realismStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (2): 237-247. 2004.This article indicates some ways in which the fantasy of the brain in the vat has been used in thought experiments to discuss important philosophical problems. The first has to do with scepticism about the external world. The second has to do with Hilary Putnam’s arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and his rejection of metaphysical realism. The third issue to which the brain in the vat is relevant has to do with the difference between broad and narrow content of beliefs and Putnam’s cha…Read more
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63Utilitarianism: For and Against.Utilitarian EthicsPhilosophical Quarterly 24 (96): 279-281. 1974.
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60Man as Man, The Science and Art of Ethics. By the Rev. T. J. Higgins (The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee. 1949. Pp. 607 (review)Philosophy 25 (95): 368-. 1950.
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58Book Reviews : Critique of the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory. ERIC P. POLTEN. The Hague: Mouton, I973. Pp. xviii+290. 34 Guilders (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 5 (1): 83-86. 1975.
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56Quine's philosophy of scienceSynthese 19 (1-2). 1968.This article is mainly concerned to summarise a fairly well articulated position on the philosophy of science which may be extracted from scattered passages in quine's "word and object." (1) there is no sharp line between philosophy and science, Or between science and mathematics, Or between science and common sense. (2) abstract mathematical entities are theoretical posits just as electrons are. (3) epistemology is a branch of biology. (4) quine's earlier instrumentalism has given way to a scie…Read more
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51The reality of theoretical entitiesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1). 1956.This Article does not have an abstract
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50Foundations of the Unity of Science. Volume II, no. 7: Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science.International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, I and II (review)Philosophical Review 62 (3): 473. 1953.