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To resort to hypoxic air machines—would that be to cheat? This clearly depends on whether such machines are prohibited or not. So the important question is this: Should sport authorities prohibit them or not?One way of approaching this question may be to argue casuistically. Erythropoietin is prohibited. Blood doping is prohibited. Training at high altitude is allowed. Does the hypoxic air machine bear more resemblance to training at high altitude than to the use of EPO? If that is the case it should not be prohibited. If, on the other hand, it bears more resemblance to the use of EPO, then it should be prohibited.However, to argue casuistically is not entirely satisfactory. Even if, through such reasoning, we reach an answer, we do not obtain a principled explanation of the answer. We may get a hint at what to do , but not at why we should do so.1 So the question need to be posed at a more principled level: If rules against doping in sport are to be …

In principle, there seem to be three main ways in which society can react when people commit crimes under influence of mental illness. (1) The standard model. We excuse them. If they are dangerous they are detained in the interest of safety of the rest of the citizens. (2) The Swedish model. We hold them responsible for their criminal offence, we convict them, but we do not sentence them to jail. Instead, we sentence them to psychiatric treatment. (3) My model. We sentence them to jail, but offer them (voluntary) psychiatric treatment. The advantages of my model are obvious. We get a clear delineation of roles. We allow the psychiatrist to be just a doctor, not a warden. We liberate psychiatry of the objective of deciding whether people who were mentally ill when they committed criminal offences ‘could have acted otherwise’— a hopeless task. We allow that psychiatrists live up to their professional ethical code (the Hawaii Declaration). We treat psychically ill persons as ‘normal’, we allow them to repent their crimes, which renders easier their recovery. However, two objections to my model come to mind. First of all, is it not unfair to sentence people to jail who could not help doing what they did? And, secondly, the question of fairness set to one side, is it not inhumane to sentence mentally ill persons to jail? Is it not inhumane to the mentally ill persons themselves, and does it not mean that they will be a burden to other prisoners? In my paper I show that, if our system of criminal punishment takes a civilised form, neither of these objections carries any weight.

Particularism is in vogue in ethics today. Particularism is sometimes described as the idea that what is a sufficient moral reason in one situation need not be a sufficient moral reason in another situation. Indeed, it has been held, on particularism, what is a reason for an action in one situation might be a reason against the same type of action, or might not be a reason at all, in another situation. However, this description is insufficient. Even a generalist, such as a utilitarian, may admit that, what is in one situation a sufficient reason for the rightness of an action may, in another situation, be a sufficient reason for its wrongness. For example, the fact that if I shoot at a certain person, I kill him, may, in one situation, be a sufficient reason not to shoot at him. It is sufficient for the wrongness of shooting at him if, in the situation, shooting at him suffices to guarantee that welfare does not get maximized. He is killed, say, and deprived of future pleasure, with no positive ‘side-effects’ whatever.

Why should we respect the privacy of donors of biological material? The question is answered in the present article in general philosophical terms from the point of view of an ethics of honour, a libertarian theory of rights, a view of respect for privacy based on the idea that autonomy is of value in itself, and utilitarianism respectively. For different reasons the ethics of honour and the idea of the value of autonomy are set to one side. It surfaces that the moral rights theory and utilitarianism present conflicting answers to the question. The main thrust of the argument is that there is no way of finding an overlapping consensus, so politicians have to take decisions that are bound to be controversial in that they can be questioned on reasonable philosophical grounds

The paper is a record of a debate which took place between a group of clinicians and the author concerning a clinical trial of a drug supposed to postpone the time when HIV-patients develop AIDS. A problem with the trial was that on available (inconclusive) evidence it appeared that one patient out of 500 was killed by the drug. The question raised was whether, in view of this evidence, it was morally defensible to go on with the trial. The discussion came to involve general topics such as the appropriate role of the ideal of autonomy as well as more particular topics of quantitative and qualitative risk assessments. The main thrust of the argument is that different conceptions of rationality may provide rationales of conflicting clinical decisions. Philosophy matters to medicine. Keywords: autonomy, equipoise, hazards, the Helsinki Declaration, maximizing expected utility, potential benefits, rationality, risk assessment CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

It is argued that there are moral costs of our accepting ‘strict materialism’, the view that there is no such phenomenon as an irreducible first‐person point of view. If we accept strict materialism, then we have to give up some considered moral views, such as the principle of an agent‐relative morality and the hedonistic principle. The necessity involved is not logical, however, but pragmatic. Strict materialism does not imply that these moral views are false; it is our belief in them that is undermined by pur belief in strict materialism. If there is no irreducible first‐person point of view these moral views simply do not seem to make any moral sense. Since these moral views are prima facie very plausible, the moral costs of our accepting strict materialism are considerable.