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22The Philosophy of F. H. Bradley (review)Idealistic Studies 16 (3): 283-284. 1986.As the editors remark in their preface, the neglect of F. H. Bradley during the last forty years or so is partly due to the dearth of good secondary literature. This book amply rectifies this situation. Something like nineteenth-century idealism is once more in the air, as Dummett and his followers run together questions of truth with those of warranted assertability. H. H. Joachim talked horribly of something he called “truth-or-knowledge,” and in the end Bradley may not always have kept the tw…Read more
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22Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Natural Sciences By Rom Harré Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, viii+375 pp., £25.00 (review)Philosophy 62 (242): 541-. 1987.
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RepliesIn John Jamieson Carswell Smart, Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & Jean Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart, Blackwell. 1987.
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585Commentaries on David Hodgson's "a plain person's free will"Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1): 20-75. 2005.REMARKS ON EVOLUTION AND TIME-SCALES, Graham Cairns-Smith; HODGSON'S BLACK BOX, Thomas Clark; DO HODGSON'S PROPOSITIONS UNIQUELY CHARACTERIZE FREE WILL?, Ravi Gomatam; WHAT SHOULD WE RETAIN FROM A PLAIN PERSON'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL?, Gilberto Gomes; ISOLATING DISPARATE CHALLENGES TO HODGSON'S ACCOUNT OF FREE WILL, Liberty Jaswal; FREE AGENCY AND LAWS OF NATURE, Robert Kane; SCIENCE VERSUS REALIZATION OF VALUE, NOT DETERMINISM VERSUS CHOICE, Nicholas Maxwell; COMMENTS ON HODGSON, J.J.C. Smart; T…Read more
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23'Looks red' and dangerous talkPhilosophy 70 (274): 545-554. 1995.This paper is partly to get rid of some irritation which I have felt at the quite common tendency of philosophers to elucidate ‘is red’ in terms of ‘looks red’. For a relatively recent example see, for example, Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter, ‘An Objectivist′s Guide to Subjectivism about Colour’. However rather than try to make a long list of references, I would rather say ‘No names, no pack drill’. I have even been disturbed to find the use of the words ‘looks red’ that I am opposing ascrib…Read more
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3The compatibility of direct realism with the scientific account of perception; comment on mark CrooksJournal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3): 239-244. 2002.These comments are concerned to show that direct realism about perception is quite compatible with the physical and neuroscientific story. Use is made of D.M. Armstrong's account of perception as coming to believe by means of the senses. What we come to believe about is the bird on the gatepost, say. So the account is direct realist. But it is obviously compatible with the scientific story which explains how the coming to believe comes about. We can also identify beliefs with brain states
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14Wittgenstein, following a rule, and scientific psychologyIn Edna Ullmann-Margalit (ed.), The Scientific Enterprise, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 123--137. 1992.
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85Nicholas Maxwell, the comprehensibility of the universe: A new conception of scienceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4): 907-911. 2000.
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95A form of metaphysical realismPhilosophical Quarterly 45 (180): 301-315. 1995.This essay defends a view which is near enough to Putnam's characterization of metaphysical realism for it to be called by the same name. Indeterminacy of reference is conceded, in the sense that there may be multiple reference relations, but it is denied that this implied belief in unknowable noumena. It is enough for metaphysical realism as conceived here, that there be at least one reference relation. The essay also argues against defining truth epistemically. Even a Peircean ideal theory mig…Read more