Paul Schollmeier

Let us assume with the classical philosophers that we have a faculty of theoretical intuition, through which we intuit theoretical principles, and a faculty of practical intuition, through which we intuit practical principles. This modest assumption would allow us to distinguish conceptual intuitions from perceptual intuitions. l wish to ask how we could then know if our intuitions of practical principles are true or not. Could we justify or verify our theoretical and practical intuitions in the same way? One would think not, for we assume that we have two different faculties for grasping principles of different kinds. We would thus ask what method or technique we could use to justify or to verify our practical principles. The identification of a method for this purpose would appear to be desirable, for surely we ought to have some guide for developing principles for social and political policies. All too often we find that discourse about policy abandons rationality in favor of appeals to emotion or threats of coercion.

The ancient Greeks present a moral outlook which is not without considerable difficulty for contemporary philosophers. This difficulty has origins which may go back as far as the Renaissance, but we can surely trace its sources at least to Descartes. We tend to think that we had best use a moral theory to address problems of morality. What better way to determine how we ought to conduct ourselves than to define, once and for all, some basic principles of action! If only we could get our ethical concepts straight, we would then be able to act properly in almost any circumstances, whether we so act out of duty, for the sake of an overarching end, or in recognition of established norms and customs.